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INTRODUCTION 
As zealous supporters of First Amendment rights are all too 
well aware, William J. Brennan, Jr. retired as an Associate Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court in 1990, following 34 
years of memorable service. Few would disagree that Justice 
Brennan's tenure on the Court coincided with an unprecedented 
blossoming of judicial protection of freedom of speech in this 
country, and that he had as much to do with that evolution as 
any other Justice. His special and important contributions to the 
law of freedom of speech have been explored elsewhere, 1 and are 
undeniable. Justice Brennan's colleague, Thurgood Marshall, en-
ded 24 years of service as an Associate Justice in 1991. Together, 
Brennan and Marshall supported challenges to governmental 
authority under the First Amendment with a consistency and 
fervor matched only by their former brethren, Hugo Black and 
William O. Douglas. Now that Justices Brennan and Marshall 
are gone, and ~specially considering the fact that a majority of 
the present Justices - O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Thomas - were appointed by conservative presidents deter-
mined to select judges who are not "judicial activists," the time 
seems right to inquire: Whither freedom of speech? 
This article will explore the positions taken in a number of 
the most important areas of the law of freedom of speech by 
each of the Justices presently on the Court,2 and will attempt to 
suggest the extent to which protection of speech has been, or 
likely will be, diminished in the post-Brennan era. Obviously, 
not every aspect of the law of freedom of speech could be, or is, 
covered in this article. To that extent, any picture that emerges 
from the ensuing discussion may not be fully representative; the 
selected topics are, however, by their nature, highly indicative of 
the depth of a Justice's commitment to the protection of speech. 
The law of freedom of speech - unlike some other promi-
nent aspects of constitutional laws - is not an arena of ideologi-
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and The Freedom of Speech: A 
First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1991). 
2. Thus, references to Justices no longer on the Court are frequently omitted in the 
discussion of a given case. 
3. Compare the topics of affirmative action based upon race, City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and the right to an abortion, Planned Parenthood 
2
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cal warfare among the Justices. With few exceptions, the Jus-
tices do not bring an "agenda" to their evaluation of arguments 
in the realm of freedom of expression. No sitting Justice is hos-
tile to core values of freedom of expression, nor is any of them 
grossly insensitive to such values. The inquiry at hand, however, 
is a comparative one: To what extent, if any, are the present 
Justices (or some of them) less committed to the protection of 
speech than were Brennan and Marshall? The standard of mea-
surement is, admittedly, a high one. 
Because the assessment herein of the Justices is essentially 
comparative in nature, this article does not evaluate each of 
their rulings and doctrinal positions in terms of their ultimate 
persuasiveness or desirability . 
. Finally, this article assumes a fair amount of knowledge of 
First Amendment law on the part of the reader; space limita-
tions simply do not permit elaborate explanation of every under-
lying concept in an article of this scope.4 
I. FACIAL OVERBREADTH 
The application of the First Amendment facial overbreadth 
doctrine by the Supreme Court over the past two decades has 
been marked by sharp disagreement and a fair amount of unpre-
dictability. The Justices have frequently differed on the ques-
tions of whether, and when, to utilize this highly speech-protec-
tive procedural tool. They have also differed significantly in 
their readiness to find statutes facially overbroad. Clearly, the 
doctrine has survived, but the extent of the Court's enthusiasm 
for it is open to question. 
Antipathy to the facial overbreadth device was expressed as 
long ago as 1971, in Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati." A turning 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
4. Fo~ the same reasons, the abundant literature analyzing and critiquing the deci-
sions referred to are not reviewed in this article. 
5. 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971). Justice Blackmun dissented from Brennan's vigilant ap-
plication of the overbreadth doctrine in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), but 
Justice White did not. Brennan rested his finding of facial overbreadth heavily on the 
Georgia courts' past construction of the Georgia statute at issue, a practice that Black-
3
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point was Broadrick u. State of Oklahoma,6 in 1973, in which 
White, writing for a bare majority of the Court that included 
Blackmun and Rehnquist, imposed the requirement of "substan-
tial" overbreadth as a necessary condition to facial invalidation 
of a statute on First Amendment grounds. "[W]e believe", 
White wrote, "that the overbreadth of a statute must not only 
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep."7 Brennan's dissent, joined by 
Marshall, was quite reflective of their inclination to give great 
protection to freedom of speech. Their hypothesized examples of 
speech which appeared to be punishable under the Oklahoma 
civil service regulations (limiting political activities by civil ser-
vants) were indeed minimal in relation to the statute's "plainly 
legitimate sweep." Yet, for Brennan and Marshall, these exam-
ples sufficed. To Brennan, the majority assumed, 
not only that the ban on the wearing of badges 
and buttons may be "impermissible," but also 
that the Act "may be susceptible of some other 
improper applications" ... Under principles that 
I had thought were established beyond dispute, 
that assumption requires a finding that the stat-
ute is unconstitutional on its face. 8 
The adoption of the substantiality ·requirement did not, of 
course, mark the end of the Court's use of the facial overbreadth 
device to invalidate statutes. One such holding occurred the very 
next year, in Lewis u. City of New Orleans. 9 As in Gooding u. 
Wilson1o two years earlier, the case involved a "fighting-words"-
type ordinance, although this time more narrowly focused upon 
speech directed to ("or with reference to") police officers. Again, 
Brennan wrote for the majority. The ordinance in Lewis was, on 
its face, considerably more restrictive than the acceptable 
mun found inappropriate and unfair, at least in that case. 
6. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
7. Id. at 615. White did, in Broadrick, suggest that this principle applied "particu-
larly where conduct and not merely speech is involved." Id. Later cases, notably New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), made clear that the requirement of substantial 
overbreadth is not limited to cases involving expressive conduct. 
8. 413 U.S. at 628 (citations omitted). Brennan agreed, however, with the finding of 
insubstantial overbreadth in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
9. 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
10. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3
1993] FREEDOM OF SPEECH 417 
Chaplinsky concept of "fighting words,"ll and had not been 
meaningfully parrowed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Yet 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, dissented. Their antipa-
thy to the use of the facial overbreadth device as a tool for strik-
ing down "chilling" laws, even though the challenger before the 
court could be constitutionally punished, seemed clear. The doc-
trine, in Blackmun's words, was 
being invoked indiscriminately without regard to 
the nature of the speech in question, the possible 
effect the statute or ordinance has upon such 
speech, the importance of the speech in relation 
to the exposition of ide~s, or the purported or as-
serted community interest in preventing that 
speech. And it is no happenstance that in each 
- case the facts are relegated to footnote status, 
conveniently distant and in a less disturbing fo-
cus. This is the compulsion of a doctrine that 
reduces our function to parsing words in the con-
text of imaginary events. l ! 
Blackmun went on to contend that Mrs. Lewis' speech was 
"plainly" within the category of fighting words. IS But to the 
Brennan majority (which included White), the point was irrele-
vant. It is on such occasions, of course, when the facial over-
breadth doctrine affords the challenger her only basis for vic- . 
tory, that the doctrine has real meaning and significance. 
The Court has continued to find statutes facially overbroad, 
but, at least during the early 1980's, dissenting Justices contin-
ued to articulate apparently categorical objections to the prac-
tice. In 1981, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,14 the Court 
struck down a zoning ordinance which, in effect, prohibited all 
live entertainment in a municipality. Justice White wrote for the 
majority and, along with the concurring Justices (including 
Blackmun), focused entirely upon the challenged ordinance, 
rather than upon the nature of the challenger - an "adult" 
bookstore which featured "a live dancer, usually nude.,,!11 Rehn-
quist, in contrast, joined a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice 
11. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
12. 415 U.S. at 136-37. 
13. [d. at 141. But see Justice Powell's concurrence, arguing the contrary. [d. at 135. 
14. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
15. [d. at 62. 
5
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Burger which chose to focus only on the nature of the chal-
lenger. "I would hold," wrote Burger, "that, as applied, the ordi-
nance is valid. . . . An overconcern about draftsmanship and 
overbreadth should not be allowed to obscure the central ques-
tion before us. "16 
A 1984 decision, Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., Inc./7 was another case in which the doctrine was 
applied, but with notable resistance. Justice Blackmun wrote for 
the (bare) majority, thus revealing his willingness to embrace the 
doctrine at least some of the time. Following its 1980 ruling in 
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment/6 
the Court struck down a state law which, similar to the ordi-
nance invalidated in Schaumburg, imposed serious limitations 
on organized charitable solicitations. What made the case partic-
ularly interesting was the fact that the plaintiff, Munson, was 
not itself a charitable organization, but rather a professional 
fundraiser. Munson was injured by the statute, which barred 
charitable organizations from paying more than 25% of its re-
ceipts for expenses, but Munson had no First Amendment rights 
of its own to raise in opposition to the Maryland law; rather, the 
First Amendment interests recognized (in Schaumburg, initially) 
were those of the charities with whom Munson dealt. To the ma-
jority (which included White and Stevens, along with Brennan 
and Marshall), this was of no consequence, gIven the First 
Amendment facial overbreadth doctrine: 
The fact that, because Munson is not a char-
ity, there might not be a possibility that the chal-
lenged statute could restrict Munson's own First 
Amendment rights does not alter the analysis. Fa-
cial challenges to overly broad statutes are al-
lowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, 
but for the benefit of society - to prevent the 
statute from chilling the First Amendment rights 
of other parties not before the court. Munson's 
ability to serve that function has nothing to do 
with whether or not its own First Amendment 
16. [d. at 85, 86. 
17. 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
18. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
6
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rights are at stake.19 
But Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by O'Connor, 
bemoaned the Court's use of the overbreadth doctrine, "not at 
the behest of any affected charity, but at the behest of a profes-
sional fundraising organization."20 Comparing the more conven-
tional "as-applied" challenge to a facial attack, he went on to 
assert, more generally: 
The advantages of the first approach are ob-
vious. It is less intrusive on the legislative prerog-
ative and less disruptive of state policy to limit 
the permitted reach of a statute only on a case-
by-case basis. Such restraint also allows State 
courts the opportunity to construe a law to avoid 
constitutional infirmities .... Finally, the deci-
sion itself is likely to be more sound when based 
on data relevant and adequate to an informed 
judgment. The facts of the case focus and give 
meaning to the otherwise abstract and amorphous 
issues the court must decide . . . . 
One might as a matter of original inquiry 
question whether an overbreadth challenge 
should ever be allowed, given that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and the availability of preliminary 
injunctive relief will usually permit a litigant to 
discover the scope of constitutional protection af-
forded his activity without subjecting himself to 
criminal prosecution. Be that as it may, however, 
our cases at least indicate that the doctrine is to 
be used sparingly. Z1 
Rehnquist's dissent concluded with words of similar import, 
describing the majority's "misunderstanding" of, and "un-
grounded speculation" about, the Maryland statute as "the nat-
ural hazards of overbreadth analysis."22 "When the Court's 
sights are not focused on the actual application of a statute to a 
specific set of ~acts," Rehnquist warned, "its vision proves sadly 
19. 467 U.S. at 958. 
20. [d. at 975. 
21. [d. at 977-78 (citations omitted). 
22. [d. at 985. 
7
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deficient."z3 These are strong words, indeed - and suggestive of 
a profound disinclination to use the facial overbreadth tool. To 
these Justices, the policy concerns that underlie the facial over-
breadth doctrine - namely, the desire to dispel quickly the 
"chilling effects" of statutes that violate the First Amendment 
much of the time - are apparently outweighed by the interest 
in maximizing the chances of reaching "correct" results in indi-
vidual cases. 
Although the use of facial overbreadth in Munson itself was 
critical to the resolution of an issue of standing, Justice Black-
mun, in a footnote, pointed out that the concept of "over-
breadth" transcends that particular category of case: 
The dissenters appear to overlook the fact 
that "overbreadth" is not used only to describe 
the doctrine that allows a litigant whose own con-
duct is unprotected to assert the rights of third 
parties to challenge a statute, even though "as ap-
plied" to him the statute would be constitutional 
.... "Overbreadth" has also been used to de-
scribe a challenge to a statute that in all its appli-
cations directly restricts protected First 
Amendment 
activity and does not employ means narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest .... 
Whether that challenge should be called 
"overbreadth" or simply a "facial" challenge, the 
point is that there is no reason to limit challenges 
to case-by-case "as applied" challenges when the 
statute on its face and therefore in all its applica-
tions falls short of constitutional demands.24 
The footnote may help explain Blackmun's own willingness to 
accept a facial challenge to a statute, notwithstanding his own 
previously expressed reservations about the facial overbreadth 
tool. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 965-66 n.13 (citations omitted). See also the Blackmun majority opinion 
in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975), in which he appeared to view the facial 
overbreadth doctrine more favorably than he had in earlier decisions. 
8
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Along the way, other indications of a disinclination to apply 
facial overbreadth - probably for more particularized reasons 
- have surfaced. In the 1978 ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Found.,25 
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality that included Justice 
Rehnquist, declined to engage in a facial review of the section of 
the Federal Communications Act that authorized the FCC order 
in question. The statute forbade the use of "any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language by means of radio communications,"26 
and the Commission's order applied that law to the famous 
George Carlin monologue on "dirty" words. As Justice Powell 
recognized in his concurring opinion, it was (technically) proper 
to reject the facial challenge, because the Commission's order 
was limited to the facts of this case, and the Supreme Court had 
granted certiorari with respect to the validity of the order, not 
the validity of the statute. But Stevens went further, purporting 
to bolster his refusal to address the controversy on broader 
grounds by offering these words: 
It is true that the Commission's order may 
lead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At 
most, however, the Commission's definition of in-
decency will deter only the broadcasting of pa-
tently offensive references to excretory and sexual 
organs and activities. While some of those refer-
ences may be protected, they surely lie at the pe-
riphery of First Amendment concern .... Invali-
dating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical 
application to situations not before the Court is 
"strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and 
only as a last resort" .... We decline to adminis-
ter that medicine to preserve the vigor of patently 
offensive sexual and excretory speech."27 
Powell, joined by Blackmun, replied that he "had not 
thought that the application vel non of overbreadth analysis 
should depend on the Court's judgment as to the value of the 
protected speech that might be deterred."28 But to Justice Ste-
25. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
26. Id. at 731. 
27. Id. at 743 (citations omitted). See also Stevens' similar statements in the earlier 
case of Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). 
28. Id. at 761 n.4. 
9
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vens, it apparently did. 
The Court upheld the Commission's order, passing up the 
opportunity to remove the chilling effect created by a statute 
that actually uses such subjective and potentially sweeping 
terms as "indecent" and "profane". Technically proper or not, 
the decision demonstrates little commitment to the policy con-
cerns underlying the facial overbreadth doctrine.29 
Justice Stevens has been a persistent source of creative 
thinking with respect to the facial overbreadth doctrine. In New 
York v. Ferber,80 the "child pornography" case of 1982, Justice 
White's opinion for the majority, that the New York statute 
amounted to "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose le-
gitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications,"81 
was so reasonable a conclusion that Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, concurring in the judgment, agreed. But Stevens felt the 
need to address the matter at length. Positing a hypothetical vi-
olation of the New York statute that would, in his view, consti-
tute protected expression, he stated that he "would refuse to ap-
ply overbreadth analysis for reasons unrelated to any prediction 
concerning the relative number of protected communications 
that the statute may prohibit. "82 Was Stevens effectively saying 
that he was refusing to join his colleagues in estimating the 
"substantiality" of the perceived overbreadth of any statute? He 
went on to recite, in a fashion reminiscent of the (later) Rehn-
Quist dissent in Munson, the general policy reasons for not em-
ploying the facial overbreadth tool: 
29. Yet another avoidance of facial review, this time unacknowledged, occurred in 
the Court's 1986 decision in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), 
the case involving the sexually suggestive campaign speech delivered by a high school 
student at an assembly. The school district suspended the student, pursuant to a school 
disciplinary rule prohibiting "[clonduct which materially and substantially interferes 
with the educational process ... including the use of obscene, profane language or ges-
tures." [d. at 678. The District Court held that the rule was overbroad, and a Ninth 
Circuit panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, through a majority opinion by 
Chief Justice Burger that spoke very generally about the governmental interests at stake, 
but which ultimately appeared to focus on the facts of Fraser's case. Not one word was 
said, explicitly, about whether the disciplinary rule was or was not overbroad on its face. 
Surprisingly, neither did the opinion of Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment. 
Justice Marshall dissented, but he, too, limited himself to the facts of the case. 
30. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
31. [d. at 773. 
32. [d. at 780. 
10
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When we follow our traditional practice of adjudi-
cating difficult and novel constitutional questions 
only in concrete factual situations, the adjudica-
tions tend to be crafted with greater wisdom. Hy~ 
pothetical rulings are inherently treacherous and 
prone to lead us into unforeseen errors; they are 
qualitatively less reliable than the products of 
case-by -case adjudication.33 
423 
Stevens then harked back to his view, expressed in Pacifica, that 
certain low-value speech was deserving of less protection than 
other speech, concluding that "generally marginal speech does 
not warrant the extraordinary protection afforded by the over-
breadth doctrine. "34 
Despite these protestations, every sitting Justice has at 
some point concurred in a finding of facial overbreadth. On the 
same day in 1987, the Court held two municipal laws facially 
overbroad. In City of Houston u. Hill,3/) only Justice Rehnquist 
dissented from the invalidation of a Houston ordinance making 
it unlawful "to ... in any manner oppose, ... or interrupt any 
policeman in the execution of his duty ... "36 Justice Brennan 
wrote the majority opinion, clearly finding that the law was sub-
stantially overbroad. As in Lewis u. City of New Orleans, the 
challenger could probably have been punished constitutionally 
under a narrowly drawn statute.37 
The other decision, Board of Airport Comm'rs u. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc.,38 was unanimous. Justice O'Connor, despite her po-
sition in Munson, wrote the relatively brief majority opinion, 
33. [d. at 780-81. 
34. [d. at 781. See also Stevens' opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 
490, 545-46 (1981), eschewing the use of facial overbreadth despite the absence of "low 
value" speech. 
35. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
36. [d. at 455. 
37. Blackmun, concurring, took pains to dissociate himself from "any implication -
if one exists - that Gooding u. Wilson, ... and Lewis u. City of New Orleans . .. are 
good law in the context of their facts .... " [d. at 472 (citations omitted). But he was not 
troubled by the success of a facial challenge here. Justice Powell, joined by O'Connor, 
would have certified a question to a Texas appellate court, in order to receive an authori-
tative state-court construction of the ordinance. Failing that, they, along with Scalia, 
were willing to join the result, but apparently on grounds of vagueness rather than first 
amendment overbreadth. [d. at 480-81. 
38. 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
11
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finding an official resolution banning all "First Amendment ac-
tivities" at Los Angeles International Airport to be substantially 
overbroad, and "not fairly subject to a limiting construction. "S9 
Interestingly, the Court ruled as it did without resolving what is 
ordinarily a threshold issue in First Amendment litigation -
namely, whether the airport terminal was or was not a "public 
forum"; O'Connor made clear that the resolution was unaccept-
ably overbroad even if the airport were not a publi.c forum. This 
law was an unusually oppressive one; as O'Connor explained, 
"the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of ex-
pressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, 
purports to create a virtual 'First Amendment Free Zone' at 
LAX .... "40 It was an easy case, but, notably, no Justice argued 
that the court should focus only on the plaintiffs' activity at the 
airport, which was the distribution of free religious literature on 
a pedestrian walkway in the Central Terminal Area.41 O'Connor, 
moreover, demonstrated considerable sensitivity to First 
Amendment values in declining the petitioners' invitation to im-
pose a narrowing construction on the resolution. She concluded: 
"[I]t is difficult to imagine that the resolution could be limited 
by anything less than a series of adjudications, and the chilling 
effect of the resolution on protected speech in the meantime 
would make such a case-by-case adjudication intolerable."42 
In 1988, in Frisby v. Schultz,4S a case that could not be said 
to involve "marginal" speech, Stevens joined Brennan and Mar-
shall, in dissent, in arguing that a municipal restriction on resi-
dential picketing was facially overbroad, despite appearing to 
believe that the plaintiffs' own conduct could be validly 
prohibited. 
Finally, the entire Court was once again unanimous (albeit 
for differing reasons) in finding the St. Paul Bias-Motivated 
Crime Ordinance facially unconstitutional, in R.A. V. v. City of 
39. [d. at 577. 
40. [d. at 574. 
41. As the later decision in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Jnc. v. 
Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (discussed at note 318, infra) demonstrated, moreover, not all 
of the Justices believe that there is a first amendment right to distribute literature in an 
airport terminal. 
42. 482 U.S. at 575-76. 
43. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
12
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St. Paul"" in 1992. The case involved a criminal prosecution for 
cross-burning, and $0 we might well have expected someone on 
the Court to insist that an as-applied challenge would be more 
appropriate; but no one did. Granted, the posture of the case as 
it came to the Court - on a motion to dismiss - militated 
against such a position, but the readiness of each Justice to eval-
uate the ordinance on its face (including Stevens, concurring 
separately and emphasizing "the importance of context"4r,) is 
further evidence that the anguished objections to "abstract" ad-
judication as intrinsically undesirable may well have been 
abandoned.46 
Less sweeping doctrinal constrictions of the availability of 
facial challenges have emerged, however, and it is with respect 
to these that the law of overbreadth has become somewhat 
unpredictable. 
Stevens introduced one such limitation in 1984, as the au-
thor of the majority opinion in Los Angeles City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent.'" The relevant Los Angeles code section pro-
hibited the posting of signs on public property. The plaintiffs 
wished to post political campaign signs on utility poles. The 
Court upheld the law, finding the city's interests in safety and 
aesthetics to be sufficiently important. Given the essence of the 
Court's reasoning, it could surely have addressed the plaintiff's 
facial challenge by ruling that the code section, being adequately 
justified, was not substantially overbroad. Instead, Stevens 
wrote that 
[T]his is not ... an appropriate case to entertain 
a facial challenge based on overbreadth. For we 
have found nothing in the record to indicate that 
the ordinance will have any different impact on 
any third parties' interests in free speech than it 
has on [the plaintiffs] ... 
44. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
45. [d. at 2566. 
46. See also the recent ruling in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. 
Ct. 2395 (1992), in which the majority - Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter - held a parade permit ordinance facially invalid, over the protest of the dissent-
ers that the case should be remanded to the lower courts for an interpretation of the 
ordinance. See id. at 2404 n.12. 
47. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
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. . . They have, in short, failed to identify 
any significant difference between their claim that 
the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds 
and their claim that it is unconstitutional when 
applied to their political signs. Specifically, [the 
plaintiffs] have not attempted to demonstrate 
that the ordinance applies to any conduct more 
likely to be protected by the First Amendment 
than their own . . . signs . . . . Accordingly, on 
this record it appears that if the ordinance may 
be validly applied to [the plaintiffs], it can be val-
idly applied to most if not all of the signs of par-
ties not before the Court. . . . It would therefore 
be inappropriate in this case to entertain an over-
breadth challenge to the ordinance!S ' 
At first glance, Stevens' argument seems logical. But was it re-
ally necessary? If all Stevens meant was that, given the position 
of the plaintiffs, their case was as strong as any that might be 
hypothesized, fine. But if he meant that, even if the plaintiffs 
were successful, a facial challenge would not be entertained, that 
conclusion seems inappropriate and a bit odd. Why leave the or-
dinance standing, simply because those who challenged it had 
been in the strongest position to do so? Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun dissented, but with no separate discussion 
of facial overbreadth. 
Perhaps the Stevens discussion in Vincent can be properly 
seen, in retrospect, as a harbinger of Justice White's majority 
opinion in the 1985 decision, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 
Inc. 49 A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had, some-
what inexplicably, invalidated a Washington obscenity statute in 
its entirety because it contained a definition of the word "pruri-
ent" (incorporating an ambiguous reference to "lust") that, as 
the Supreme Court agreed, swept too far. Justice White was cor-
rect in ruling that the Ninth Circuit's remedy exceeded that 
which was called for, and that "the Washington law should have 
been invalidated only insofar as the word 'lust' is to be under-
stood as reaching [constitutionally] protected materials."lio But 
48. Id. at 801·02. 
49. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
50. [d. at 504. Brennan and Marshall dissented in Brockett, based on the Brennan 
position on obscenity generally; see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 
(1973). 
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White used language which was itself unnecessary, and which, 
again, suggested a serious limitation upon the use of facial over-
breadth. After describing the doctrine, with particular reference 
to the situation in which the challenger can succeed only by in-
voking a facial challenge, he stated: 
It is otherwise where the parties challenging 
the statute are those who desire to engage in pro-
tected speech that the overbroad statute purports 
to punish. . . . There is then no want of a proper 
party to challenge the statute, no concern that an 
attack on the statute will be unduly delayed or 
protected speech discouraged. The statute may 
forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it 
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact. 
The cases before us are ones governed by the 
normal rule that partial, rather than facial, invali-
dation is the required course.!!l 
First of all, the last-quoted sentence appears to compare an ap-
ple ("partial") to an orange ("facial"); the successful challenge in 
Brockett was surely "facial", in that it had nothing to do with 
the facts of a particular case, but the remedy should indeed have 
been partial invalidation of the statute. 
More significantly, the passage as a whole may be said to 
imply that a facial challenge should not be entertained when an 
"as-applied" challenge would succeed. That has not been "the 
normal rule" (as decisions such as Brandenburg v. Ohio"2 and 
Jews for Jesus"3 arguably demonstrate), and it should not be. 
Indeed, it would be perverse to remove a "chilling" law from the 
books, on facial grounds, only at the behest of one whose speech 
was unprotected. 
Justice Scalia appeared to address these aspects of Vincent 
and Brockett, but without referring to either case, in his 1989 
51. 472 U.S. at 504. 
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
53. Compare Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc .• 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
discussed at notes 38-42. supra. with International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness. Inc. 
v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). The latter ruling revealed that some of the Justices who 
upheld the facial challenge in the former ruling would not have upheld an "as-applied" 
challenge. 
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majority opinion in Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. 
Fox.r,4 Because the Court in Fox needed only to correct an error 
made by a Court of Appeals pertaining to the law of commercial 
speech/ill the Court ultimately remanded the case, without actu-
ally resolving any issue of overbreadth. But Scalia saw fit to hold 
forth on the availability of a facial overbreadth challenge. He 
saw the challengers in this case as directly affected by the alleg-
edly overbroad applications of the statute, but he made it clear 
that that fact should not deprive them of the opportunity to 
raise a facial challenge. As Scalia persuasively demonstrated, a 
contrary rule "would produce absurd results."116 Arguably, this is 
at odds, at least in spirit, with the position put forth by Stevens 
in Taxpayers for Vincent. But Scalia continued, in apparent 
agreement with White's position in Brockett: 
It is not the usual judicial practice, however, 
nor do we consider it generally desirable, to pro-
ceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily - that 
is, before it is determined that the statute would 
be valid as applied. Such a course would convert 
use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary 
means of vindicating the plaintiff's own right not 
to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional 
into a means of mounting gratuitous wholesale at-
tacks upon state and federal laws. Moreover, the 
overbreadth question is ordinarily more difficult, 
to resolve than the as-applied .... Thus, for rea-
sons relating both to the proper functioning of 
courts and to their efficiency, the lawfulness of 
the particular application of the law should ordi-
narily be decided first. &7 
In dissent, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall had 
no difficulty finding the regulation in question to be substan-
54. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
55. See the discussion at note 479, infra. 
56. 492 U.S. at 484. 
57. [d. at 484-85. The core of this excerpt was quoted, in a somewhat inconclusive 
fashion, by Justice Kennedy for the majority in Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2340 
(1991), a case in which the first amendment challenge was deemed nonjusticiable. Mar-
shall and Blackmun, dissenting, responded by pointing out that "the rule that a court 
should consider as-applied challenges before overbreadth challenges is not absolute." [d. 
at 2351. 
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tially overbroad on its face. They responded to Scalia's theoreti-
cal discourse quickly, observing in a footnote that "[a]lthough at 
times we have suggested that as-applied challenges should be 
decided before overbreadth challenges, . . . we have often felt 
free to do otherwise," citing Jews for Jesus and Houston v. 
Hill.58 
Three years later, Scalia's admonition in Fox was seemingly 
forgotten when, in R.A. V.59 Scalia himself proceeded immedi-
ately to a finding of facial overbreadth, never considering the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota "hate-speech" law as applied. 
White did the same for the concurring Justices. 
In 1989, the Court considered, but rejected, a very different 
kind of limitation upon the availability of a· facial overbreadth 
challenge. The case was Massachusetts v. Oakes,60 which in-
volved a "child nudity" law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court struck down the statute as overbroad under the First 
Amendment, but the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and 
remanded. 
For four Justices - O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Ken-
nedy - the key to their decision was the fact that the statute 
had been amended, to add a "lascivious intent" requirement, af-
ter certiorari had been granted. O'Connor stated that "[b]ecause 
it has been repealed, the former version of [the statute] cannot 
chill protected expression in the future. Thus, . . . the over-
breadth question in this case has become moot as a practical 
matter, and we do not address it."6l She added: 
An overbroad statute is not void ab initio, but 
rather voidable. . . . Because the special concern 
that animates the overbreadth doctrine is no 
longer present after the amendment or repeal of 
the challenged statute, we need not extend the 
benefits of the doctrine to a defendant whose con-
duct is not protected .... We also note that the 
amendment of a statute pending appeal to elimi-
nate overbreadth is not different, in terms of ap-
58. Id. at 487 n.2. 
59. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
60. 491 U.S. 576 (1989). 
61. [d. at 583-84. 
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plying the new law to past conduct from a state 
appellate court adopting a limiting construction 
of a statute to cure overbreadth.62 
Since the Court had taken this case only to consider the over-
breadth issue, the proper resolution to this plurality was re-
manding to the Massachusetts courts for the purpose of deciding 
whether the former version of the statute could constitutionally 
be applied to Oakes. 
But the other five Justices - including Brennan and Mar-
shall, as well as Blackmun and Stevens - joined in part of a 
partially dissenting opinion authored by Scalia; thus their "dis-
senting" opinion was in reality, in 1989, a majority opinion. In 
that opinion, Scalia forthrightly disagreed that the overbreadth 
defense is unavailable once the statute has been amended to 
cure the defect. Scalia stated: "It seems to me strange judicial 
theory that a conviction initially invalid can be resuscitated by 
postconviction alteration of the statute under which it was ob-
tained."68 Scalia, then, apparently regards a conviction under a 
facially overbroad statute as invalid, even if the defendant's own 
speech could constitutionally be punished. And Blackmun, 
whose early dissenting opinions suggested disagreement with 
such a belief, joined that opinion. Scalia continued: 
The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect consti-
tutionally legitimate speech not merely . . . after 
the offending statute is enacted, but also ... when 
the legislature is contemplating what sort of stat-
ute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad 
laws affecting speech was cost free, as the plural-
ity's new doctrine would make it - that is, if no 
conviction of constitutionally proscribable con-
duct would be lost, so long as the offending stat-
ute was narrowed before the final appeal - then 
legislatures would have significantly reduced in-
centive to stay within constitutional bounds in 
the first place. . . . [A] substantial amount of le-
gitimate speech would be "chilled" as a 
consequence . 
. . . Even if one were of the view that some of 
62. [d. at 584. 
63. [d. at 586 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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the uses of the overbreadth doctrine have been 
excessive, this would not be a legitimate manner 
in which to rein it in.s. 
431 
Although the Oakes situation seems unlikely to recur with 
great frequency, and while one's position on the precise question 
raised therein is not necessarily indicative of any other position, 
the debate seems revealing. The Scalia position appears to re-
flect a heartening solicitude for freedom of expression, and an 
appreciation of the importance of the overbreadth tool in facili-
tating that freedom. One wonders, however, whether legislators 
will truly be affected by such opinions, as Scalia seems to as-
sume, and whether legislators will even be aware of them. Per-
haps the more persuasive argument for the Scalia position is 
that those who' challenge facially overbroad statutes should not 
be deterred, or defeated, by the prospect of belated amendment 
of the challenged statute. 
In Oakes itself, Scalia and Blackmun, while prepared to 
consider the issue of facial overbreadth, went on to decide that 
the statute (pre-amendment) was simply not substantially over-
broad, estimating "that the legitimate scope [of the law] vastly 
exceeds the illegitimate. "611 Brennan, on the other hand, joined 
by Marshall and Stevens, would have reached the opposite con-
clusion, demonstrating again their lower tolerance for speech-
threatening statutes. They were influenced, too, by the "sever-
ity" of the possible criminal sanctions, and by the very fact that 
the statute was so easily amended to cure its defects; "[t]he 
availability of such simple correctives renders the statute's over-
breadth less acceptable. "66 
Regrettably, no Justice has publicly opposed the well-estab-
lished principle that a judicial narrowing construction can save 
an otherwise facially overbroad statute from invalidation. Boos 
v. Barry67 and Frisby v. Schultz,68 both decided in 1988, made 
clear that such a saving construction could be imposed in the 
very litigation in which the facial overbreadth challenge was 
64. [d. at 586-87 (footnote omitted). 
65. [d. at 588. 
66. [d. at 598. 
67. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
68. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
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raised, and Ward v. Rock Against Racism,69 in 1989, gave sup-
port to the corollary that an administrative agency, as well as a 
court, could supply the narrowing construction. Osborne v. 
Ohio,70 in 1990, provided the setting for a full explication of the 
rationale for allowing a contemporaneous narrowing construc-
tion to cure the problem of facial overbreadth, even in a criminal 
case. Justice White stated: "Our cases have long held that a stat-
ute as construed 'may be applied to conduct occurring prior to 
the construction, provided such application affords fair warning 
to the defendan[t).' "71 He added: "This principle, of course, ac-
cords with the rationale underlying overbreadth challenges .... 
[O]nce a statute is authoritatively construed, there is no longer 
any danger that protected speech will be deterred and therefore 
no longer any reason to entertain the defendant's challenge to 
the statute on its face."72 White, in Osborne, restated Scalia's 
Oakes argument, and explained the difference: A legislature 
would not be encouraged by the Osborne ruling to act without 
regard to First Amendment rights, because the legislature could 
not predict that a judicial narrowing construction would emerge 
to save the statute.73 
The problem with the entire concept of the benevolent nar-
rowing construction is that it is arguably at odds with the under- . 
lying purposes of the facial overbreadth doctrine. In the case of 
a contemporaneous narrowing construction, not only does a 
broadly-worded statute remain on the books, but even the cou-
rageous and knowledgeable challenger is taken by surprise, pos-
sibly at great cost. But, again, every Justice has apparently ac-
cepted the prevailing rules. 
Osborne v. Ohio, like Massachusetts v. Oakes, also reveals 
differences in the Justices' readiness to reach a finding of sub-
stantial overbreadth. In Osborne, the defendant was convicted 
under an Ohio child pornography statute for possessing offend-
ing photographs. The Ohio Supreme Court, in affirming the con-
viction, had placed a narrowing construction on the statute in 
this very case. As Justice White appeared to recognize for' the 
69. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
70. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
71. [do at 115. 
72. [do at 115·16 n.12. 
730 [do at 120·21. 
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majority, Osborne's facial overbreadth argument was a credible 
one; still, the majority was "skeptical" of the overbreadth claim, 
in light of the statute's exemptions. White acknowledged: "It is 
true that, despite the statutory exceptions, one might imagine 
circumstances in which the statute, by its terms, criminalizes 
constitutionally protected conduct."" But it was "far from 
clear" that any such overbreadth was substantiaP6 The argu-
. ment failed, in any event, because of the Ohio court's narrowing 
construction. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall and Stevens, dissented, 
contending that the statute was fatally overbroad even with the 
narrowing construction. The statute essentially criminalized 
"material ... that shows a minor who is not the person's child or 
ward in a state of nudity,"76 with some detailed exceptions. The 
majority was satisfied, with brief discussion resting on references 
to the Ferber case, that the Ohio Supreme Court had saved the 
law by reading in the requirement that the prohibited nudity 
constitute "a lewd exhibition or [involve] a graphic focus on the 
genitals."" But the three dissenters were completely uncon-
vinced, and demonstrated at length and in detail that the judi-
cially-discovered elements of the crime "not only fail to cure the 
overbreadth of the statute, but ... also create a new problem of 
vagueness."78 It is a dissenting opinion that demonstrates con-
siderable solicitude for freedom of speech.79 
Finally, a facial overbreadth challenge will, on occasion, lead 
a federal court to decide to abstain from hearing the case until a 
74. [d. at 113 n.9. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 126. 
77. [d. at 128. 
78. [d. 
79. See also the begrudging deflection of a facial challenge in Regan v. Time, Inc., 
468 U.S. 641 (1984), on the part of Justice White, writing for a plurality that included 
Rehnquist and O'Connor. The case concerned the federal statute restricting the use of 
photographic reproductions of United States currency, but permitting such use, under 
limited circumstances, by publications. Time, Inc. was partially successful in its chal-
lenge to the law, but the plurality gave short shrift to its facial challenge to the "publica-
tion" requirement. Stevens, concurring in the judgment in part, seemed to join in that 
disposition. In contrast, the dissenting Brennan and Marshall argued persuasively that 
the requirement was substantially overbroad. Blackmun, dissenting in part on other 
grounds, did not reach the issue. 
See also the dissenting opinion of Brennan, joined again by Marshall, in San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 560-73 (1987). 
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state court has had the opportunity to interpret the challenged 
statute. Even with respect to this aspect of the doctrine, the Jus-
tices have shown differing propensities. A unanimous Court 
adopted that approach in 1988, in Virginia v. American Book-
sellers Ass'n, Inc.,so where the scope of the statute at hand was 
the subject of serious debate. But in the BrockettS1 decision of 
1985, O'Connor and Rehnquist were the only Justices who 
deemed abstention appropriate. Those same two Justices, along 
with Powell, were also the only ones favoring certification of 
questions to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in City of 
Houston v. Hill s2 in 1987. Justice Brennan, for the majority, felt 
simply that the ordinance - which, again, made it a crime to 
"oppose" or "interrupt" a policeman, among other things - "is 
not susceptible to a limiting construction because, as both courts 
below agreed, its language is plain and its meaning unambigu-
OUS."S3 Similarly, in 1992, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement,S' Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas urged, in 
dissent, that the challenged parade permit ordinance be re-
manded for interpretation by a lower court; the majority, speak-
ing through Blackmun, felt no such need. 
What, then, is the prognosis for the facial overbreadth doc-
trine? Surely, no one on the Court was more likely to employ it 
than Brennan and Marshall. Their replacements, Souter and 
Thomas, along with Kennedy, have said little on the issue thus 
80. 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
81. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
82. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
83. Id. at 468. He appeared to also take into account the facts that the City had 
raised the abstention issue belatedly, the city's suggested narrowing construction was 
unsatisfying, state trial courts had applied the ordinance for years without giving it a 
narrowing construction, and state law placed limits on the possibilities for satisfactorily 
interpreting this municipal ordinance. Brennan also quoted, in passing, language from 
1960's cases suggesting the inappropriateness of abstention in speech cases. Id. Justices 
White and Blackmun were in the majority, and Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, 
indicated agreement with the majority with respect to the inappropriateness of 
certification. 
But Justice Powell, joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor, felt that certification of 
questions to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was appropriate, given the existence of 
"a serious question as to the meaning of the ordinance." Id. at 473. Powell, joined on this 
point by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, viewed abstention as inappropriate because of 
the belated raising of this issue, "coupled with ... doubts as to whether relief could be 
secured under Texas law." Id. at 478. In the process, he expressed doubt about Bren- . 
nan's assertion of an established disinclination to abstain in facial overbreadth cases. Id. 
at 476 n.4. 
84. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
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far, but Scalia has shown himself to be somewhat sensitive to 
the concerns that underlie the doctrine. Of the other five Jus-
tices, all have joined, at least once, in finding a law facially over-
broad under the First Amendment, but each of these five "veter-
ans" has also had occasion (admittedly not recently) to raise 
pointed questions about the desirability of the facial approach. 
In Blackmun's case, those questions were raised only during his 
early years on the Court. In Stevens' case, they tended to be 
raised only in cases in which he was generally unwilling to ex-
tend such protection to what he viewed as "low-value" speech. 
Rehnquist has most frequently and emphatically rejected the 
device, with O'Connor a distant second in that category. While 
White authored the important Broadrick opinion, it seems clear 
that that decision was not meant to terminate the Court's use of 
the facial overbreadth doctrine, but simply to make its benefi-
cence somewhat less freely available; White has often since 
joined in striking down laws as facially invalid, but he has also 
often declined to do so. Along with O'Connor and Rehnquist 
(and, to a less consistent extent, Stevens and Scalia), White has 
been most willing to place limits on the availability of facial 
challenges; Blackmun, in recent years, has been least willing to 
accept such limitations. The entire Court, in any event, has been 
inconsistent in its application of announced limitations. In terms 
of a propensity to readily perceive laws as substantially over-
broad, only Stevens, in recent years, has matched the departed 
Brennan and Marshall. 
II. PRIOR RESTRAINT 
As commentators have noted,811 it is not at all clear, beyond 
certain easy instances, when government action deserves the pe-
jorative label of "prior restraint," nor is it clear what the conse-
quence of such a designation should be. But clearly the phrase 
continues to connote unconstitutionality, "invalid" prior re-
straints apparently far outnumbering "valid" ones. The readi-
ness of a Supreme Court Justice to pin that label on a govern-
ment practice is therefore indicative, in part, of that Justice's 
intolerance for regulations posing threats to freedom of 
expression. 
85. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 419 
(1983). 
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The easy prior restraint cases are legendary, but few. In the 
modern era, both of the landmark prior restraint cases involved 
court orders muzzling expression by particular prospective 
speakers. In the Pentagon Papers case of 1971,86 Brennan, Mar-
shall, and White were members of the six-man majority, each 
writing separately to make clear that the burden the government 
must meet to obtain preliminary injunctive relief against the 
press is a very heavy one indeed. (Interestingly, the young Jus-
tice Blackmun was one of the dissenters, deeming the Court's 
action too hasty, and seemingly more accommodating to the gov-
ernment.87) The commitment of the present Court to that high 
standard has not yet been tested. In the 1976 decision in Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,88 the Court unanimously struck 
down a "gag order" imposed on the press by a state trial judge 
presiding over a criminal case. Justices White, Blackmun, Rehn-
quist, and Stevens remain from the Court of 1976, and there is 
no perceptible reason to fear slippage from the philosophy of 
that decision. 
A point of growing disagreement, however, has been the 
reach and extent of the procedural requirements laid down in 
the Brennan opinion in the 1965 case of Freedman v. Mary-
land.89 More generally, the problem area for the law of prior re-
straint has been, for the most part, the realm of pornography 
and alleged obscenity. The Court made clear, as early as the 
Kingsley Books90 case of 1957, that it had no problem with in-
junctions against the distribution of materials already adjudi-
cated obscene. What has typically caused consternation is a li-
censing scheme that targets obscenity (which poses no 
constitutional problems in itself), but which also threatens to 
suppress non-obscene films or publications. Such was the case in 
Freedman, in which a nearly unanimou!;1 Court invalidated a 
Maryland film censorship statute. Brennan wrote for a majority 
that included White, and the key passages of his opinion bear 
repeating: 
86. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
87. Id. at 759. Justice White, on the other hand, took a position strongly opposing 
the use of preliminary injunctions against the press. Id. at 730-40. 
88. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Here, too, Justice White, concurring, took an especially vigi-
lant position. [d. at 570-71. 
89. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
90. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). 
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[W]e hold that a noncriminal process which re-
quires the prior submission of a film to a censor 
avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes 
place under procedural safeguards designed to ob-
viate the dangers of a censorship system. First, 
the burden of proving that the film is unprotected 
expression must rest on the censor .... Second, 
while the State may require advance submission 
of all films, ... because only a judicial determina-
tion in an adversary proceeding ensures the nec-
essary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a 
procedure requiring a judicial determination suf-
fices to impose a valid final restraint. To this end, 
the exhibitor must be assured ... that the censor 
will, within a specified brief period, either issue a 
license or go to court to restrain showing the film. 
Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judi-
cial determination on the merits must ... be lim-
ited to preservation of the status quo for the 
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judi-
cial resolution. Moreover, ... the procedure must 
also assure a prompt final judicial decision. . . .91 
437 
Remarkably, a majority of the Court, ten years later, coa-
lesced around an application of the Freedman requirements in a 
very different context. The case was Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad,92 and Justice Blackmun wrote for a majority 
that included Brennan and Marshall. The directors of a munici-
pally-controlled theater denied a production company the right 
to stage the musical "Hair" in that theater, because they be-
lieved that the play was, at least in part, obscene. Blackmun 
called the denial a prior restraint and found it invalid under 
Freedman. The majority thus believed that the directors of a 
municipal theater were constitutionally obliged to go into court 
- promptly - in order to give final effect to their decision to 
deny a request to use that theater. As Justice Rehnquist ob-
served in his dissenting opinion, it was unclear from the major-
ity opinion whether its reasoning would apply to any denial of 
access to a municipal theater, or only to denials predicated on 
the contention that the production was obscene.93 The Rehn-
91. 380 U.S. at 58-59 (citations omitted). 
92. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
93. [d. at 571-73. 
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quist .opini.on, m.ore.over, effectively raised questi.ons ab.out the 
w.orkability .of imp.osing the Freedman pr.ocedural requirements 
up.on the public-theatrical setting. Justice White dissented sepa-
rately, believing, am.ong .other things, that the city "may reserve 
its audit.orium f.or pr.oducti.ons suitable f.or exhibiti.on t.o all the 
citizens .of the city, adults and children alike" - with.out g.oing 
t.o c.ourt t.o d.o S.o.94 F.or each .of these tw.o Justices, then, there 
were limits t.o the applicability .of Freedman t.o the g.overnmen-
tal "cens.orship" pr.ocess. 
In 1980, Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.9r, pr.ovided an-
.other .opp.ortunity f.or Justices Rehnquist and White t.o dissent. 
In a per curiam .opini.on, the C.ourt invalidated a Texas public 
nuisance statute directed t.oward the exhibiti.on .of .obscene films. 
The District C.ourt and the Fifth Circuit C.ourt .of Appeals had 
stricken the Texas law, c.onstruing it t.o auth.orize pri.or re-
straints, in the f.orm .of temp.orary injuncti.ons, ".of indefinite du-
rati.on .on the exhibiti.on .of m.oti.on pictures that have n.ot been 
finally adjudicated t.o be .obscene."96 Mindful .of the h.olding .of 
Walker v. Birmingham97 (a 1967 ruling in which White had 
j.oined, but fr.om which Brennan had dissented), the Vance ma-
j.ority .observed that, presumably, an exhibit.or w.ould be required 
. t.o .obey any such temp.orary injuncti.on, pending review, "and 
w.ould be subject t.o c.ontempt pr.oceedings even if the film is ulti-
mately f.ound t.o be n.on.obscene."98 Thus, the fundamental prin-
ciple .of Freedman was vi.olated. White and Rehnquist, dissent-
ing, seemed in effect t.o simply disagree as t.o h.ow the Texas 
statute might .operate, believing that any injuncti.on thereunder 
w.ould be phrased in general terms, and, as c.onstrued, the stat-
ute was "functi.onally indistinguishable fr.om a criminal .obscen-
ity statute."99 It is n.otable that the maj.ority; which included 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, ch.ose t.o 
94. [d. at 569. 
95. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
96. [d. at 316. As Chief Justice Burger observed in dissent, the majority was assum-
ing that the Texas statute authorized temporary injunctions against named films, a point 
that he contended was far from clear under the Texas statute; he therefore would have 
abstained, in order to have the benefit of an interpretation by a Texas court. [d. at 319-
20. 
97. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
98. 445 U.S. at 316. 
99. [d. at 324. 
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adopt the more speech-protective approach to the question at 
hand. 
But in 1986, in a case dealing with a very different kind of 
statute, the result was not very protective of speech. Arcara v. 
Cloud Books, Inc. 10o upheld a New York statute which author-
ized the closure of an "adult" bookstore for one year when a 
building or place has been "used for the purpose of lewdness, 
assignation, or prostitution. "101 The New York Court of Appeals 
had found this provision to amount to an unconstitutional prior 
restraint, but the Supreme Court reversed. The essence of Chief 
Justice Burger's majority opinion was his conclusion that "the 
First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a 
public health regulation of general application against the physi-
cal premises in which respondents happen to sell books. "102 The 
law did not single out bookstores, but rather "was directed at 
unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or other ex-
pressive activity."103 The penalty was analogous to closure for 
fire-code violations, he said, rather than to an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. The challengers, he emphasized, remained free to 
sell their books at another location. Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Stevens, concurred, asserting- that a contrary ruling "would lead 
to the absurd result that any government action that had some 
conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the arrest of 
a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis under 
the First Amendment.mo• 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, view-
ing the closure penalty as "an unnecessary burden on speech."lOI1 
Responding to the majority, Blackmun wrote: 
But the First Amendment ... protects against all 
laws "abridging the freedom of speech" - not 
just those specifically directed at expressive activ-
ity. Until today, this Court has never suggested 
that a State may suppress speech as much as it 
likes, without justification, so long. as it does so 
100. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). 
101. ld. at 699. 
102. ld. at 707. 
103. ld. 
104. ld. at 708. 
105. ld. at 711. 
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through generally applicable regulations that have 
"nothing to do with any expressive conduct .... " 
... [W]hen a State directly and substantially 
impairs First Amendment activities, such as by 
shutting down a bookstore, I believe that the 
State must show, at a minimum, that it has cho-
sen the least restrictive means of pursuing its leg-
islative objectives. The closure of a bookstore can 
no more be compared to a traffic arrest of a re-
porter . . . than the closure of a church could be 
compared to the traffic arrest of a clergyman.lo6 
Tying his views to the law of prior restraint, Blackmun added: 
"Until today, the Court has required States to confine any book 
banning to materials that are determined, through constitution-
ally approved procedures, to be obscene," citing Freedman and 
Vance. I07 It is a powerful dissenting opinion that reflects a 
highly speech-protective judicial inclination. But it was not per-
suasive to O'Connor, Stevens, Rehnquist, or White. 
The Court was unanimous, however, in striking down a dif-
ferent kind of property-related penalty in Fort Wayne Books, 
Inc. v. Indiana lo8 in 1989. Pursuant to Indiana's RICO statutes, 
applicable to petitioners because of a pattern of obscenity viola-
tions at their bookstores, an Indiana court directed the seizure 
of all of their property, real and personal, that was allegedly 
"used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived 
from, or realized through" their "racketeering" activities. lo9 The 
court acted on the basis of a finding of "probable cause" that the 
Indiana RICO law had been violated, and as a result the county 
sheriff padlocked the stores and "hauled away" their contents.110 
For the majority (and on this point there was no dissent), 
Justice White appeared to have no difficulty finding this proce-
dure unconstitutional. Cases from the 1960s and 1970s had es-
tablished the principle, applicable here, that a publication "may 
106. [d. at 709-11 (citations omitted). 
107. [d. at 712. 
108. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
109. [d. at 51. 
110. [d. at 52. 
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not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a 
determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing."lll 
White's readiness to apply that principle here was all the more 
striking because, as he recognized, the "predicate crimes" - i.e., 
the obscenity convictions underlying the alleged RICO violation 
- "had been adjudicated and are unchallenged."ll2 But the pe-
tition for seizure here, he observed, was "aimed at· establishing 
no more than probable cause to believe that a RICO violation 
had occurred, and the order for seizure recited no more than 
probable cause in that respect."1l3 Equ.ally heartening was 
White's rejection (in this case, at least) of the reasoning of the 
Indiana Supreme Court, which had stressed that the pretrial 
seizures "were not based on the ... suspected obscenity of 
the . . . items seized, but upon the neutral ground that the se-
questered property represented assets used and acquired in the 
course of racketeering activity."1l4 But he did not reject that ra-
tionale completely and for all time and all cases; "we assume 
without deciding," he said, "that bookstores and their contents 
are forfeitable ... when it is proved that these items are prop-
erty actually used in, or derived from, a pattern of violations of 
the State's obscenity laws."lUi Here, however, it was 
incontestable that these proceedings were begun 
to put an end to the sale of obscenity at the three 
bookstores named in the complaint, and hence we 
are quite sure that the special rules applicable to 
removing First Amendment materials from circu-
lation are relevant here. This includes specifically 
the admonition that probable cause ... is insuffi-
cient .... 118 
Not a single Justice, in 1989, grabbed the opportunity to af-
firm the seizure orders on the basis of either the forfeiture-of-ill-
gotten-gains or prior-conviction rationale. But there was a hint 
that some of the Justices would have affirmed, on the "forfei-
ture" theory, had the State presented a proper case in which to 
111. [d. at 63. 
112. [d. at 66. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 64. 
115. [d. at 65. In a footnote, White added that the Court was not reaching "the 
question of the constitutionality of post-trial forfeiture .... " [d. at 65 n.ll. 
116. [d. at 65-66. 
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do so. The notion that bookstores may be closed, and non-ob-
scene publications seized, under any circumstances is a troub-
ling one. Stevens, joined by Brennan and Marshall in dissent, 
appeared to recognize that. "I would extend the Court's hold-
ing," he wrote, "to prohibit the seizure of these stores' invento-
ries, even after trial, based on nothing more than a 'pattern' of 
obscenity misdemeanors."ll7 There is a difference "of constitu-
tional dimension," he explained, between a business selling pub-
lications and one that is engaged in another commercial 
activity. 118 
The most recent decision of this broadly-defined genre is 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,1l9 decided in 1990, in which a 
seriously splintered Court addressed the applicability of the 
Freedman requirements to a somewhat different contemporary 
setting. The case involved a Dallas ordinance which required, in 
pertinent part, that "sexually oriented businesses" (including 
adult bookstores and theaters) be licensed and inspected.120 The 
problem was that the ordinance, in practical effect, set no time 
limit within which the required inspection had to occur, and 
thus allowed for the possibility of indefinite postponement of 
the issuance of a license. Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall 
and Blackmun in concurring in the judgment, would have fully. 
applied Freedman to this regulatory scheme.' But Justice 
O'Connor, otherwise writing for a majority but speaking only for 
herself and Justices Stevens and Kennedy as to this aspect of 
the Dallas ordinance, distinguished Freedman, and declined to 
apply each of its three requirements. In the process of doing so, 
O'Connor showed appropriate sensitivity to First Amendment 
concerns: 
The core policy underlying Freedman is that 
the license for a First Amendment-protected busi-
ness must be issued within a reasonable period of 
time, because undue delay results in the unconsti-
tutional suppression of protected speech. Thus, 
the first two safeguards are essential: the licensor 
must make the decision whether to issue the li-
117. [d. at 84. 
118. [d. 
119. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
120. [d. at 220-21. 
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cense within a specified and reasonable time pe-
riod during which. the status quo is maintained, 
and there must be the possibility of prompt judi-
cial review in the event that the license is errone-
ously denied.l21 
443 
Here, these requirements were not satisfied, and thus the ordi-
nance was invalid. But the third Freedman requirement - that 
the censor bear the burden of going into court in order to sup-
press the speech and the burden of proof once there, if a license 
is to be denied - was, in the context of this regulatory scheme, 
not deemed necessary by this group of Justices. The reasons 
were twofold. First, Freedman, unlike the present case, involved 
"direct censorship of particular expressive material," which was 
"presumptively invalid."122 Second, the license applicants in this 
case had "much more at stake" than the film distributor in 
Freedman, and thus had a greater incentive to pursue a license 
denial in court.123 
Brennan protested: "The heavy presumption against prior 
restraints requires no less" than the full application of Freed-
man to this ordinance.124 "In distributing the burdens of initiat-
ing judicial proceedings and proof," he continued, "we are 
obliged to place them such that we err, if we must, on the side of 
speech, not on the side of silence. "12& 
Brennan also argued that, even if this case was factually dis-
tinguishable from Freedman in the ways O'Connor suggested, it 
was not meaningfully different from the Court's 1988 decision in 
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc. l2S In Riley, 
Brennan wrote for a majority that invalidated a North Carolina 
requirement that a professional fundraiser obtain a license 
before engaging in solicitation. The Act imposed no time limit 
on the licensing agency, and was therefore unconstitutional. 
"[S]uch a regulation," wrote Brennan therein, "must provide 
that a licensor 'will, within a specified brief period, either issue a 
121. [d. at 228 (citations omitted). 
122. [d. at 229. 
123. [d. at 229-30. 
124. [d. at 241. 
125. [d. at 241-42. 
126. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
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license or go to court,' "127 citing Freedman. Justices White, 
Kennedy, and Scalia joined that opinion, along with Marshall 
and Blackmun. To Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Stevens, the li-
censing requirement in Riley "[did] not create a sufficiently sig-
nificant burden on speech by charities" to warrant First Amend-
ment analysis. 128 
In FW /PBS, White and Rehnquist viewed Freedman as 
completely inapplicable, and set forth an interesting explanation 
of their position: 
The Dallas ordinance is in many respects analo-
gous to regulations requiring parade or demon-
stration permits and imposing conditions on such 
permits. Such regulations have generally been 
treated as time, place, and manner restrictions 
and have been upheld if they are content neutral, 
serve a substantial government interest, and leave 
open alternative avenues of communication. . . . 
The Dallas scheme regulates who may operate 
sexually oriented businesses, including those who 
sell materials entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection; but the ordinance does not regulate con-
tent and thus it is unlike the content-based prior 
restraints that this Court has typically scrutinized 
very closely. 129 
Riley (in which White had joined the majority) was distin-
guished on this basis. White also pointed out that "no evidence" 
suggested that arbitrary or undue delays in licensing had oc-
curred, and urged the Court not to assume such occurrences. ISO 
The White-Rehnquist theory would seriously restrict Freed-
man's applicability. To the contrary, the O'Connor modification 
of Freedman, which mayor may not turn out to be limited to 
fact patterns resembling that in FW/PBS, is, in the main, faith-
ful to Freedman, retaining its important core. Indeed, the aban-
127. [d. at 802. 
128. [d. at 813. 
129. 493 U.S. at 245-46 (citations omitted). 
130. [d. at 247. Scalia, dissenting in part, would have upheld the ordinance, on com-
pletely separate grounds, see discussion at notes 417-21, infra; ·because he believed "that 
Dallas could constitutionally have proscribed the commercial activities that it chose in-
stead to license, [he did) not think the details of its licensing scheme had to comply with 
First Amendment standards." [d. at 253. 
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donment of Freedman's third requirement, in nearly all con-
texts, would be understandable, since it is strikingly burdensome 
to government to require it to seek judicial approval of every 
license or permit denial affecting interests in expression. lSI Rea-
sonable or not, the adherence to this requirement by Brennan, 
Marshall and Blackmun was, again, reflective of their remarka-
bly speech-protective instincts. With only one of that trio still 
on the Court, however, it is fair to wonder whether even the 
O'Connor position in FW /PBS would command a majority 
today. 
Wholly outside the realm of pornography, two other deci-
sions of recent years are instructive. One was Ward u. Rock 
Against Racism, 1~2 in which Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens saw 
as an impermissible prior restraint, and would have applied the 
Freedman requirements to, a New York law requiring the use of 
a city sound technician in certain Central Park concerts. Ken-
nedy, for .the majority, did not see it that way at all, remarking 
that the city regulation "grants no authority to forbid speech, 
but merely permits the city to regulate volume .... "lSS The three 
dissenters thus perceived even governmental "distortion" of a 
performer's music as a form of advance censorship.1s4 
The other was the 1988 ruling in City of Lakewood u. Plain 
Dealer Publishing CO.1S6 Justice Brennan wrote for only four 
Justices (the others being Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia), but 
that group of four constituted a majority in the case, as Rehn-
quist and Kennedy did not participate in the decision. For the 
majority it was an easy decision, calling for the application of 
long-settled law. A Lakewood ordinance gave its mayor the au-
thority to grant or deny applications for annual news rack per-
mits, relating to the placement of newsracks on city property. 
The ordinance placed no perceptible limits on the Mayor's dis-
131. While the Supreme Court has never extended Freedman to the parade permit 
setting, the subject of White's analogy in dissent in FW/PBS, the suggestion has been 
made, and the logic of the case law would seem to lead to its fulfillment. See Central Fla. 
Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d ISIS, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1985) (Henderson, 
J., concurring). 
132. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
133. Id. at 795 n.5. 
134. Id. at 808-12. The Justices also differed as to whether the city's Guidelines 
should be properly understood as granting unbridled discretion to the sound technician. 
135. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
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cretion, and thus ran afoul of the long-standing principle that "a 
licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a 
government official or agency constitutes [an impermissible] 
prior restraint."138 Such a law, furthermore, in Brennan's view, 
was (and has always been) an appropriate target of a facial 
challenge. 
But Justice White, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, dis-
sented. White's theory of the case was less simple. An outright 
ban on newsracks on city sidewalks, he believed, would be con-
stitutional, because the right to distribute newspapers in a pub-
lic forum did not encompass the right to appropriate city prop-
erty, on a virtually permanent basis, for one's own exclusive 
use.137 Furthermore, he contended, the doctrine allowing facial 
challenges to discretionary licensing schemes (with no require-
ment that the potential licensee even apply for a license) "ap-
plies only when the specific conduct which the locality seeks to 
license is protected by the First Amendment. Because the place-
ment of newsracks on city property is not so protected ... the 
exception to our usual facial challenge doctrine does not apply 
here."138 Here, the Plain Dealer had not applied for a license 
under the challenged ordinance; hence, White would have ruled 
against it. 
Brennan justified allowing a facial challenge largely on the 
ground that the licensing system here "is directed narrowly and 
specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with 
expression: the circulation of newspapers."139 In contrast, he 
said, "laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct 
commonly associated with expression ... carry with them little 
danger of censorship."140 To White, Brennan's approach was 
"amorphous" and "vague,"I41 and White scored a clear point 
with his comparison of the newsrack ordinance to an unchal-
lenged companion ordinance giving the City Council unlimited 
discretion to grant· or deny applications for all other exclusive 
uses of city property: 
136. [d. at 757. 
137. Brennan had no occasion to address this precise point. [d. at 762 n.7. 
138. [d. at 774. 
139. [d. at 760. 
140. [d. at 760-61. 
141. [d. at 787-88. 
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But what if Lakewood ... repeals local ordi" 
nance § 901.181 (the detailed newsrack permit 
law) and simply left § 901.18 (the general ordi-
nance concerning "any ... structure or device" on 
city property) on the books? .... Because this 
law is of "general application," it should survive 
scrutiny under the Court's opinion - even as ap-
plied to newsracks. If so, the Court's opinion 
takes on an odd "the-greater-but-not-the-Iesser" 
quality: the more activities that are subjected to a 
discretionary licensing law, the more likely that 
law is to pass constitutional muster.142 
447 
But Brennan was able to point out problems with White's rea-
soning as well: "The key to the dissent's analysis is its 'greater-
includes-the-Iesser' syllogism. But that syllogism is blind to the 
radically different constitutional harms inherent in the 'greater' 
and 'lesser' restri~tions."14a Content-neutral regulations of 
speech may well be upheld as valid time, place, and manner re-
strictions, Brennan continued: 
In contrast, a law or policy permitting com-
munication in a certain manner for some but not 
for others raises the specter of content and view-
point censorship. This danger is at its zenith 
when the determination of who may speak and 
who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of 
a government official. . . . Therefore, even if the 
government may constitutionally impose content-
neutral prohibitions on a particular manner of 
speech, it may not condition that speech on ob-
taining a license or permit from a government of-
ficial in that official's boundless discretion . . . . 
Fundamentally, then, the dissent's propos'al ig-
nores the different concerns animating our test to 
determine whether an expressive activity may be 
banned entirely, and our test to determine 
whether it may be licensed in an official's unbri-
dled discretion.144 
The White position in Lakewood (again, joined by O'Connor 
142. [d. at 790. 
143. [d. at 762-63 (footnote omitted). 
144. [d. at 763-64 (citations omitted). 
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and Stevens) is by no means one that is seriously inhospitable to 
freedom of expression, and it succeeds in pointing out weak-
nesses (even from a speech-protective perspective) in the Bren-
nan opinion. Yet it comes as a mild shock that, fifty years after 
the creation of the Court's nearly impregnable stand against un-
bridled discretion in licensing schemes, it should have been 
questioned at all, however astutely. When all is said and done, 
the Brennan position must be seen as the more responsive to 
interests in freedom of speech; yet it is by no means clear that 
his position would be the majority position, were Lakewood de-
cided today. 
The entire Court recently reaffirmed its opposition to laws 
that confer unbridled discretion upon administrative officials, in 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement. w , The majority -
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter -. inter-
preted the parade permit ordinance in question as doing just 
that, with respect to the decision to require an advance payment 
of funds for such a permit "in order to meet the expense inci-
dent to the administration of the Ordinance and to the mainte-
nance of public order in the matter licensed. "146 For the four 
dissenters, Rehnquist protested that the Court "unnecessarily 
reaches out to interpret the ordinance on its own . . . even 
though there are no lower court factual findings on the scope or 
administration of the ordinance. "147 He' would have remanded 
for an interpretation by the lower courts, but agreed "that the 
Constitution does not permit a system in which the county ad-
ministrator may vary fees at his pleasure .... "14S Given the ease 
with which the position of the dissent might have been adopted, 
the majority's action can be seen as quite protective of speech.H9 
145. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
146. [d. at 2399. 
147. [d. at 2407. 
148. [d. at 2407. 
149. The dissenters also took the majority to task for not addressing the question on 
which certiorari had been granted - namely, whether the county could impose a license 
fee, in the context of a demonstration, for more than a "nominal" sum, in order to 
recoup the actual expenses of maintaining public order. For the dissenters - Rehnquist, 
White, Scalia, and Thomas - the answer was "yes". See id. at 2405-08. How the major-
ity felt about this remained unknown, and, possibly for that reason, the discussion by the 
dissenters on this point was not developed in detail. Their willingness to impose such 
potentially large expenses on speakers, however, does not bode well for future demon-
strators. Compare Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th 
Cir. 1985). . 
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. There has been no major theoretical campaign launched 
against any part of the Court's prior restraint doctrine. But re-
sistance to its full application has been demonstrated, notably 
by Justices White and Rehnquist, and, to a lesser extent, by 
O'Connor and Stevens.' As with its close cousin, the facial over-
breadth doctrine, the presumption against prior restraints serves 
a largely prophylactic function,' by invalidating statutes that 
threaten to prevent protected speech from being heard. To the 
extent that a Justice is more tolerant of such laws, he or she is, 
correspondingly, apparently less wary of that potential for deter-
rence. Only Blackmun remains of the trio that was most con-
cerned about that potential. 
III. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, ABSENT 
SPECIALIZED RULES 
A. CONTENT-BASED REGULATION 
It is now hornbook law that, unless a specialized rule ap-
plies, regulation of expression based upon the content of that 
expression is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, in the usual sense 
of that term. Although earlier cases occasionally pointed toward 
such a rule, not until 1972, in Marshall's majority opinion in Po-
lice Dep't v. Mosley/50 was it expressly articulated. At that, 
Marshall's statement of the strict scrutiny formula was indirect 
and somewhat weak, and was mixed with plainly misleading 
statements to the effect that content-based regulations are 
"never permitted".11>1 Oddly, too, Mosley framed the issue as 
principally one of Equal Protection rather than as one arising 
simply under the First Amendment. As late as 1980, in Carey v. 
Brown,1I>2 the same theoretical approach was put forth, this time 
by Brennan himself. Subsequently, the rule has been consist-
ently deemed a First Amendment principle, the Equal Protec-
tion reference having quietly disappeared. It was, in fact, the 
decade of the 1980's that produced the crystallization of First 
Amendment law (to the extent that it is crystallized) that we 
regard as foundational today. Thus, the period of the early 
1980's marked the beginning of the relatively consistent prac-
tices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between 
150. 408 u.S. 92 (1972). 
151. Id. at 99. 
152. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
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content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech, of cat-
egorizing public property as "public fora" or not (for purposes of 
freedom of speech), and of applying fixed rules to each of these 
situations. Indeed, the development of "public forum" theory -
notably in the 1983 decision of Perry Educ. Ass'n u. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass'nu3 - did much to anchor the rule of strict 
scrutiny to content-based regulations of speech. None of these 
foundational rules seems likely to change in the near future. 
Unacknowledged inconsistency in the willingness to apply 
these rules, however, may not have entirely disappeared. No 
Justice pointed out, for example, that the FCC order at issue in 
FCC u. Pacifica Found.,!"· in 1978, was content-based, and the 
same was true in the 1986 decision in Bethel School Dist. u. Fra-
ser,m a public school speech case upholding a content-based re-
striction on student expression. Neither decision expressly in-
voked a rule of strict scrutiny. 1"6 
In Young u. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,!'" in 1976, the 
majority (speaking through Justice Stevens) acknowledged that 
the Detroit zoning law in question affected theaters based on the 
content of the films they displayed, yet accepted the city's justi-
fication of the statute without any reference to strict ·scrutiny. 
Stevens considered, at length, the misleading language by Mar-
shall in Mosley that had suggested that content-based regulation 
was never permissible. With that straw man easily knocked 
down, Stevens pointed out (1) that "government's paramount 
obligation" is "neutrality"I"S - an observation that tends to re-
duce the heaviness of the presumption against content regula-
tion; (2) that the kind of speech being regulated by this law -
films featuring "Specified Sexual Activities" - was not deserv-
ing of the fullest First Amendment protection; and (3) that 
"what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on 
153. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
154. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
155. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Nor were the regulatory schemes designed to protect pri-
vacy interests, at issue in the line of cases beginning with Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), characterized as content-based. See the discussion at notes 
369-98, infra. 
156. Surprisingly, Brennan joined in that theoretical lapse in Bethel, concurring in 
the judgment. 
157. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
158. [d. at 70. 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3
1993] FREEDOM OF SPEECH 451 
the place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the 
determination of whether a particular film fits that characteriza-
tion turns on the nature of its content"11i9 - a comment that 
tends to minimize the key distinction between content-based 
and content-neutral regulations. White and Rehnquist joined in 
this singularly ad hoc bit of First Amendment reasoning, while 
Justice Stewart, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
accused the majority of "rid[ing] roughshod over cardinal princi-
ples of First Amendment law."18o (Of course, these principles 
hadn't been "cardinal" for very long.) 
Ultimately, the failure to apply strict scrutiny in Young was 
effectively explained, ten years later, in the remarkably similar 
case of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 18l That deci-
sion blurred the fundamental distinction between content-neu-
trality and content-relatedness. As in Young, the ordinance 
under review required the scattering of theaters exhibiting films 
" 'characteri[zed] by an emphasis on ... "specified sexual activi-
ties" ... .' "182 Rehnquist, for the majority, explained why this 
ordinance should be viewed as a content-neutral time, place and 
manner regulation: 
[T]he Renton ordinance is aimed not at the con-
tent of the films shown at "adult motion picture 
theaters," but rather at the secondary effects of 
such theaters on the surrounding cpmmunity. The 
District Court found that the City Council's 
"predominate concerns" were with the secondary 
effects of adult theaters, and not with the content 
of adult films themselves . . . . 
The District Court's finding ... is more than 
adequate to establish that the city's pursuit of its 
zoning interests here was unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression. The ordinance by its 
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the 
159. [d. at 70-72. 
160. [d. at 85-86. Justice Powell concurred separately. [d. at 73-84. White and 
Rehnquist had also demonstrated a lack of concern about content discrimination the 
previous year, dissenting in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). Rehn-
Quist and Stevens displayed similar insensitivity in the later case of Metromedia, Inc. v. 
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553-55 (1981). 
161. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
162. [d. at 44. 
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city's retail trade, maintain property values, and 
generally "protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of 
[the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, 
and the quality of urban life," not to suppress the 
expression of unpopular views . . . . 
In short, the Renton ordinance is completely 
consistent with our definition of "content-neu-
tral" speech regulations as those that "are justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech." . . . . The ordinance does not 
contravene the fundamental principle that under-
lies our concern about "content-based" speech 
regulations: that "government may not grant the 
use of a forum to people whose views it finds ac-
ceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express 
less favored or more controversial views."163 
It was, despite the usual attempt to make an adroit rewriting of 
doctrine appear to be nothing new, a wholly unprecedented ap-
proach to the understanding of content-neutrality. The last-
quoted sentence, moreover, has reference to viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which has always been treated as worse than, but dis-
tinct from, content discrimination.164 The Court went on to up-
hold the ordinance. 
Only Brennan and Marshall dissented. 16G Surprisingly, how-
ever, Brennan did not take aim at the questionable doctrinal un-
derpinnings of the Rehnquist opinion, but, instead, calmly and 
succinctly stated his disagreement with the majority's approach, 
and then took issue, at greater length, with the majority's use of 
the facts of the case. The ordinance's failure to target bars, mas-
sage parlors, and adult bookstores, he contended, "strongly sug-
gests that Renton was interested not in controlling the 'second-
ary effects' associated with adult businesses, but in 
discriminating against adult theaters based on the content of the 
films they exhibit."166 Applying strict scrutiny, he would have 
invalidated the ordinance. 
Much of the opinion that Brennan might have written in 
163. Id. at 47-49 (citations omitted). 
164. See id. at 56 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
165. Id. at 55-65. Blackmun concurred in the result, saying nothing. Id. at 55. 
166. Id. at 57. 
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Renton he wrote two years later, concurring, with Marshall, in 
Boos v. Barry.167 He wrote separately "to register my' continued 
disagreement with the proposition that an otherwise content-
based restriction on speech can be recast as 'content-neutral' if 
the restriction 'aims' at 'secondary effects' of t~e speech .... "168 
"The dangers and difficulties po~ed by the Renton analy-
sis," he asserted, "are extensive."169 The "secondary effects" ra-
tionale, he went on, offers 
countless excuses for content-based suppression 
of political speech. No doubt a plausible argu-
ment could be made that the political gatherings 
of some parties are more likely than others to at-
tract large crowds causing congestion, ... or that 
speakers delivering a particular message are more 
likely than others to attract an unruly audience. 
Our traditional analysis rejects such a priori cate-
gorical judgments based on the content of speech, 
. . . requiring governments to regulate based on 
actual congestion, visual clutter, or violence 
rather than based on predictions that speech with 
a certain content will induce those effects. The 
Renton analysis, however, creates a possible ave-
nue for government censorship whenever censors 
can concoct "secondary" rationalizations for regu-
lating the content of political speechPo 
The Renton approach, moreover, failed in Brennan's eyes to 
provide courts with sufficient guidance: 
The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line 
rule: any restriction on'speech, the application of 
which turns on the content of the speech, is a 
content-based restriction regardless of the moti-
vation that lies behind it .... The Renton analy-
sis, in contrast, plunges courts into the morass of 
legislative motive, a notoriously hazardous and in-
determinate inquiry .... 
[T]he best protection against governmental at-
tempts to squelch opposition has never lain in our 
167. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
168. [d, at 334 (citations omitted). 
169. [d, at 335. 
170. [d. (citations omitted). 
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ability to assess the purity of legislative motive 
but rather in the requirement that the govern-
ment act through content-neutral means that re-
strict expression the government favors as well as 
expression it disfavors. l71 
The Renton definition of content-neutrality is not without 
its appeal, given the fact that the absence of content-neutrality 
subjects the challenged governmental act to strict scrutiny, a 
very difficult test for the government to pass. Arguably, it is no 
accident that the cases (including Young, Pacifica, and even 
Bethel) in which the Court appeared to ignore the content-based 
nature of the regulation (at least as "content-based" was under-
stood, pre-Renton) were cases in which the regulation was lim-
ited by some element of time or place as well as by· content. 
Thus, these cases, like Renton, may have "felt" more like "time, 
place, and manner" cases (in which something more akin to ad 
hoc balancing takes place)172 than "content" cases - and they 
are cases in which, given the limited impact on speech,173 it is 
arguable that a test of strict scrutiny demands too much. Still, 
Brennan's powerful critique of Renton reveals its potential for 
serious mischief, and it once again marks Brennan (along with 
Marshall) as perhaps more committed to highly speech-protec-
tive rules than any Justice now sitting. 
Thus far, Renton has experienced no growth. Its application 
in Boos v. Barry174 was rejected, not only by Brennan and Mar-
shall, but also by O'Connor, writing for herself, Stevens, and 
Scalia. One issue in that case was the validity of a section of the 
District of Columbia Code making it unlawful to display any 
sign "designed or adapted to ... bring into public odium any 
foreign government, ... or to bring into public disrepute politi-
cal . . . acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government" 
within 500 feet of any building in the District of Columbia used 
by any foreign government as an embassy or consulate.17~ A ma-
jority regarded this statute as content-based, and found that it 
failed to survive strict scrutiny. The District officials argued that 
171. [d. at 335-37. 
172. See discussion at notes 240-80, infra. 
173. See Young, 427 U.s. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring). 
174. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
175. [d. at 316. 
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the case was governed by Renton, in that "the real concern is a 
secondary effect, namely, our international law obligation to 
shield diploinats from speech that offends their dignitY,"176 but 
O'Connor promptly rejected the contention. "Listeners' reac-
tions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred 
to in Renton," she stated. Here, unlike Renton, the regulation of 
speech was justified by reference to its "potential primary im-
pact," i.e., its "emotive impact" on its audience, and thus it was 
indisputably content-based.177 
Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun dissented, for the reasons 
stated by Judge Bork, of the D.C. Circuit, below.178 Bork, inter-
estingly, adverted to Rentor- in a footnote, suggesting that, given 
Renton, the "display" statute in Boos "may not in fact qualify 
as a content-based statute .... [W]hile differentiating on the 
basis of the content of the speech, [the statute] is justified by 
reference to content-neutral values - the need to adhere to 
principles of international law and to provide sufficient protec-
tion to foreign embassies."179 But he confessed to being "not en-
tirely sure" that this analysis was correct180 - and, he didn't 
need it, since he believed that the statute satisfied strict scrutiny 
in any event. A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, as we 
have seen, but possibly one or more of the three dissenters 
would have taken Renton as far as Bork suggested. 
Justice Kennedy provided evidence, in his majority opinion 
for the court in 1989's Ward u. Rock Against Racism,181 that the 
Renton approach to the determination of content discrimination 
was acceptable to him. Ward itself surely involved a content-
neutral regulation. Still, Kennedy's dictum is revealing, and 
questionable: "The principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys."182 He continued: "The government's purpose is the con-
176. [d. at 320. 
177. Id. at 321. Brennan and Marshall, concurring separately, deemed it "ominous" 
that O'Connor could even consider the application of Renton to "political speech." [d. at 
338. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. 
178. [d. at 338. 
179. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
180. [d. at 1469-70 n.15. 
181. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
182. [d. at 791. 
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trolling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unre-
lated to the content 'of expression is deemed neutral, even if it 
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others," citing Renton.18s That is the Renton understanding of 
content-neutrality, not the Brennan understanding.184 
The Court's most recent "expressive conduct" cases, al-
though very different in other ways, have provided further op-
portunities for disagreement on the question: "Is the law con-
tent-based?" An affirmative answer to that question, by 
Brennan for a bare majority, was apparently crucial to the re-
sults in the flag-burning cases of 1989 and 1990, Texas v. John-
sonl811 and United States v. Eichman.186 The dissenters main-
tained, in Stevens' words in Johnson, that the content of the 
flag-burner's message "has no relevance whatsoever to the 
case."187 It is perhaps notable that no dissenter relied on (or 
even mentioned) Renton in these two cases, though doing so 
would not have been inconceivable.188 The flag desecration stat-
utes were by no means the most obvious examples of content-
based regulation, yet Scalia and Kennedy joined Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun in finding that those laws were content-
based (and that strict scrutiny was the consequence). 
It was otherwise, however, in the post-Brennan nude danc-
ing case, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc./ 89 where a different bare 
majority upheld Indiana's ban on nudity in public places, as ap-
plied to nude dancing in barrooms and "bookstores." Every Jus-
tice but Scalia assumed that expressive conduct, within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, was involved. Beyond that 
minimal area of agreement, however, lay substantial differences. 
. Consider first the dissenting opinion of Justice White 
183. [d. 
184. In a footnote to his dissenting opinion, Marshall - joined by Brennan and 
Stevens - protested the use of the Renton theory in a case unlike Renton itself, refer-
ring to the "serious threat to free expression posed by" 'that analysis. [d. at 804 n.1. 
185. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
186. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
187. 491 U.S. at 438. See also id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
188. Brennan himself came closest to mentioning Renton, taking time in Johnson to 
remind his readers that the Court in Boos had rejected the "secondary effect" argument 
therein. [d. at 412. 
189. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
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(joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), because his is the 
presumptively correct approach, and one that deserves close 
attention: 
The purpose of the proscription in [the present] 
contexts is to protect the viewers from what the 
State believes is the harmful message that nude 
dancing communicates . . . . As the State no~ 
tells us, ... the State's goal in applying what it 
describes as its "content neutral" statute to the 
nude dancing in this case is "deterrence of prosti-
tution, sexual assaults, criminal activity, degrada-
tion of women, and other activities which break 
down family structure" .... The attainment of 
these goals, however, depends on preventing an 
expressive activity. 
This being the case, it cannot be that the 
statutory prohibition is unrelated to expressive 
conduct. Since the State permits the dancers to 
perform if they wear pasties and G-strings but 
forbids nude dancing, it is precisely because of 
the distinctive, expressive content of the nude 
dancing performances at issue in this case that 
the State seeks to apply the statutory prohibition. 
It is only because nude dancing performances 
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism 
and sensuality among the spectators that the 
State seeks to regulate such expressive activity, 
apparently on the assumption that creating or 
emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the 
minds of the spectators may lead to increased 
prostitution and the degradation of women. But 
generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the 
essence of the communication . . . . 
That fact dictates the level of First Amend-
ment protection to be accorded the performances 
at issue here. leo 
He then cited Texas v. Johnson (despite his having dissented 
therein), stated that strict scrutiny was called for, and went on 
. 190. [d. at 2473-74 (citations omitted), 
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to find that test unsatisfied in this case .. What is notable here, in 
addition to the "Brennanesque" sensitivity to freedom of ex-
pression shown by White in this opinion, is the fact that the 
content-neutrality argument which he rejected might well have 
been embraced as a variant of the "secondary effects" theory of 
Renton. White was in the Renton majority, and could probably 
provide us with an astute basis for distinguishing Renton from 
Barnes, but that distinction is far from obvious. 
Also notable, perhaps, is the fact that even Rehnquist, writ-
ing for a plurality of three Justices (the others being O'Connor 
and Kennedy), placed no reliance on Renton. Instead, Rehn-
quist, having acknowledged that expressive conduct was in-
volved, simply shifted into an application of the four-part test 
from United States u. O'Brien,t91 without first addressing the 
threshold question of whether the case did or did not involve 
content-based regulation of expression. Under the First Amend-
ment regime recognized in Texas v. Johnson (in which Kennedy 
joined the majority), to apply O'Brien is to have already con-
cluded that the expression has not been targeted because of its 
content. In the course of applying O'Brien, however, the plural-
ity made its key conclusion clear: The state's interest was unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression, because "[p]ublic 
nudity is the evil the state seeks to prevent, whether or not it is 
combined with expressive activity."192 
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, and agreed with 
the majority that the O'Brien test was applicable. But whereas 
Rehnquist saw the statute as furthering "a substantial govern-
ment interest in protecting order and morality,"193 Souter 
preferred to rely "on the State's substantial interest in com-
bating the secondary effects of adult entertainment estab-
lishments ... '. "19' And in this regard he invoked Renton, tying 
that decision to the application of the O'Brien requirement that 
the government interest must (to satisfy this particular test) be 
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression."196 In so doing, 
191. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
192. 111 S. Ct. at 2463. The Scalia concurrence, while theoretically different, shared 
that key characterization of the statute with the plurality. [d. at 2464. 
193. [d. at 2462. 
194. [d. at 2468-69. 
195. 391 U.S. at 377, quoted in 111 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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he found it necessary to rebut the position of Justice White, 
quoted above. Here is the core of Souter's response to the 
dissenters: 
To say that pernicious secondary effects are asso-
ciated with nude dancing establishments is not 
necessarily to say that such effects result from the 
persuasive effect of the expression inherent in 
nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that the 
effects are correlated with the existence of estab-
lishments offering such dancing, without deciding 
what the precise causes of the correlation actually 
are. It is possible, for example, that the higher in-
cidence of prostitution and sexual assault in the 
vicinity of adult entertainment locations results 
from the concentration of crowds of men predis-
posed to such activities, or from the simple view-
ing of nude bodies regardless of whether those 
bodies are engaged in expression or not. In 
neither case would the chain of causation run 
through the persuasive effect of the expressive 
component of nude dancing. 
Because the State's interest in banning nude 
dancing results from a simple correlation of such 
dancing with other evils, rather than from a rela-
tionship between the other evils and the expres-
sive component of the dancing, the interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression. 
Renton is again persuasive in support of this 
conclusion. 186 
He then briefly described Renton, correctly observing that the 
Court therein made its "secondary effects" correlation "without 
need to decide whether the cause of the correlation might have 
been the persuasive effect of the adult films that were being 
regulated. "197 
While the precise issue in Barnes was by no means identical 
to that in Renton, it appears safe to say that Justice Souter, un-
like his predecessor, finds the Renton analysis persuasive, and 
that he is therefore open to questionable arguments pointing to 
a conclusion of content-neutrality in the regulation of expres-
1960 [do at 2470-71. 
1970 [do at 2471. 
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sion. Clearly, his was the decisive vote in Barnes itself. 
There have, of course, been cases in which every Justice has 
agreed that the regulation was based upon the content of speech, 
and in which there was no dissent from the use of strict scrutiny 
to invalidate the law. One recent example is Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC/98 decided in 1989, in which the Court 
(in an opinion written by White) struck down a federal statute 
barring "indecent" interstate commercial telephone messages. 
Another was the 1991 decision in Simpn & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,199 which struck 
down New York's so-called "Son of Sam" law. It is notable that 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals had found the 
law constitutional, yet the Supreme Court (with Justice Thomas 
not participating) was unanimous in reaching the opposite con-
clusion. In contrast to the Court of Appeals majority, Justice 
O'Connor showed great solicitude for First Amendment con-
cerns, both in defining the State's compelling interest narrowly 
and in perceiving the statute as "significantly overinclusive" in 
relation to its (properly-defined) goals.20o It should be said, too, 
that, as a threshold matter, O'Connor properly perceived the law 
as content-based, a characterization that apparently eluded the 
District Court. 
The Simon & Schuster decision provided, in addition, the 
occasion for a most significant (and unexpected) display of 
speech-protectiveness by Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the 
judgment. The core of his concurrence reads as follows: 
The regulated content has the full protection of 
the First Amendment and this, I 'submit, is itself 
a full and sufficient reason for holding the statute 
unconstitutional. In my view it is both unneces-
sary and incorrect to ask whether the State can 
show that the statute "'is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.'" ... . . That test . . . derives 
from our equal protection jurisprudence, ... and 
has no real or legitimate place when the Court 
considers the straightforward question whether 
198. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
199. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). 
200. Id. at 511. 
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the State may enact a burdensome restriction of 
speech based on content only . . . .201 
461 
Here, the regulation was based upon the content of speech, in a 
context to which no "historic and traditional" rule was applica-
ble. Thus, according to Kennedy, "[n]o further inquiry is neces-
sary to reject the State's argument that the statute should be 
upheld."202 
One is entitled to wonder why it took Kennedy over two 
years, during which time he joined in the majority opinions in 
Texas v. Johnson and Sable Communications, to discover the 
ostensible error of the Court's ways in this area of the law, but 
one can still applaud his inclination to abandon a test which (in 
his words) has "the capacity to weaken central protections of the 
First Amendment."2os Yet the test of strict scrutiny has always 
been considered a rigorous and highly speech-protective test, 
and, when it has been applied, there are few examples of laws 
abridging expression that have survived it; indeed, the problem 
has been the persistent effort to bypass it. Why, moreover, 
should a rigorous yet not-inflexible test yield to a rule that, 
within its assigned domain, is absolute? That the Court may 
never have openly discussed the adoption of strict scrutiny in 
the realm of the First Amendment does not necessarily mean 
that, in Kennedy's words, it was adopted without "considered 
201. [d. at 512. 
202. [d. at 513. Kennedy "acknowledged that the compelling interest inquiry has 
found its way into our First Amendment jurisprudence of late" ("of late?"), but submit-
ted that "the Court appears to have adopted this formulation in First Amendment cases 
by accident rather than as the result of a considered judgment." [d. at 513-14. He traced 
the language of strict scrutiny (in first amendment cases) back to the 1980 decision in 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), which, as he correctly observed, had approached 
what was essentially a first amendment case in terms of equal protection. "Thus," he 
concluded, "was a principle of equal protection transformed into one about the govern-
ment's power to regulate the content of speech in a public forum .... " 112 S. Ct. at 513. 
To this extent his use of precedent is acceptable, but, surprisingly, he went on to set 
forth, as evidence of the true governing principle, quotations from the Mosley decision of 
1972, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and the Regan decision of 1984, 468 U.S. 641, supra note 79, 
both of them misleading at the time they were uttered, to the effect that government 
"has no power" to restrict expression because of its content. 468 U.S. at 648-49; 408 U.S. 
at 95 (emphasis added). He regarded that principle, supplemented by "historic and 
traditional categories" of speech regulation, as "preferable to the sort of ad hoc balancing 
that the Court henceforth must perform in every case if the analysis here used becomes 
our standard test." 112 S. Ct. at 514. 
203. [d. at 515. 
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judgment."204 Kennedy earns plaudits for his instinct here, but, 
in the short run, it seems extremely unlikely that he will be 
joined in this radical point of view by any more Justices than 
joined him in his initial expression of it in Simon & Schuster. 
Ironically, however, Kennedy joined a plurality in upholding 
a content-based restriction of speech in the very same term, in 
Burson v. Freeman. 2011 Burson upheld a Tennessee statute 
prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the distribution of cam-
paign materials, on an election day, within 100 feet of the en-
trance to a polling place. Blackmun wrote for the plurality, 
which included Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy.20B Blackmun 
found that the regulation was content-based, applied strict scru-
tiny, and, "reaffirm[ing] that it is the rare case in which we have 
held that a law survives strict scrutiny,"207 found that to be so 
here. The "obviously" compelling interests were twofold: pro-
tecting the right of citizens to vote freely, and protecting "the 
right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliabil-
ity."208 Blackmun underscored the special nature of the case by 
saying that it called for "a particularly difficult reconciliation: 
the accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse 
with the right to vote - a right at the heart of our 
democracy. "209 
This unique confrontation of important interests appears to 
explain the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, who claimed (for 
reasons quite unclear) to concur not only in the judgment but in 
Blackmun's opinion as well. "As I noted in Simon & Schuster," 
he wrote, "there is a narrow area in which the First Amendment 
permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary 
for the accommodation of another constitutional right. "210 Here, 
he suggested, the right to vote was involved, and, for that rea-
son, it seems, his general rule against content-based regulation 
could give way without being given up. The remainder of his 
concurring opinion, embodying an attempt to modify and fur-
204. Id. at 513. 
205. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992). 
206. Scalia concurred on other grounds, id. at 1859, and Thomas took no part. 
207. 112 S. Ct. at 1857. 
208. Id. at 1851. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1859. 
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ther explain his personal content-regulation theory, was totally 
elusive to this writer. 
The Stevens dissenting opmlOn, joined by O'Connor and 
Souter, is one of his finest, and makes mincemeat of the too-
deferential Blackmun plurality opinion. The bulk of Blackmun's 
opinion is devoted to a detailed description of the history of 
election-day abuses and the evolution of responses thereto; the 
analysis therefore appears to deserve Stevens' rebuke that "it 
confuses history with necessity, and mistakes the traditional for 
the indispensable."211 Blackmun upheld the 100-foot boundary 
so readily that, as Stevens protested, the plurality's considera-
tion appears "to be neither exacting nor scrutiny."212 Havi.ng de-
cided that a restricted zone is necessary, Blackmun went on to 
conclude that "the minor geographic limitation prescribed" by 
the Tennessee statute did not even raise "a question of 'consti-
tutional dimension.' "213 
Compare the vigilant Stevens opmlOn, concerned about 
preventing states from "unnecessarily hinder[ing] last-minute 
campaigning"214 (upon which some less affiuent candidates rely 
heavily), and observing "[t]hat some states have no problem 
maintaining order with zones of 50 feet or less,"211! thus strongly 
suggesting "that the more expansive prohibitions are not neces-
sary to maintai~ access and order."216 He was unpersuaded, in 
fact, that there was any need for regUlating speech outside the 
polling place. Stevens, not Blackmun, showed the greater affinity 
for traditional strict-scrutiny analysis on this occasion, pointing 
out significant underinclusiveness in the statute's reach, insist-
ing that it be logically justified, and requiring an evidentiary 
showing by the state in support of that justification. It is an im-
preSSlve and heartening statement by Stevens, O'Connor, and 
Souter. 
Three members of the Burson plurality - Rehnquist, 
White, and the usually-reliable Blackmun - were also together 
211. Id. at 1862. 
212. Id. at 1866. 
213. Id. at 1857. 
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in dissent, with respect to the validity of a content-regulatory 
statutory provision, in Boos u. Barry.217 Again, they stated 
therein only that they would have upheld the law (banning cer-
tain expressive acts within 500 feet of foreign embassies) for the 
reasons'stated by Judge Bork in his' opinion for the Court of 
Appeals. Those reasons, stated in careful detail by Bork,218 were 
wholly bound up with foreign policy concerns and aspects of in-
ternational law. 
Boos and Burson, then, can each be seen as providing spe-
cial reasons for finding strict scrutiny satisfied. Still, the oppos-
ing positions in those cases are so persuasive (while doing no real 
harm to the values underlying the government's position) that 
one must tentatively regard Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun as 
a bit "soft" in the application of strict scrutiny to content-based 
regulation of speech. 
The alignments have shifted, however, with virtually every 
issue. At least in some contexts, Stevens, in particular, has been 
all too ready to overlook the fact of content regulation.219 But, in 
Barnes, as we have seen, Stevens joined White and Blackmun in 
finding content-based regulation, while Souter' and O'Connor 
failed to do so. 
In three other cases of the past two terms, the signals have 
continued to be decidedly mixed. 
Cohen u. Cowles Media CO.,220 in 1991, joins the list of cases 
involving content-based regulation that the Court has inexplica-
bly failed to recognize and address as such. Justice White wrote 
the majority opinion upholding a cause of action for promissory 
estoppel against a newspaper, based upon publication of facts in 
breach of a promise of confidentiality. Blackmun, joined in dis-
sent by Souter, O'Connor, and Marshall, came closest to calling 
217. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
218. See the discussion at notes 179-80, supra. 
219. $ee the discussion at notes 154-60, supra. See also Stevens' partial dissent, 
accepting a content-based regulation that the White plurality rejected, in Metromedia, 
Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553-55 (1981). Rehnquist essentially agreed. [d. at 569-
70. See also the Stevens dissenting opinion in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 
364, 418-19 (1984). 
220. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
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the restriction content-based.221 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement222 offered a ray of . 
sunshine in 1992. Blackmun's majority decision, invalidating a 
parade-permit fee provision because it gave unbridled discretion 
to a county administrator in setting the fee, might have been 
unremarkable, after one accepted his interpretation of the ordi-
nance (as the dissenters were unprepared to do). But Blackmun 
went on to observe, as further reason to find the law invalid, 
that "the ordinance often requires that the fee be based on the 
content of the speech. "223 He explained: 
In order to assess accurately the cost of security 
for parade participants, the administrator" 'must 
necessarily examine the content of the message 
that is conveyed,''' . . . estimate the response of 
others to that content, and judge the number of 
police necessary to meet that response. The fee 
assessed will depend on the administrator's mea-
sure of the amount of hostility likely to be created 
by the speech based on its content.224 
This he would not permit. Furthermore, he rejected, as the 
Court had done in Boos v. Barry, the argument that the ordi-
nance was content-neutral because it was directed only at a 
"secondary effect" of speech; "[l]isteners' reaction to speech is 
not a content-neutral basis for ·regulation."22& Blackmun was 
joined in this highly speech-sensitive opinion by Stevens, 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. 
Finally, there was R.A. V. v. St. Paul,226 the 1992 head-spin-
ner that invalidated St. Paul's "hate-speech" ordinance, in 
which both the majority and the dissenters displayed encourag-
ing instincts, even while disagreeing vehemently among them-
221. Of course, the whole line of cases, culminating in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524 (1989), involving privacy-based restrictions on truthful publication, has pro-
ceeded without explicit recognition of the fact that they involved content-based regula-
tion. But it seems that a rule of strict scrutiny has effectively been applied nonetheless. 
See the discussion at notes 369-98, infra. 
222. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
223. Id. at 2403. 
224. Id. (citations omitted). The dissenters did not expressly disagree with the lan-
guage quoted above. See the discussion at .notes 145-49, supra. 
225. Id. 
226. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
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selves. Scalia, writing for himself, Rehnquist and all three of the 
"new kids" (Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas), essentially ex-
tended the presumptive invalidity of content discrimination into 
the previously-irredeemable realm of "unprotected" expression 
- here, the venerable category of "fighting words". Accepting 
for purposes of decision the Minnesota Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the ordinance as prohibiting only "fighting words," 
Scalia found impermissible content discrimination because the 
particular "fighting words" banned were only those (according to 
the ordinance) "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to 
know [arouse] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion or gender."227 Even with regard to 
"fighting words," he asserted, "government may not regulate use· 
based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying 
message expressed."228 To the argument that bias-motivated 
speech causes injuries that are "qualitatively different" from 
other injuries, he responded: 
What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, 
etc. produced by violation of this ordinance dis-
tinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc. 
produced by other fighting words is nothing other 
than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive 
idea, conveyed by a distinctive message. The First 
Amendment cannot be evaded that easily.220 
Considering the city's justification for this discrimination, 
he found it insufficient, because it was not "necessary" to serve 
the compelling interests in ensuring "the basic human rights" of 
members of historically persecuted minority groups.280 It was 
not necessary, it seemed, because "adequate content-neutral al-
ternatives" existed,231 which apparently meant the simple prohi-
bition of "fighting words" generally - which was slightly odd, 
because even that is not content-neutral in the usual sense of 
the term. But it seems that every Justice would find a wholesale 
prohibition of such "unprotected" words to be acceptable. 
227. [d. at 2541. 
228. [d. at 2545. 
229. [d. at 2548. Somewhat less convincingly, he even saw viewpoint discrimination 
at work here. [d. at 2547-48. 
230. [d. at 2549. 
231. [d. at 2550. 
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Justice White, joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens, 
concurred in the judgment, because he found that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court had failed to properly narrow the ordinance 
to embody a correct understanding of the "fighting words" con-
cept; thus, it was facially overbroad. But he disagreed sharply 
with the key premise of the Scalia opinion: 
It is inconsistent to hold that the government 
may proscribe an entire category of speech be-
cause the content of that speech is evil ... ; but 
that the government may not treat a subset of 
that category differently without violating the 
First Amendment; the content of the subset is by 
definition worthless and undeserving of constitu-
tional protection.232 
That belief, on the part of the Court's veteran centrists - and 
remaining "liberals" - is understandable, but in fact it is less 
speech-protective than the Scalia position, quite regardless of 
what logic might suggest. It is particularly difficult, moreover, to 
understand' why White characterized the majority opinion as 
embracing "a general renunciation of strict scrutiny review;"233 
or why Blackmun asserted that "the Court seems ... inevitably 
to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based 
laws ... thereby weaken[ing] the traditional protections of 
speech."23 .. Blackmun seemed to believe that, by granting some 
protection to hitherto-unprotected speech, the Court will ulti-
mately dilute its protection of other speech. Why that result will 
surely follow, however, is far from clear. In protesting as they 
did, White and Blackmun sounded like the true champions of 
freedom of speech, but the majority - based simply on this de-
cision - has at least as good a claim to that halo. 
Where Scalia seems vulnerable is with respect to his com-
plex scheme of exceptions to his newly-discovered rule; thus, not 
all content discrimination within a category of "unprotected" 
speech is presumptively invalid.2311 White may be right in con-
232. [d. at 2553 (citations omitted). 
233. [d. at 2554. 
234. [d. at 2560. Nor is it clear why Stevens took Scalia to task for establishing "a 
near-absolute ban on content-based regulations of expression." [d. at 2562. 
235. [d. at 2545-47. One such exception, it should be noted, represents the Renton 
"secondary-effects" phenomenon - but, as in Boos v. Barry, it was not deemed applica-
ble here. [d. at 2549. 
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cluding that Scalia's theory, in its full-blown form, "does not 
work and will do nothing more than confuse the law."238 
In the part of his separate concurring opinion in which he 
spoke only for himself, Stevens made clear - probably to the 
surprise of no one - his profound lack of enthusiasm for deci-
sion-making according to categories and general rules. "[I]t is 
just too simple," he said, "to declare expression 'protected' or 
. 'unprotected' or to proclaim a regulation 'content-based' or 'con-
tent-neutral.' "237 He explained at length why he would uphold 
the ordinance, but for its overbreadth. A revealing part of that 
discussion shows Stevens' ingenious ability to avoid the content-
discrimination problem: 
Significantly, the St. Paul ordinance regulates 
speech not on the basis of its subject matter ... 
but rather on the basis of the harm the speech 
causes . . . . Contrary to the Court's suggestion, 
the ordinance regulates only a subcategory of ex-
pression that causes injuries based on "race, 
color, creed, religion or gender," not a subcategory 
that involves discussions that concern those 
characteristics.288 
Scalia called this "word-play."239 It is more than that, but it is 
not a characterization that adds to the protection of speech. 
The Justices have truly taken turns in rejecting or accepting 
content-based regulations of speech. In this branch of the law of 
freedom of speech, none of them appears to be heir to the man-
tle of vigilance worn consistently by Brennan and Marshall. 
B. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER REGULATIONS 
Justice Marshall, dissenting with Brennan in Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non- Violenceuo in 1984, said it all: 
[I)n this case, as in some others involving time, 
place, and manner restrictions, the Court has dra-
236. Id. at 2558. 
237. [d. at 2569. 
238. [d. at 2570 (footnote omitted). 
239. [d. at 2548. 
240. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
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matically lowered its scrutiny of governmental 
regulations once it has determined that such reg-
ulations are content-n~utral. The result has been 
the creation of a two-tiered approach to First 
Amendment cases: while regulations that turn on 
the content of the expression are subjected to a 
strict form of judicial review, regulations that are 
aimed at matters other than expression receive 
only a minimal level of scrutiny. The minimal 
scrutiny prong of this two-tiered approach has led 
to an unfortunate diminution of First Amend-
ment protection. By narrowly limiting its concern 
to whether a given regulation creates a content-
based distinction, the Court has seemingly over-
looked the" fact that content-neutral restrictions 
are also capable of unnecessarily restricting pro-
tected expressive activity .... 
[T]he disposition of this case reveals a mistaken 
assumption regarding the motives and behavior of 
Government officials who create and administer 
content-neutral regulations. The Court's salutary 
skepticism of governmental decision making in 
First Amendment matters suddenly dissipates 
once it determines that a restriction is not con-
tent-based .... What the Court fails to recognize 
is that public officials have strong incentives to 
overregulate even in the absence of an intent to 
censor particular views.241 
469 
Both before and after Marshall wrote those words, the decade of 
the 1980s was a period in which the fact that a regulation of 
speech was content-neutral almost always meant that the gov-
ernment would prevail against "a First Amendment challenge.242 
Prominent examples, prior to the Clark case, were Heffron v. In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,243 in 1981, and Los 
Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent244 in 1984. They 
were followed by Renton246 in 1986, Frisby v. Schultz246 in 1988, 
241. [d. at 312-15 (footnotes omitted). 
242. But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), and Schad v. Borough of 
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
243. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
244. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
245. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
246. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
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and Ward v. Rock Against Racism247 in 1989. Brennan and Mar-
shall dissented in everyone of those cases, sometimes joined by 
Stevens and/or Blackmun. Rehnquist and White were in the ma-
jority in each case, joined by O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy 
once those Justices were on the Court. 
It was in dictum in the Perry Educ. Ass'n248 case, in 1983, 
that White first articulated the version of the standard that has 
apparently taken firm root: "The State may ... enforce regula-
tions of the time, place, and manner of expression which are 
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication."249 Overt doctrinal differences have been few in 
this area. 
The primary theoretical battle took place in a 1989 decision, 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 2 &O The Court in Ward upheld a 
New York City law requiring performers in a certain bandshell 
in Central Park to utilize sound amplification equipment and a 
sound technician provided by the city. The overriding objective, 
simply put, was volume control. The Court of Appeals, insisting 
that a valid time, place, and manner regulation be "the least in-
trusive means" of accomplishing a significant goal, found that it 
was not, given the alternatives, and struck down the regula-
tion.2&1 The Supreme Court reversed, with Kennedy writing for 
247. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
248. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
249. [d. at 45. Earlier formulations, particularly in Heffron, supra note 243, omitted 
the "narrowly tailored" language, which did appear in the early statement of the gov-
erning principle, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), and which Bren-
nan used in his Heffron dissent. 452 U.S. at 658. Justice White reverted to the less pro-
tective Heffron language in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984), and stated, in 
applying the test to the "color" limitation of the federal ban on reproduction of illustra-
tions of currency, "It is enough that the color restriction substantially serves the Govern-
ment's legitimate ends." [d. at 657. (White, for a plurality of four that included Rehn-
quist and O'Connor, treated this color li~itation as a time, place, and manner regulation, 
and upheld it. Stevens concurred in that part of the judgment. Blackmun did not reach 
the issue. Brennan and Marshall stated that they need not reach the issue, but called the 
plurality's reasoning into question. [d. at 688-90 n.27.) Rehnquist put forth an appar-
ently unique verbal formulation of the standard in Renton, in 1986, requiring such regu-
lations to be, inter alia, "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest," City of 
Renton v: Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (emphasis added), thus not 
only omitting the usual "narrow tailoring" requirement, but seeming as well, ironically, 
to elevate the level of the required governmental justification. 
250. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
251. [d. at 789. 
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the five-person majority.m 
Quoting White's plurality opinion in Regan v. Time, Inc.,26a 
Kennedy restated a pronouncement that had engendered no de-
bate at the time of that 1984 opinion, or at any time since: "This 
'less-restrictive-alternative analysis ... has never been a part of 
the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regula-
tion.' "264 He elaborated: 
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we 
reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, 
or manner of protected speech must be narrowly 
tailored to serve the government's legitimate 
content-neutral interests but that it need not 
be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means 
of doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow 
tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation." . . . To be sure, this standard does 
not mean that a time, place or manner regulation 
may burden substantially more speech than is 
'necessary to further the government's legitimate 
interests. Government may not regulate expres-
sion in such a manner that a substantial portion 
of the burden on speech does not serve to advance 
its goals .... So long as the means chosen are not 
substantially broader than necessary to achieve 
the government's interest, however, the regulation 
will not be invalid simply because a court con-
cludes that the government's interest could be ad-
equately served by some less-speech-restrictive 
alternative.266 
Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Brennan 
and Stevens, and he reacted to the majority opinion with alarm. 
"Our cases have not," he wrote, " 'clearly' rejected a less restric-
tive alternative test."266 In practice, Marshall contended, "the 
252. [d. at 784. Blackmun concurred in the result, saying nothing more. [d. at 803. 
253. 468 U.S. 641 (1984). 
254. 491 U.S. at 797. 
255. [d. at 798-800 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
256. [d. at 804. 
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Court has interpreted the narrow tailoring requirement to man-
date an examination of alternative methods of serving the as-
serted governmental interest and a determination whether the 
greater efficacy of the challenged regulation outweighs the in-
creased burden it places on protected speech."2li7 But, tellingly, 
he could cite only two cases,2Ci8 each nearly fifty years old, for 
that proposition. He went on to predict the worst results flowing 
from Kennedy's formulation: 
The majority requires only that government show 
that its interest cannot be served as effectively 
without the challenged restriction .... It will be 
enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation 
advances the government's interest only in the 
slightest, for any differential burden on speech 
that results does not enter the calculus. Despite 
its protestations to the contrary, the majority 
thus has abandoned the requirement that restric-
tions on speech be narrowly tailored in any ordi-
nary use of the phrase.2 &9 
While Marshall probably overreacted to Kennedy's words, it 
does seem fair to suggest that those words took too big a step 
toward inviting judges to demand less in the way of justification 
for content-neutral restrictions on expression. The debate be-
tween Kennedy and Marshall in Ward may well provide the best 
example in First Amendment law of the difficulty of capturing in 
a verbal formulation just exactly how a particular kind of deter-
mination is to be made. At the heart of this analysis, arguably, 
has always been a sensitive balancing, blending a serious solici-
tude for freedom of speech with the recognition that content-
neutral regulations that burden speech are both inescapable and 
relatively non-threatening to core First Amendment values; 
thus, a lesser justification is demanded than would otherwise be 
the case. To insist on the "least restrictive alternative," in this 
context, is arguably to have gravitated into the realm of maxi-
mum judicial scrutiny, which is not quite what anyone had in 
mind. Still, the very act of balancing (much less a requirement 
of "narrow tailoring," as Marshall properly said) implies a con-
257. [d. at 805. 
258. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 
(1939). 
259. 491 U.S. at 806 (footnote omitted). 
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sideration of necessity, and therefore of less restrictive 
alternatives. 
The fact that Marshall had to reach back nearly fifty years 
to find cases to support his vision of the proper analysis, how-
ever, reflects the fact that cases of more recent years had, in ac-
tuality, been decided in accordance with the approach now being 
espoused by Kennedy. Indeed, Marshall and Brennan had regu-
larly, as dissenters, complained that challenged time, place and 
manner regulations were more restrictive of speech than was 
necessary. 
Frisby v. Schultz,260 decided in 1988, is an example. The 
majority upheld an ordinance banning picketing directed at a 
residence, finding it narrowly tailored to achieve the important 
goal of protecting the tranquility and privacy of the home. Bren-
nan, joined by Marshall, protested that the ordinance was not 
narrowly tailored, pointing out that: 
[F]or example, the government could constitu-
tionally regulate the number of residential picket-
ers, the hours during which a residential picket 
may take place, or the noise level of such a picket. 
In short, substantial regulation is permitted to 
neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects 
of picketing around the home. But to say that 
picketing may be substantially regulated is not to 
. say that it may be prohibited in its entirety.2el 
Such differences in approach, along with the intrinsic open-
endedness of the governing standard - what is required under 
the heading of "narrow tailoring," and when are there "ample 
alternative channels of communication?" - suggest that this is, 
in truth, the most unguided area of First Amendment law, and 
thus the one in which Justices most clearly balance interests ac-
cording to their own proclivities. In performing this balancing, 
only Brennan and Marshall consistently favored the interests of 
speech. 
Thus, in Renton,262 only Brennan and Marshall felt that the 
260. 487 u.s. 474 (1988). 
261. [d. at 494. Stevens dissented separately. [d. at 496·99. 
262. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 64·65 (1986). Compare 
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Detroit zoning ordinance left the regulated theaters with less 
than adequate available geographic opportunities for engaging in 
business. In Heffron263 and Clark,264 Brennan and Marshall 
(joined by Stevens in Heffron) would have required evidence in 
support of the state's interests, decrying the majority's indul-
gence of "speculative" problems raised by the government.26lI 
The demand for factual support is, of course, a key component 
of a genuinely demanding level of review, and has not, at least in 
recent times, been in any way associated with the review of time, 
place, and manner regulations. 
In Clark and Taxpayers for Vincent,266 Brennan and Mar-
shall (joined by Blackmun in Vincent), as if to emphasize that 
the analysis truly embodied ,a process of balancing, took time to 
emphasize the nature and significance of the speech interests in-
volved, facts either assumed or cursorily acknowledged by the 
majority. Thus, in Vincent, a decision upholding a municipal 
ban on the posting of signs on utility poles, Brennan stressed 
"the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of 
communication," recognizing such signs as "doubtless 'essential 
to the poorly financed causes of little people.' "267 With respect 
to the availability of alternative channels of communication, 
Brennan responded to the majority's treatment of this element 
by pointing to the absence of any "showing" that the suggested 
alternatives would serve as well.268 In this case, as well, he dis-
played an overt skepticism about the city's alleged interest in 
aesthetics, warning that "the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic 
judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its 
justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a 
reviewing court meaningfully to" evaluate such claims.269 Thus, 
while the majority (speaking through Stevens) accepted the 
city's aesthetic interest as sufficient, Brennan would, again, have 
the less sympathetic remark by Rehnquist, commenting upon the same facts: "That re-
spondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market ... does not give rise to a 
First Amendment violation." [d. at 54. 
263. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981). 
264. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
265. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 661-62; Clark, 468 U.S. at 308-09. 
266. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
267. [d. at 819·20. 
268. [d. at 820. 
269. [d. at 822. 
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required "tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of 
its aesthetic objective," by insisting upon a showing that the city 
was pursuing its purported objective "comprehensively."270 
Whatever one may think of the Court's disposition of each 
of the time, place, and manner cases of the 1980's, it is clear that 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, on occasion joined by Blackmun 
or Stevens, took an approach to these cases that was markedly 
less deferential to government than the rest of the Court. Since 
then, the signals have been mixed. 
In a case in which no other Justice addressed the precise 
point, Justice Kennedy showed himself ready to uphold {what 
270. [d. at 828. An oddity of the Taxpayers for Vincent case is the fact that, despite 
the fact that the ordinance in question clearly fits the description of a content-neutral 
time, place and manner regulation, Stevens, writing for the Court, chose (without real 
explanation) to apply the test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), rather 
than the standard generally used to evaluate the validity of time, place and manner regu-
lations; as it turned out, that theoretical departure probably made no difference to the 
outcome of the case. O'Brien was the first Supreme Court case to confront the issue of 
"symbolic speech," and Chief Justice Warren resolved the precise issue before the Court 
by subjecting the government's regulation of what was assumed to be expressive conduct 
to a brand new four-part test, the thrust of which was to allow such regulation when the 
government had a sufficiently important interest unrelated to the suppression of speech. 
Several weeks after Vincent, the Court decided Clark, supra note 264, a symbolic 
speech case which might naturally have been resolved under O'Brien. In a triumph of 
good sense, however, Justice White, after stating both tests, resolved the case under the 
well-established time, place and manner analysis, and then remarked that "the foregoing 
analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation is sustainable under the four-
factor standard of United States v. O'Brien, ... for validating a regulation of expressive 
conduct, which, in the last analysis, is little, if any, different from the standard applied 
to time, place, and manner restrictions." 468 U.S. at 298. In a footnote, he added: "Rea-
sQnable time, place, and manner restrictions are valid even though they directly limit 
oral or written expression. It would be odd to insist on a higher standard for limitations 
aimed at regulable conduct and having only an incidental impact on speech." [d. at n.8. 
Some of us felt, on the basis of that prescient observation, that the arguably gratuitous 
O'Brien test could, and should, have been laid to rest. 
But it was not to be. Justice Brennan, of all people, invoked O'Brien, understanda-
bly, as the presumptive alternative to the rule of strict scrutiny actually applied in the 
flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and a plurality of the Court has 
since shown, in the Barnes case, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), that the O'Brien test is alive and 
applicable to cases involving conduct (such as nude dancing) possibly, but not inevitably, 
having expressive value. In Barnes, Rehnquist (writing for himself, O'Connor, and Ken-
nedy) alluded to the time, place and manner concept, recalled that "[i]n Clark we ob-
served that this test has been interpreted to embody much the same standards as those 
set forth in U.S. v. O'Brien," and concluded, with no further explanation, that the 
O'Brien test would be applied. [d. at 2460. (Scalia, concurring in the judgment, charac-
terized the O'Brien test as "an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny," which 
he contended was inappropriate. [d. at 2467.) 
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he saw as) a time, place and manner regulation, in the case of 
United States v. Kokinda in 1990.271 In voting to uphold the 
federal ban on soliciting on postal premises, he perceived the 
government's interest (in facilitating postal transactions) as sig-
nificant, and stated, with no elaboration, that the regulation was 
"narrowly drawn." The dissenters, Brennan and Marshall, 
joined by Stevens, did not see the regulation as content-neutral, 
and argued, characteristically, that the total ban was not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the interest in preventing disruption of 
postal business. 
The Barnes272 case of 1991 is also instructive, despite the 
fact that Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, analyzed the Indi-
ana public indecency statute under the test of United States v. 
O'Brien,278 rather than characterizing it as a time, place, and 
manner regulation. Because the O'Brien test has been analogized 
to time, place and manner analysis,274 the application of O'Brien 
is a further indication of a Justice's approach to the evaluation 
of content-neutral regulations of speech. Rehnquist found, in 
Barnes, that the Indiana statute (as applied to nude barroom 
dancing) "furthers a substantial government interest in protect-
ing order and morality,"27& and (with minimal discussion) that it 
was narrowly-tailored to achieve that purpose. Justice Souter, 
concurring in the judgment, essentially agreed.276 The dissenters 
(White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) disagreed that the 
statute was narrowly tailored, but that conclusion mayor may 
not have been tied to the fact that they were applying strict 
scrutiny to a regulation that they perceived as content-based.277 
Finally, in 1992, in Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness ("ISKCON"),278 four Justices (Kennedy, Souter, 
Blackmun, and Stevens) applied time, place, and manner analy-
271. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
272. Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
273. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
274. See note 270. 
275. 111 S. Ct. at 2462. 
276. [d. at 2468-71. He relied illstead on "the State's substantial interest in combat-
ing the secondary effects" - apparently prostitution, sexual assault, and other crimes -
"of adult entertainment establishments of the sort typified by respondents' establish-
ments." [d. at 2468-69. Scalia, concurring in the judgment, apparently rejects the 
O'Brien test, and saw no "speech" implicated here. [d. at 2465-67. 
277. See the discussion at notes 190-91, supra. 
278. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992). 
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sis to a prohibition of the distribution of literature in public air-
port terminals, and found it wanting. With respect to the ban on 
the solicitation and receipt of funds in those terminals, however, 
Kennedy voted to uphold it as a reasonable time, place, and 
manner restriction, while Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens em-
phatically disagreed.279 The other five Justices, finding the ab-
sence of a "public forum," did not need to even apply time, 
place, and manner analysis,280 but O'Connor joined in striking 
down the distribution ban. 
While the result in Lee v. ISKCON offers hope, it is too 
soon to conclude that Marshall's observations are any less accu-
rate today than they were, in Clark, in 1984. 
C. THE "PUBLIC FORUM" LIMITATION 
In the course of determining which public properties or gov-
ernmentally-controlled media of communication are or are not 
"public fora" presumptively available for expressive activity, the 
Court has, virtually from the beginning, been consistently reluc-
tant to resolve the issue against the .government, once its focus is 
beyond the "traditional" realm of streets, sidewalks, and parks. 
Brennan and Marshall were perpetual dissenters in this area of 
First Amendment law. 
The first decision explicitly based on the Court's view that a 
particular piece of public property could reasonably and validly 
be withdrawn from First Amendment activity was Adderly v. 
Florida,281 in 1966. Not until 1974, in Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights,282 was the term "public forum" used in' an opinion so 
holding, and not until the Perry Educ. Ass'n283 decision of 1983 
did the Court clarify the legal consequences of the designations 
"public forum," "limited public forum," and "non-public fo-
rum."284 In each of these cases, the Court held that the govern-
279. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 
27l5, 2724 (1992). 
280. See the discussion at note 318, infra. 
281. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
282. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The term "public forum" had appeared, in a different con-
text, as early as Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
283. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
284. Id. at 45-46. 
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mental situs in question was not a "public forum." After Perry, 
it was clear that such a finding had the effect of reducing the 
standard of judicial review to a very low level. The Court ruled 
similarly in Greer v. Spock28& in 1976, Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Labor Union286 in 1977, Postal Servo v.· Greenburgh 
Civic Ass'ns287 in 1981, Cornelius V. NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educ. Fund288 in 1985, Hazelwood School Dist. V. Kuhlmeier289 
in 1988, United States V. Kokinda290 in 1990, and International 
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness V. Lee291 in 1992. 
One early case in which the question was nqt raised, but 
surely might have been, with the likely effect of changing the 
result, was Cohen V. California292 in 1971, a landmark decision 
on "offensive" speech, which happened to occur in a courthouse 
corridor. Another such instance, also pre-dating the emergence 
of recognized doctrine in this area, was the pioneering students'-
rights decision in Tinker V. Des Moines School Dist.,293 which 
proclaimed, in 1969, that public high school students did not 
"shed their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate."294 The later-developed "public fo-
rum" inquiry was not raised in that decision, in which White 
joined, and, probably because of the Tinker precedent, was not 
raised in the 1986 high school speech decision, Bethel School 
Dist. V. Fraser29& (whose result would not have been changed 
even if it had). By 1988, however, the Court was ready to apply 
the doctrine to the public school setting, in the Kuhlmeier 
case.296 On occasion, notably the Taxpayers for Vincent297 deci-
sion of 1984, the "public forum" question, while apparently per-
tinent (there, in connection with public utility poles), has been 
acknowledged but given inexplicably little weight.298 
285. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). See also United States V. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985). 
286. 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
287. 453 U.S. 114 (1981). 
288. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
289. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
290. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
291. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). 
292. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
293. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
294. Id. at 506. 
295. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
296. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
297. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
298. Justice Stevens, for the majority, appeared to believe, in Vincent, that a utility 
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In only a few cases was a public property not traditionally 
open for expression held, by a majority of the Court, to be a 
"public forum" (more properly, a "limited public forum," post-
Perry),299 most notably the "Hair" case300 of 1975 and Widmar 
v. Vincent301 in 1981. Widmar involved state university facilities 
that were "routinely" made available to student organizations; 
no one dissented on the public forum issue. The "Hair" case, 
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, involved a municipally-
managed auditorium "designed for and dedicated to expressive 
activities."302 Blackmun wrote for the majority, and White and 
Rehnquist dissented, the latter believing that a public audito-
rium could not properly be analogized to a public park. 
Those cases aside, Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the 
majority in virtually everyone of the other decisions in which 
the public forum question was considered.303 Stevens joined 
. their dissenting opinions in Perry and Kokinda (and dissented 
on other grounds in Cornelius), while Blackmun did so in Cor-
nelius, Kuhlmeier, and Kokinda. Justices Rehnquist and 
O'Connor, in contrast, have rejected every non-traditional "pub-
lic forum" argument which they have considered, and nearly the 
same thing can be said of White. 304 
pole (on which the plaintiffs sought to post their campaign signs) was not a public forum, 
a conclusion which, in theory, ought to have been virtually dispositive, on an issue that 
should have been a threshold one. In the process, he appeared, for the most part, to be in 
tune with the prevailing doctrine. [d. at 813-15. Yet he declined, in effect, to rest the 
decision on that point, and, in a footnote, cryptically opined that "it is ... of limited 
utility in the context of this case to focus on whether the tangible property itself should 
be deemed a public forum." [d. at 815 n.32. 
299. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983). 
300. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
301. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Another such holding was Madison School Dist. v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976). (See the Brennan concurrence, 
at 178-79). 
302. 420 U.S. at 555. 
303. An exception for Marshall was the Cornelius case, supra note 288, in which he 
did not participate. Brennan's position almost invariably led him to dissent, the excep-
tion being his concurrence in the judgment, on other grounds, in the Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'ns case, 453 U.S. 114, 134. At times, moreover, their dissenting positions were purely 
on other grounds. See Jones, supra note 286; United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 
(1985). 
304. The exception for White is his concurrence in the judgment in Postal Servo V. 
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 141-42 (1981), in which he called the postal sys-
tem "open" to all protected written expression, but went on, uncharacteristically, to sug-
gest that the inquiry was not a useful one. 
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As opinion writers, the primary architects of the public fo-
rum doctrine have been White (in Perry) and O'Connor (in Cor-
nelius and Kokinda). The doctrine they have fostered, which 
looks first to tradition and then to governmental intent, has 
been accepted by a majority of the Court. In terms of doctrinal 
disagreement (as opposed to mere differences in application),30I1 
Brennan and Marshall initially stood alone, essentially resting 
their positions, in Greer and Greenburgh, on a competing notion 
of "compatibility"308 - i.e., the forum is presumptively open to 
all First Amendment activity not incompatible therewith - that 
is ultimately at odds with the underlying premise of the prevail-
ing public-forum theory. That premise is that, subject to mini-
mal constitutional restrictions, government simply does not have 
to allow expression in non-traditional public settings when it has 
chosen not to do so. 
It was in the Cornelius307 case that the theoretical debate 
took on an added dimension, and one that has survived the de-
parture of Brennan and Marshall. Here, O'Connor, for a plural-
ity of four Justices, set forth the highly limiting principle that 
the existence of a "limited public forum" (in which the usual 
rules of freedom of speech apply) is to be ascertained entirely by 
reference to "the government's intent."308 Blackmun stepped 
forward, joined by Brennan, to write an outstanding critique of 
"the Court's circular reasoning."309 In the process (despite their 
differing positions in Lehman, Greer, and Perry), he aligned 
himself with the Brennan view that the proper approach to this 
aspect of First Amendment analysis should embody an evalua-
tion of "compatibility": 
305. In some cases, such as Lehman, supra note 282, the dissenting opinion rested 
on the contention that the municipal transit system's advertising space had become a 
public forum. In Perry, supra note 283, the dissenters argued that the government had 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination, concededly impermissible even in a non-public fo-
rum; they suggested, but found unnecessary to pursue, the argument that the school mail 
system was indeed a public forum. In Kuhlmeier, supra note 289, too, the dissenters 
declined to take the public forum issue head-on, resting instead on a collection of argu-
ments, embracing viewpoint discrimination, the Tinker precedent, and the absence of 
sufficient governmental justification. 
306. Greer, 424 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 
U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring), 149-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
307. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
308. Id. at 802-04. 
309. Id. at 813. 
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Thus, the public forum, limited-public-fo-
rum, and nonpublic forum categories are but ana-
lytical shorthand for the principles that have 
guided the Court's decisions regarding claims of 
access to public property for expressive activity. 
The interests served by the expressive activity 
must be balanced against the interests served by 
the uses for which the property was intended .... 
Where an examination of all the relevant interests 
indicates that certain expressive activity is not 
compatible with the normal uses of the property, 
the First Amendment does not require the Gov-
ernment to allow that activity. 
The Court's analysis ... turns these princi-
ples on end . . . . [T]he Court simply labels the 
property and dispenses with the balancing . . . . 
. . . The Court offers no explanation why at-
taching the label "nonpublic forum" to particular 
property frees the Government of the more strin-
gent constraints imposed by the First Amend-
ment .... 
The Court's analysis empties the limited-
public-forum concept of meaning ..... The Court 
makes it virtually impossible to prove that a fo-
rum restricted to a particular class of speakers is 
a limited public forum. If the Government does 
not create a limited public forum unless it intends 
to provide an "open forum" for expressive activ-
ity, and if the exclusion of some speakers is evi-
dence that the Government did not intend to cre-
ate such a forum, . . . no speaker challenging 
denial of access will ever be able to prove that the 
forum is a limited public forum.310 
·481 
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, essentially sidestepped 
the "scholarly debate" between Blackmun and O'Connor, re-
marking that he was "somewhat skeptical about the value of this 
analytical approach in the actual decisional process."311 By 
310. [d. at 820-21, 825. 
311. [d. at 833. Recall his opinion for the Court in Taxpayers for Vincent, discussed 
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standing outside the debate, however, he surely gave evidence 
that he would not subject himself to the limitations of the plu-
rality's rigid approach. 
The majority opinion in Kuhlmeier312 three years later, 
written by White and joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, 
and Stevens, seemed to adopt the Cornelius approach, but al-
most certainly the finding of a non-public-forum in Kuhlmeier 
did not depend on that approach, since the student newspaper 
in Kuhlmeier had never truly been "opened" as a forum for un-
censored expression. 
O'Connor wrote again for a plurality in Kokinda313 in 1990, 
refusing to treat a postal sidewalk as the equivalent of a tradi-
tional, ordinary public sidewalk, and utilizing her Cornelius ap-
proach to conclude that the government had not intended to 
open postal premises for expressive activity of the sort in which 
the defendants had engaged (i.e., "soliciting"). Significantly, 
Scalia joined the opinion, along with Rehnquist and White. Just 
as significantly, Kennedy did not, although he concurred in the 
result. While Kennedy ultimately declined to decide the public 
forum question in Kokinda, deeming the ban on solicitation on 
postal premises to be a valid time, place, and manner regulation, 
he indicated clearly that he could not embrace O'Connor's pure 
reliance on tradition and governmental intent: 
While it is legitimate for the Postal Service to en-
sure convenient and unimpeded access for postal 
patrons, the public's use of postal property for 
communicative purposes means that the sur-
rounding walkways may be an appropriate place 
for the exercise of vital rights of expression. As 
society becomes more insular in character, it be-
comes essential to protect public places where 
traditional modes of speech and forms of expres-
sion can take place. It is true that the uses of the 
adjacent public buildings and the needs of its pa-
trons are an important part of a balance, but 
there remains a powerful argument that, because 
of the wide range of activities that the Govern-
at notes 297-98, supra. 
312. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
313. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
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ment permits to take place on this posted side-
walk, it is more than a non public forum. 
This is so even though the Government may 
intend to impose some limitations on the forum's 
use. If our public forum jurisprudence is to retain 
vitality, we must recognize that certain objective 
characteristics of Government property and its 
customary use by the public may control the case. 
See, e.g., Cornelius . .. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
While it is proper to weigh the need to maintain 
the dignity and purpose of a public building, ... 
or to impose special security requirements, see 
Adderly ... , other factors may point to the con-
clusion that the Government must permit wider 
access to the forum than it has otherwise 
intended. S14 
483 
Stevens and Blackmun, as well as Marshall, joined the dis-
senting opinion by Brennan which contended that the postal 
sidewalk was a traditional public forum, and picked up where 
Blackmun had left off in Cornelius in castigating the plurality's 
overall approach to the public forum question. One line from 
this dissenting opinion merits particular attention here: 
Whatever the proper application of public forum 
doctrine to novel situations like fund-raising 
drives in the federal workplace ... or the internal 
mail systems of public schools, . . . we ought not 
unrefiectively transfer principles of analysis de-
veloped in those specialized and difficult contexts 
to traditional forums such as streets, sidewalks, 
and parks.SiG 
The members of the plurality, of course, did not act "unreflec-
tively," nor would they agree that the matter is as simple as 
Brennan suggested. But his comment underscores the difference 
between cases in which the "no-public-forum" holding arguably 
makes sense, and cases in which the rigid application of doc-
trine, with hairs cleverly split, appears to be little more than 
that. Not only does a distinction among sidewalks create the 
likelihood of unnecessary future line-drawing, but the refusal to 
314. [d. at 737-38 (citations omitted). 
315. [d. at 746-47. 
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call that sidewalk even a "limited public forum" (when doing so 
would have been easy, given all the expressive activity permitted 
thereon) seems reflective of a commitment to maximum feasible 
resistance to finding open forums for expression. 
Justice Scalia recently demonstrated the importance, to 
him, of the public forum limitation, by arguing, all alone, that 
the area directly surrounding a polling place is not, by tradition, 
a "public forum" for speech, even to the extent that such an 
area encompasses streets and sidewalks. He thus concurred in 
the judgment in Burson v. Freeman,S16 in which Tennessee's ban 
on electioneering within 100 feet of polling places was upheld. 
But the plurality, which included Blackmun, Rehnquist, White, 
and Kennedy, thought that the regulation touched upon speech 
in "quintessential public forums."317 That Scalia was unable to 
attract the support of any other Justice for his point of view 
suggests just how singular his approach to the "public forum" 
concept may be. 
The division of the Justices in this area of First Amendment 
law was clearly displayed, once again, in the most recent deci-
sion turning on the public forum inquiry, International Soc'y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (HISKCON") v. Lee.318 Five 
Justices - Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas -
held that a publicly operated airport terminal was not a public 
forum, either by tradition or designation. Again, the possibility 
that a non-traditional public forum had been created by desig-
nation was tied to the government's intent. (Thomas, then, has 
aligned himself with this important limitation.) But the four 
Justices who dissented on this point included Kennedy and Sou-
ter, along with the more dependable Blackmun and Stevens. 
Speaking for those four, Kennedy, building on his Kokinda con-
currence, placed himself solidly in the tradition of Justice Bren-
nan in this ongoing doctrinal debate. Displaying admirable resis-
tance to rote acceptance of prevailing dogma, he wrote: 
Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a juris-
prudence of categories rather than ideas or con-
vert what was once an analysis protective of ex-
316. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992). 
317. [d. at 1850. As previously noted, however, they found strict scrutiny satisfied. 
See the discussion at notes 206-10, supra. 
318. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). 
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pression into one which grants the government 
authority to restrict speech by fiat. I believe that 
the Court's public forum analysis in this case is 
inconsistent with the values underlying the 
speech and press clauses of the First 
Amendment.319 
In a country where most citizens travel by auto-
mobile, and parks all too often become locales for 
crime rather than social intercourse, our failure to 
recognize the possibility that new types of govern-
ment property may be appropriate forums for 
speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our . . 
expressive activity.320 
485 
Sounding a great deal like Blackmun in his Cornelius dis-
sent, Kennedy criticized the majority's analysis as one that 
"leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to re-
strict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articu-
lating a non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it leaves 
almost no scope for the development of new public forums ab-
sent the rare approval of the government."321 The requirements 
for inclusion in the designated-forum category, he asserted, "are 
so stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has 
any 'content left at a11."322 In terms highly reminiscent of the de-
parted Brennan, he set forth a promising alternative to the ma-
jority's approach: 
If the objective, physical characteristics' of the 
property at issue and the actual public access and 
uses which have been permitted by the govern-
ment indicate that expressive activity would be 
appropriate and compatible with those uses, the 
property is a public forum. The most important 
considerations in this analysis are whether the 
property shares physical similarities with more 
traditional public forums, whether the govern-
ment has permitted or acquiesced in broad public 
access to the property, and whether expressive ac-
319. [d. at 2715. 
320. [d. at 2717. 
321. [d. at 2716. 
322. [d. at 2717. 
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tivity would tend to interfere in a significant way 
with the uses to which the government has ... 
dedicated the property.323 
Strikingly, Kennedy added the corollary that courts should con-
sider the availability of reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions in undertaking this "compatibility" analysis. Possible 
inconsistencies between expressive activities and the property's 
uses should not defeat a public-forum finding, he argued, "if 
those inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permit-
ted regulations."3u In the present case, involving "the airport 
corridors and shopping areas outside of the passenger security 
zones,"3211 he found all of those elements satisfied. 
Writing separately, Justice Souter - who was addressing 
the issue for the first time - indicated his full agreement with 
Kennedy.326 Thus, two of the youngest Justices have essentially 
adopted the positions previously held by Brennan and Marshall 
with respect to this oft-arising threshold question. Because of 
their relative youth, the highly speech-protective approach 
which they espouse has, now, a greater chance of someday be-
coming law than it has had at any time in the past two decades. 
Once the decision is made that a particular public venue is 
in no way a public forum, the government is, of course, held to a 
very low standard of review; only if the regulation is "unreasona-
ble," or amounts to viewpoint discrimination, will it be found 
unconstitutional. Even at this stage, the Justices have somewhat 
predictably disagreed. In Perry,327 the majority (speaking 
through White, and including Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Black-
mun) saw the school board's policy of selective access to teach-
ers' mailboxes (allowing access to the teachers' union that had 
been elected the exclusive bargaining representative but denying 
access to a rival union) as reasonable and as a policy "based on 
the status of the respective unions rather than their views. "328 
Brennan, however, joined by Marshall and Stevens in dissent, 
saw the exclusive access policy as viewpoint-discriminatory, with 
323. [d. at 2718. 
324. [d. 
325. [d. at 2715. 
326. [d. at 2724. 
327. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
328. [d. at 49. 
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"no discernible state interest" being furthered thereby.329 
In Kuhlmeier,330 the majority (again speaking through 
White) found the principal's censorship of the school newspaper 
to be quite reasonable, while the dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun) thought it "served no legitimate pedagogical 
purpose. "331 
The Kokinda case provides another good example of a set-
ting in which these differing reactions were manifest. Having de-
cided that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum, the plu-
rality went on to rule that the ban on solicitation of money at 
that location was reasonable, "because solicitation is inherently 
disruptive of the Postal Service's business."332 "[C]onfrontation 
by a person asking for money," wrote O'Connor, "disrupts pas-
sage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter 
with a person giving out information."333 She added that the 
regulation did not discriminate on the basis of content or 
viewpoint.334 
For the four dissenters, however, Brennan did not see the 
regulation as content-neutral, demonstrating greater sensitivity 
concerning that distinction once again. 3311 "If a person on postal 
premises says to members of the public, 'Please support my po-
litical advocacy group,' " Brennan explained, "he cannot be pun-
ished. If he says, 'Please contribute $10,' he is subject to crimi-
nal prosecution. His punishment depends entirely on what he 
says."336 That contention was significant, again, only if the pos-
tal sidewalk were viewed as a public forum. Even if it were not, 
however, Brennan - now joined only by Marshall and Stevens 
- could not regard the solicitation ban as "reasonable," for the 
primary reason that other forms of expression, which he saw as 
equivalent in their capacity for disruption, were permitted on 
postal premises. He also felt that restrictions short of a total ban 
329. [d. at 68. 
330. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
331. [d. at 289. 
332. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990). 
333. [d. at 734. 
334. Content discrimination, of course, would not have been impermissible in a non-
public forum. 
335. [d. at 753. See generally the discussion at notes 166-85, supra. 
336. [d. 
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on solicitation were possible, and that, while the least restrictive 
alternative was not required in a non-public-forum, '~these other 
approaches to the problem of disruption are so obvious that the 
no-solicitation regulation can scarcely be considered ... reasona-
ble .... "837 Once again, the Brennan position was maximally 
speech -protective. 
The plurality responded to the dissent, in part, in a way 
that seems revealing. Purporting to address the "reasonable-
ness" question, but perhaps having in mind the threshold public 
forum question, O'Connor said: 
[I]t is anomalous that the [Postal] Service's allow-
ance of some avenues of speech would be relied 
upon as evidence that it is impermissibly sup-
pressing other speech. If anything, the Service's 
generous accommodation of some types of speech 
testifies to its willingness to provide as broad a 
forum as possible, consistent with its postal mis-
sion. The dissent would create, in the name of the 
First Amendment, a disincentive for the Govern-
ment to dedicate its property to any speech activ-
ities at all.888 
O'Connor responded further to Brennan by stating: "Even if 
more narrowly tailored regulations could be promulgated, . . . 
the Postal Service is only required to adopt reasonable regula-
tions, not 'the most reasonable or the only reasonable' regulation 
possible."339 O'Connor, fairly clearly, would invest the "reasona-
bleness" requirement with less meaning than would the Kokinda 
dissenters. 
But in ISKCON, O'Connor demonstrated that she did not 
regard the "reasonableness" requirement as toothless. The dis-
p~te in ISKCON involved a New York Port Authority prohibi-
tion of distribution of written material and "[s]olicitation and 
receipt of funds" in the interior areas of air terminals.8'0 The 
majority, which found no public forum present, had little 
trouble concluding that, as in Kokinda, the solicitation ban was 
reasonable. Justice Kennedy - who, again, did. view the termi-
337. [d. at 763. 
338. [d. at 733. 
339. [d. at 735-36. 
340. 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 (1992). 
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nal as a public forum -joined the majority in this result, seeing 
the ban on "[s]olicitation and receipt of funds" as a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction. a41 
But O'Connor joined Kennedy and the three dissenters to 
form a different majority, in what was technically a' companion 
case arising from the very same dispute. a42 That majority held, 
in a brief per curiam ruling, that the ban on distribution of liter-
ature in the airport terminals was unconstitutional. O'Connor 
deemed the prohibition unreasonable, emphasizing the failure of 
the Port Authority to provide any independent justification for 
this restriction; moreover, she could not "see how peaceful pam-
phleteering is incompatible with the multipurpose environment" . 
of the airports.a4a Kennedy, joined by the Souter group, applied 
time, place, and manner analysis to this prohibition, and found 
it wanting. Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas dissented; in-
voking concerns about congestion, passenger delays, and safety 
hazards, they found even the distribution ban reasonable. 
The Justices remain deeply divided over the concept of the 
public forum, and the longstanding trend in favor of governmen-
tal restrictiveness has yet to be reversed. But, because of Ken-
nedy and Souter, there is now hope for the future in this area of 
First Amendment law. 
IV. INDIVIDUAL CONTENT-BASED CATEGORIES 
A. DEFAMATION 
There has been no indication that anyone on the Court -
other than Justice White - wishes to repudiate the general rule 
of New York Times v. Sullivan,a44 imposing the "actual malice" 
requirement on defamation lawsuits brought by "public offi-
cials" (and, by virtue of later case law,a4G "public figures" as 
well). Further developments in this field, however, have been ac-
companied by constant disagreement. Might any of the detailed 
341. [d. at 2715. 
342. Lee v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 
(1992). 
343. 112 S. Ct. at 2714. . 
344. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
345. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butta, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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rules of the present First Amendment law of defamation be in 
imminent danger of modification? 
After New York Times, the most important Supreme Court 
libel case was Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.,346 decided in 1974. Of 
the five Justices who joined the majority opinion (authored by 
Powell), only Blackmun and Rehnquist remain. Marshall joined 
that majority as well, but Brennan did not. The case held, first, 
that private-figure plaintiffs in defamation cases must demon-
strate fault (presumably negligence), but not "malice," in order 
to prevail, and, second, that such plaintiffs cannot receive pre-
sumed or punitive damages unless they show "malice." Justice 
White dissented at length, taking the position that the Court 
had no sound basis for rejecting the approach of the common 
law (allowing liability and presumed damages upon a showing of 
mere falsity) in the case of a private-figure plaintiff. He was con-
cerned about the impact of the Court's ruling on private citizens; 
he was not worried that preserving the common law to this ex-
tent would likely pose any serious threat to the vitality of the 
press. 
That White has not abandoned his opposition to Gertz was 
demonstrated eleven years later, in his separate concurrence in 
Dun & Bradstreet u. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. S47 Powell wrote 
the plurality opinion, joined only by Rehnquist and O'Connor, 
holding that, in private-figure defamation suits in which the 
false statement is not on a matter of "public concern," presumed 
and punitive damages are available even without a showing of 
"actual malice."348 (The plurality said nothing regarding the 
Gertz standard for proof of liability in a private-figure defama-
tion case; White asserted that that rule must also be inapplica-
ble in a no-public-concern case, but the dissenters maintained 
that the liability requirement had not been questioned.349) The 
fourth and fifth votes for affirmance in Dun & Bradstreet came 
from White and Chief Justice Burger, who would have simply 
overruled Gertz, thus permitting awards of presumed and puni-
tive damages on no special showing. 
346. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
347. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
348. [d. at 761. 
349. [d. at 781. 
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Not only did White urge that Gertz be overruled, he now 
felt that the basic ruling of New York Times was unwarranted: 
In New York Times, instead of escalating the 
plaintiff's burden of proof to an almost impossible 
level, we could have achieved our stated goal by 
limiting the recoverable damages to a level that 
would not unduly threaten the press. Punitive 
damages might have been scrutinized . . . or per-
haps even entirely forbidden. Presumed damages 
to reputation might have been prohibited, or lim-
ited, as in Gertz. Had that course been taken and 
the common-law standard of liability been re-
tained, the defamed public official, upon proving 
falsity, could at least have had a judgment to that 
effect. His reputation would then be vindicated; 
and to the extent possible, the misinformation 
circulated would have been countered. He might 
also have recovered a modest amount, enough 
perhaps to pay his litigation expenses.3GO 
It must be emphasized that he stood alone in these views. Bren-
nan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented, ob-
jecting both to the plurality's general rule and to its application 
here. Remaining from that decision, then, are two Justices 
(Rehnquist and O'Connor) from the plurality; one (White) who 
concurred, on radical grounds; and two (Blackmun and Stevens) 
who dissented, urging no deviation from Gertz. The question 
could thus be decided wholly afresh. 
Another aspect of Dun & Bradstreet is important to note. 
Although the Vermont Supreme Court had based its ruling in 
the case on a distinction between "media" and "non-media" de-
fendants,3lU the plurality totally sidestepped that point. White 
and Brennan agreed that the law of defamation should embody 
no such distinction. 
The only other decision that speaks to fundamental rules, in 
this area of the law, is the 1986 decision in Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps.362 O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, 
350. [d. at 771. 
351. [d. at 752-53. 
352. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
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holding that a private-figure plaintiff in a defamation suit must, 
like a public-figure plaintiff, bear the burden of proving that the 
allegedly defamatory statement was false, at least when the 
speech is on a matter of public concern and when the suit is 
brought against a "media" defendant. Why O'Connor chose to 
speak in such narrow terms is not clear, but it is true that she 
adhered to the precise situation before the Court, adding in a 
footnote: "Nor need we consider what standards would apply if 
the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant . . . . "363 By doing so, 
however, she quickly revived the debate over whether the iden-
tity of the defendant should matter, for any purpose, in the First 
Amendment law of libel. Brennan, briefly concurring with 
Blackmun, wrote separately only to try to dispel, once again, any 
suggestion that it should. Only O'Connor and Blackmun remain 
from the Hepps majority. 
Stevens dissented, joined by White and Rehnquist. In sharp 
contrast to O'Connor - who showed impressive sensitivity to 
the deterrent effect of the common law rule placing on the de-
fendant the burden of proving the truth of a defamatory state-
ment - Stevens, tapping heavily into the Gertz rationale, would 
have given much heavier weight to the interest in protecting the 
reputation of a private citizen.364 Emphasizing the fact that a 
private-figure plaintiff was already obliged to prove "fault" on 
the part of a defendant, he remarked that libels "contribute lit-
tle to the marketplace of ideas,"366 and that "the public's inter-
est in an uninhibited press is at its nadir when the publisher is 
at fault .... "366 He expressed concern about "[t]he danger of 
deliberate defamation by reference to unprovable facts,"367 and 
captured perfectly the difference between his approach and 
O'Connor's with this pronouncement: 
The· Court's result is plausible . . . only be-
cause it grossly undervalues the strong state in-
terest in redressing injuries to private reputations. 
353. [d. at 779 n.4. 
354. Indeed, while he limited his comments to the interests of private-figure plain-
tiffs, he indicated, in a footnote, that he "would be inclined to the view that public 
figures should not bear the burden of disproving the veracity of accusations made against 
them with 'actual malice' ... " [d. at 788 n.lO. 
355. [d. at 782. 
356. [d. at 784. 
357. [d. at 785. 
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The error lies in its initial premise, with its mis-
taken belief that doubt regarding the veracity of a 
defamatory statement must invariably be resolved 
in favor of constitutional protection of the state-
ment .... 338 
493 
The O'Connor position, in Hepps, is thus clearly the more 
speech-protective one. 
On fairly slim evidence, then, with respect to the rules of 
defamation law post-Gertz, these observations can be made: 
White would favor a radical rewriting, Rehnquist is prepared to 
maximize the position of private plaintiffs (short of rewriting 
Gertz), O'Connor and Stevens have staked out "mixed" posi-
tions, and Blackmun has taken the most consistently speech-
protective position. 
Cases since Hepps have not really yielded any further clues. 
In 1989, in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton,36e a unanimous Court upheld a libel judgment in 
favor of a public figure plaintiff against a media defendant; thus, 
no basic rules ~ere called into question. 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal CO.,360 decided in 1990, all 
but Brennan and Marsha:ll joined in a Rehnquist majority opin-
ion that declined to recognize, in the law of defamation, "an' ad-
ditional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion'."361 But, 
using the Hepps decision to bolster his conclusion, Rehnquist 
gave assurance that "Hepps stands for the proposition that a 
statement on matters of public concern" - including an "opin-
ion" - "must be provable as false before there can be liability 
under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the pre-
sent, where a media defendant is involved. "362 Concerning his 
reference to a "media defendant," he added,in a footnote, that 
"[i]n Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving 
nonmedia defendants, . . . and accordingly we do the same. "363 
358. [d. at 787. 
359. 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 
360. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
361. [d. at 21. 
362. [d. at 19-20. 
363. [d. at 20 n.6. 
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- No subsequent case has involved a nonmedia defendant. 
The Court remanded Milkovich because the Ohio courts 
had erroneously recognized an "opinion" exception under the 
First Amendment. It may be worth noting, however, that the 
Ohio Supreme Court had also decided that Milkovich was a pri-
vate figure, yet no Supreme Court Justice reached out, in this 
case, to suggest rewriting any of the rules (from Gertz to Hepps) 
applying to private-figure defamation suits. Admittedly, how-
ever, this appeal was by no means the most appropriate context 
in which to do so. 
In the most recent Supreme Court decision in the libel field, 
1991's Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,s64 White and 
Scalia showed themselves to be more inclined than their col-
leagues to impose liability, albeit in a special setting. The plain-
tiff, a public figure, accused the media defendants of knowingly 
misquoting him. The District Court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants, finding that the alleged inaccuracies did not 
raise a jury question concerning the required "actual malice," 
but the Supreme Court reversed. For the majority, Justice Ken-
nedy "reject[ed] any special test of falsity for quotations," con-
cluding "that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a 
plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity ... unless the 
alteration results iJ) a material change in the meaning conveyed 
by the statement."S6G The Court reversed the grant of summary 
judgment with respect to all except one of the quoted passages 
at issue; that one, said Kennedy, "did not materially alter the 
meaning of [Masson's] statement."S66 But White, joined by 
. Scalia, was less tolerant of knowing misquotations, believing 
that the mere fact that the reporter wrote things that she knew 
Masson had not said amounted to "knowing falsehood,"367 and, 
therefore, "actual malice" within the meaning of the rule of New 
York Times. . 
The four most junior members of the Court have thus re-
vealed little in terms of their thinking on the large, general is-
sues in the First Amendment law of defamation. With their el-
364. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). 
365. [d. at 2432-33. 
366. [d. at 2436. 
367. [d. at 2437-38. 
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ders in disagreement, almost anything could happen. 
B. PUBLICATION OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION 
Although the Court has not singled out, as a special cate-
gory, the power of government to penalize the publication (typi-
cally, but not necessarily, by the press) of truthful information, 
in a non-commercial setting raising no other well-established ba-
sis for suppression,366 it is arguably appropriate to do so. Over 
the past two decades, the Court has decided a line of cases gen-
erally upholding the right of the press to publish facts, over the 
objection~ of public and private parties asserting interests in pri-
vacy or confidentiality. That nearly unbroken string of press vic-
tories entitles one to ask: Will the press always enjoy the right to 
print the truth? A few cases that do not fit the prevailing pat-
tern may shed some light on this issue as well . 
. In 1975, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn369 initiated the 
core pattern of cases in which the press has consistently pre-
vailed. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court, avoiding 
broader-than-necessary pronouncements, but asserting that the 
First Amendment commands "that the States may not impose 
sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained 
in official court records open to public inspection."37o Three 
more cases of the late 1970's essentially followed Cox, in situa-
tions involving somewhat varied facts. 371 None involved unlawful 
acquisition of the published information, but in one, Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, it did not appear that the 
confidential information was in any way available to the public. 
By the last of these decisions, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Co., in 1979, it appeared that strict scrutiny was being applied to 
these laws. No Justice dissented, on the merits, in any of these 
four cases,372 but, in the Daily Mail case, Rehnquist showed that 
368. Compare, e.g., cases in which the government interest in national security was 
invoked as a basis for suppressing the publication of truthful information. E.g., New 
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
369. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
370. [d. at 495. 
371. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 
430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
372. Rehnquist dissented on jurisdictional grounds in Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 
501. 
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he was not truly in accord with his colleagues. In Daily Mail, the 
Court held unconstitutional a West Virginia statute prohibiting 
publication by newspapers of the names of minors subject to ju-
venile court proceedings, finding that the law did not appear to 
achieve its purposes. Only Rehnquist, concurring in the judg-
ment, made clear that he considered the state's interest in pre-
serving the anonymity of such juveniles to be compelling, and 
that, absent the limitation to newspapers, he would have upheld 
the statute.373 
Ten years later, the fundamental issue pervading these 
cases returned to the Court, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.374 Justice 
Marshall wrote the opinion, upholding the right of a newspaper 
to publish the name of a rape victim which it had obtained from 
a publicly released police report. Significantly, White, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor would have allowed the State to prohibit 
such a publication.37CI In keeping with the earlier precedents, 
Marshall eschewed sweeping propositions, expressly declining 
"appellant's invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication 
may never be punished consistent with the First Amend-
ment."376 His approach, however, was not ad hoc; rather, he 
adopted this governing principle from the Daily Mail case: "[I]f 
a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a mat-
ter of public significance then state officials may not constitu-
tionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to 
further a State interest of the highest order."377 Again, this 
sounds like strict scrutiny, which should be the standard appli-
cable to the content-based regulations involved in cases of this 
kind. Note, however, the three potential limitations upon the 
applicability of strict scrutiny that are suggested by the Daily 
Mail formulation: (1) the defendant must be a "newspaper" -
or, more sensibly, a representative of the communications media; 
(2) the published fact must be "about a matter of public signifi-
cance"; and (3) the information must have been lawfully ob-
tained.378 Treating each of these elements as though it might be 
373. 443 U.S. at 106·10. 
374. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
375. The proceeding in question was actually a civil suit, by the rape victim, alleging 
negligent violation of a Florida statute. The majority stopped short of striking down the 
statute, despite producing an opinion that seemed to lead to doing just that. 
376. Id. at 532. 
377. Id. at 533. 
378. Only the last point was recognized specifically by Marshall as an issue that did 
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a condition precedent to a First Amendment victory, Marshall 
found each of them satisfied in this case, including, most nota-
bly, the conclusion that the news article concerned "a matter of 
public significance." "That is," he wrote, "the article generally, 
as opposed to the specific identity contained within it, involved 
a matter of paramount public import: the commission, and in-
vestigation, of a violent crime .... "379 His apparent lack of con-
cern about whether the victim's name itself was "a matter of 
public significance" can be seen as seriously weakening whatever 
limiting force this element of the analysis might have, and must 
therefore be seen as reflective of a speech-protective approach. 
Marshall went on to find that the state's interests were 
"highly significant," but that the statute was not necessary to 
the achievement of those privacy interests.38o The state had 
more limited means of maintaining the confidentiality of the in-
formation, the negligence per,se standard swept too broadly (ap-
parently in contrast to the typical common law cause of action 
for invasion of privacy), and the statute was fatally underinclu-
sive in applying its prohibition only to "instrument[s] of mass 
communications."3s1 Given the majority's premises, finding these 
flaws in the Florida law required no departure from standard 
judicial analysis. In addition to Brennan, the majority included 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy. 
White, dissenting with Rehnquist and O'Connor, distin-
guished all prior cases, and took issue with each of the majority's 
bases for finding the Florida law insufficiently tailored to achieve 
its goals. Perhaps most significantly, the dissenters, unlike the 
majority, felt that the state had done virtually all it could to 
keep the victim's name confidential, notwithstanding the fact 
that the government itself had inadvertently provided the name 
to the newspaper. Although the dissenters quibbled with the au-
thoritativeness of the Daily Mail formulation adopted by Mar-
shall, they put forth no competing standard of review. Appar-
ently they would have performed a balancing of sorts, and they 
showed themselves ready, for the first time in a case of this kind, 
not require resolution in this case, Id, at 535 n.B. 
379. Id. at 536-37. 
3BO. Id. at 537. 
3B1. Id. at 539-40. Justice Scalia concurred on the basis of the majority's third 
ground for invalidation. Id. at 541. 
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to rule against a publisher of truthful information, at least under 
certain circumstances. 
The following year. the Court reverted to form with a unani-
mous decision in an easy case, Butterworth v. Smith,382 striking 
down a Florida statute banning a grand jury witness from ever 
disclosing testimony he gave before that body. Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, reiterated the Daily Mail standard. But the 
opinion resolved the dispute narrowly, finding an insufficient 
state interest to justify "a permanent ban" on disclosure, even 
after the grand jury has been discharged - but taking no ex-
press position on the validity of the ban prior to that discharge. 
Perhaps it is significant that not even Brennan or Marshall 
wrote separately to reject such an implicit distinction.383 
It is true, of course, that no contemporary Justice has in-
sisted that there is an absolute right to publish truthful informa-
tion. In 1984, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,38. a unanimous 
Court upheld a trial court's protective order, granted in connec-
tion with an order compelling extensive pre-trial discovery im-
plicating privacy interests, which had the effect of barring the 
publication of facts. As Justice Powell's majority opinion seemed 
to recognize, however, the setting was "unique."3811 
Two other cases that depart from the basic pattern may also 
be instructive. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
CO.,386 in 1977, a majority of the Court, speaking through White, 
held that a circus performer could bring a "right of publicity" 
claim against a television station which had broadcast in a news 
program a film of his "entire act."387 White likened the suit to 
those involving claims of copyright infringement, which had 
382. 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
383. The Court also seemed to assume the validity of another part of the statute, 
which bars a witness from disclosing the testimony of another witness before the grand 
jury - a point admittedly not before the Court. And Scalia, concurring, took an even 
narrower view of precisely what the state was prohibiting, suggesting a commensurately 
greater willingness than his colleagues to uphold a prohibition on the disclosure of truth-
ful information. [d. at 636-37. 
384. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
385. [d. at 34. Brennan and Marshall, concurring, wrote separately to emphasize the 
importance of the competing interests - "in privacy and religious freedom" - involved. 
[d. at 38. 
386. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
387. [d. at 575. 
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. never been thought to create First Amendment problems.888 But 
Brennan and Marshall joined the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Powell, who demonstrated a strong commitment to the protec-
tion of the broadcasting of "newsworthy" information: 
"[H]aving made the matter public - having chosen, in essence, 
to make it newsworthy - [the performer] cannot, consistent 
with the First Amendment, complain of routine news 
reportage. "389 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. u. Falwell390 is not, of course, a case 
that truly involves the publication of factual information. But, 
in a sense, the Court's disposition of the case, unanimously dis-
allowing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
proceeds on the effective assumption that Hustler's statements 
about Falwell were not false, the jury's rejection of Falwell's def-
amation claim having taken out of the case any basis for recov-
ery based upon falsity. Perhaps more importantly, the Court ar-
ticulated a standard that would disallow such claims generally 
(at least where "public figures" were concerned), unless the 
claim arose from a provably false statement satisfying the "mal-
ice" requirement of New York Times. 391 As such, this case 
should also be counted among the decisions upholding the right 
of "truthful" publication against tort-based claims. 
Against this background, the Court's 1991 opinion in Cohen 
u. Cowles Media CO.892 is not encouraging. Granted, Cohen was 
not a tort case, nor did it concern interests in privacy or confi-
dentiality. It did, however, by permitting a claim against a news-
paper based on a theory of promissory estoppel, allow for the 
possibility of civil liability on the part of the press based upon 
the publication of truthful information. Cohen claimed that the 
newspaper had published information about him, in breach of a 
promise of confidentiality, that caused him to lose his job. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment 
388. [d. at 576-77. With respect to the interaction of copyright law and the first 
amendment, see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 
(1985). 
389. 433 U.S. at 582. 
390. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
391. [d. at 56. 
392. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
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barred such a claim, but the United States Supreme Court 
reversed. 
Justice White, for the majority, began by stating that the 
case was not controlled by the Daily Mail-Florida Star line of 
cases, "but rather by the equally well-established line of deci-
sions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the 
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news."393 This was arguably the key to the majority's ruling, be-
cause, for them, it took strict scrutiny out of the case. But, as 
Blackmun pointed out in dissent, the First Amendment argu-
ment in this case was "premised, not on the identity of the 
speaker, but on the speech itself."s94 The "laws-of-general-appli-
cation" cases cited by White, he observed, were inapposite be-
cause "these cases did not involve the imposition of liability . 
based upon the content of speech."s911 
To the suggestion of content discrimination, White re-
sponded by saying that, in cases like Daily Mail and Florida 
Star: 
[T]he State itself defined the content of publica-
tions that would trigger liability. Here, by con-
trast, Minnesota law simply requires those mak-
ing promises to' keep them. The parties 
themselves . . . determine the scope of their legal 
obligations and any restrictions which may be 
placed on the publication of truthful information 
are self-imposed.se8 
This rationale for the decision is a bit more satisfying, and 
should make the case highly distinguishab~e from any case lack-
ing the "self-imposed" limitation made actionable here. Still, 
was there no need for a consideration of the strength of the 
State interest in imposing liability on a newspaper in these cir-
393. Id. at 2518. 
394. Id. at 2520. 
395. Id. at 2521. He conceded that Zacchini was the "only arguable exception," but 
. properly di~tinguished that case, too. Id., n. 1. Blackmun also wondered how this holding 
could be squared with Hustler, which involved a tort of general applicability. Id. at 2521-
22. 
396. Id. at 2519. White added, most unhelpfully, a suggestion that the information 
might not even have been "lawfully" obtained, since it was obtained "only by making a 
promise which [the newspaper] did not honor." Id. 
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cumstances? Apparently, the majority thought not. Rehnquist, 
Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the White majority opinion. 
Justice Souter, joined in dissent by Marshall and O'Connor 
as well as Blackmun, did feel the need to evaluate the strength 
of the state interest at hand. Rejecting the "self-imposed"-loss 
theory of the majority, Souter reminded them that First Amend-
ment rights are not limited to "the speaker alone," but are 
shared by the reading public as well.397 In this case, he found a 
strong public interest in receiving the information (which was 
relevant to a gubernatorial election), and the state interest in 
enforcing the newspaper's promise insufficient to outweigh that 
interest in publication. He added that he could conceive of strik-
ing the balance differently, where, for example, "the injured 
pa!ty is a private individual, whose identity is of less public con-
cern than that of the petitioner."39s 
After Cohen, the Court is farther than ever from a position 
of protecting all truthful publication from governmentally-im-
posed sanctions. An absolutist position was probably never real-
istic or appropriate, but Cohen (along with the dissent in Flor-
ida Star) suggests that the Court's collective instinct in this area 
is presently less than ideal. Individually, on the basis of admit-
tedly slim evidence, Blackmun is the most speech-protective in 
this respect, with Souter making a promising debut. White and 
Rehnquist have been the least protective, with O'Connor, Ste-
vens, Kennedy, and Scalia splitting their votes in the tw~ major 
cases. 
C. OBSCENITY 
There is no reason to think that the Court is likely to 
change its basic direction with respect to obscenity. Three Jus-
tices -. White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist - were in the majority 
that adopted the Miller v. California399 formulation, and none 
has since shown any inclination to disavow fealty to that ap-
proach.40o O'Connor has consistently joined in decisions for 
397. [d. at 2523. 
398. [d. 
399. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
400. See the pertinent Miller-based opinions by Rehnquist in Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Blackmun in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); and 
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which Miller provides the clear foundation, such as Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades",ol in 1985 and Pope v. Illinois 402 in 1987. Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy joined opinions in Fort Wayne Books, 
Inc. v. Indiana403 and Sable Communications v. FCC,",o4 both in 
1989, which were also (although less directly) premised on 
Miller. 
In Pope, however, Scalia, while concurring, indicated "the 
need for reexamination of Miller,""'ol'> observing that the Court 
was not asked to reconsider Miller at that time. Unlike the ma-
jority, he correctly perceived problems with the adoption of an 
objective approach to Miller's "value" prong, but deemed that 
resolution "the most faithful assessment of what Miller in-
tended.,,",o6 Scalia could thus be expected to take the initiative in 
modifying the Miller standard, but it seems quite unlikely that 
he would seek to alter its essence. 
Now that Brennan and Marshall are gone, Justice Stevens 
remains the only Justice who is known to oppose the Court's 
basic approach to the issue of obscenity. Beginning with his par-
tial dissent in Marks v. United States",07 in 1977, he has been a 
consistent dissenter in cases involving obscenity.",o8 His basic po-
sition, set forth at length in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. 
United States'09 in 1977, is that criminal sanctions (as opposed 
to civil remedies) represent a constitutiol)ally unacceptable re-
sponse to obscenity. He was particularly troubled by the uncer-
tainty and illusoriness of "community standards," and he 
concluded: 
White in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 
497 (1987), Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), and Ward v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 767 (1977). 
401. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
402. 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
403. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
404. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
405. 481 U.S. at 504-05. 
406. Id. 
407. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
408. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 70 (1989); Pope v. Illi-
nois, 481 U.S. 497, 507 (1987); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777 (1977); Splawn v. ,Cali-
fornia, 431 U.S. 595,602 (1977); but see Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 , 
(1985); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 305 (1978). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 
U.S. 103, 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
409. 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 
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In the final analysis, the guilt or innocence of a 
criminal defendant in an obscenity trial is deter-
mined primarily by individual jurors' subjective 
reactions to the materials in question rather than 
by predictable application of rules of law . 
. . . In my judgment, the line between com-
munications which "offend" and those which do 
not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct. It 
is also too blurred to delimit the protections of 
the First Amendment.410 
. 503 
He restated those objections, ten years later, in dissent (with 
Marshall) in Pope v. Illinois, continuing to object to the 
criminalization of "mere possession or sale of obscene literature, 
absent some connection to minors, or obtrusive display to un-
consenting adults."411. This was, of course, the Brennan position 
as well, from 1973 onward.412 Stevens seems no more likely to 
move a majority of the Court toward acceptance of his views 
than was Brennan during the period from 1973 to 1990, when 
three or four Justices stood ready to revoh,}tionize the law of ob-
scenity.413 Now, Stevens probably stands alone. 
At least the Court has shown itself unwilling to expand the 
concept of obscenity, by summarily affirming, in 1986, the deci-
sion in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut414 which invali-
dated a sweeping ordinance embodying a radical expansion of 
pros crib able sexually explicit expression. 
The only other recent development of note in this area. 
again involves Scalia - and the venerable concept of "pander-
ing." This alternative basis for a finding of obscenity was first 
recognized in 1966, in Ginzburg v. United States,OIl and was en-
dorsed by the Court, post-Miller, in 1977 in Splawn v. Califor-
nia.oe In Splawn, Stevens, along with Brennan and Marshall, 
410. [d. at 316. 
411. 481 U.S. at 513. In a footnote, he reiterated his distinction of "civil regulation 
of sexually explicit material, an area in which the States retain substantial leeway." [d. 
at 516-17 n.11. 
412. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973). 
413. Justice Stewart joined the Brennan dissent in Paris, id., and Douglas (Stevens' 
predecessor) dissented as well. 
414. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) . 
. 415. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
416. 431 U.S. 595 (1977). See also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978). 
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protested. The point emerged anew (albeit in the shadow world 
of partially dissenting opinions) in 1990 in FW /PBS, Inc. v. Dal-
las.417 That decision, again, struck down a city licensing scheme 
pertaining to "sexually oriented businesses" because the law did 
not contain the requisite procedural safeguards. 
On this point, Scalia dissented, and in the process he put 
forth an expansive and surprising theory of "the business of ob-
scenity."418 Taking note of the spate of recent governmental at-
tempts to deal with pornography through creative means (e.g., 
zoning laws), he asserted: 
It does not seem to me desirable to perpetu-
ate such a regime of prohibition by indirection. I 
think the means of rendering it unnecessary is 
available under our precedents .... That means 
consists of recognizing that a business devoted to 
the sale of highly explicit sexual material can be 
found to be engaged in the marketing of obscen-
ity, even though each book or film it sells might, 
in isolation, be considered merely pornographic 
and not obscene. 
[A] merchant who concentrates upon the sale 
of such works is engaged in the business of ob-
scenity, which may be entirely prohibited and 
hence (a fortiori) licensed as required here.419 
The inspiration for this theory, clearly, was Ginzburg - but 
Ginzburg dealt with the obscenity of individual works, and not 
the potential illegality of entire businesses. "Ginzburg, read to-
gether with Miller," continued Scalia, "establishes at least the 
following: The Constitution does not require a State or munici-
pality to permit a business that intentionally specializes in, and 
holds itself forth to the public as specializing in, performance or 
portrayal of sex acts, sexual organs in a state of arousal, or live 
human nudity."42o That his theory was addressed to businesses, 
rather than individual works, he saw as a virtue: 
417. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
418. [d. at 256. 
419. [d. at 253, 256. 
420. [d. at 258. He then went on, somewhat questionably, to read the Dallas ordi-
nance in question as capable of fitting his "pandering" theory. [d. at 259. 
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The basis of decision I have described ... entails 
no risk of suppressing even a single work of sci-
ence, literature, or art - or, for that matter, even 
a single work of pornography. Indeed, I fully be-
lieve that in the long run it will expand rather 
thap constrict the scope of permitted expression, 
because it will eliminate the incentive to use, as a 
means of preventing commercial activity patently 
objectionable to large segments of our society, 
methods that constrict unobjectionable activity as 
well!21 
505 
Only Stevens responded to him on this point. Ginzburg, he 
said, "was decided before the Court extended First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech," and thus cannot survive,,22 
"If conduct or communication is protected by the First Amend-' 
ment, it cannot lose its protected status by being advertised in a 
truthful and inoffensive manner."423 Given the evolution of the 
Court's commercial speech doctrine, the conclusion that such 
advertising cannot be banned is in fact far from clear,,24 But the 
notion that a bookstore or theater could be shut down simply 
because it holds itself out as offering sexually provocative mate-
rial is a major departure from fundamental First Amendment 
principles - and, judging from Scalia's aloneness in putting 
forth such a suggestion, one may presume that the other Justices 
thought so, too. 
D. NON-OBSCENE SPEECH THAT OFFENDS 
Speech is often regulated because of its capacity to offend, 
for a variety of reasons. It is - or at least, has been - hornbook 
law that the fact that particular expression may give offense, or 
cause anger, is not a sufficient ground for its suppression."211 The 
commitment of the Justices to that proposition, however, does 
not appear to be universal or absolute. In exploring the present 
status of that commitment, it may prove useful to proceed ac-
cording to categories of cases, each involving (in ways that are 
421. [d. at 264. 
422. [d. at 249. 
423. [d. 
424. See the discussion at notes 468-79. infra. 
425. Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1. 5 (1949). 
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roughly related within each category) a different reason why a 
listener or viewer might be offended. 
1. Pornography, Nudity, and Sex 
Although there are no special rules applicable to regulations 
bearing upon non-obscene expression involving nudity or sexual 
explicitness, regulation in this realm has generally been upheld, 
in the absence of facial overbreadth428 or the omission of crucial 
procedural safeguards.427 The major problem has been the fail-
ure, on several occasions, to recognize or treat such regulations 
as content-based (and, accordingly, to apply strict scrutiny). The 
cases exemplifying this failure are Young428 (1976), Renton429 
(1986), and Barnes430 (1991), each of which has already been dis-
cussed in the section on ~ontent discrimination.431 Thus, zoning 
restrictions of "adult" theaters and bookstores were upheld, as 
was a ban on nude dancing in similar establishments. (As has 
already been noted, White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, 
along with Marshall, in Barnes, the most recent such case.) 
When content discrimination has been recognized (explicitly 
or implicitly), as in Sable Communications u. Fccm (1989) (in-
volving "indecent" "dial-a-porn" telephonic -messages), and 
Erznoznik u. City of Jacksonuille433 (involving nudity on drive-
in theater screens), the results have been different. Justice Pow-
ell's majority opinion in the 1975 Erznoznik case seemed, too, to 
reject the contention that a public display of nudity could be 
prohibited on the ground that unwilling spectators might be of-
fended; but Rehnquist and White, in dissent, appeared to 
disagree.434 
Young, decided a year after Erznoznik, deserves further 
mention because Stevens, writing for a plurality that included 
Rehnquist and White, asserted therein that society's interest in 
426. E.g., Schad V,. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
427. E.g., FWIPBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
428. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
429. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
430. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
431. See the discussion at notes 157-66 and 189-97, supra. 
432. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
'433. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
434. [d. at 209-12, 220-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 224 (White, J., dissenting). 
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protecting "erotic materials that have some arguably artistic 
value ... is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the 
interest in untrammeled political debate .... "4311 
But a mere focus on matters sexual, in and of itself, has not 
sufficed to sustain regulation of non-pornographic literature on 
the ground that recipients may be offended. Thus, in Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corp.,436 in 1983, the entire Court struck 
down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited ad-
vertisements for contraceptives, even while applying the less de-
manding level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. As in 
Erznoznik, the majority (which included White, Blackmun, and 
Stevens) rejected the "offensiveness" rationale as insufficient to 
justify suppression of speech; Rehnquist and O'Connor, however, 
while concurring in the judgment, would not have dismissed that 
justification out of hand.437 
2. Profanity 
But for stare decisis, would Cohen v. California,438 the 
landmark free speech decision of 1971, be decided the same way 
today? Consider that neither of the two remaining Justices from 
that Court - White and Blackmun - joined the majority in 
Cohen. Of course, White did not reach the merits of the case, 
and it was a very different Justice Blackmun that dissented 
more than twenty years ago; would he vote today as he did 
then? As much as he has evolved over the years, nothing that 
Blackmun has said or done in later decisions provides a clear 
basis for concluding otherwise. 
Dissenting in 1972's Gooding v. Wilson,439 a case decided on 
facial overbreadth grounds but involving a. man who cursed at 
435. 427 U.S. at 70. Souter quoted this language with approval, 15 years later, in his 
Barnes concurrence, 111 S. Ct. at 2470. 
436. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). The Court distinguished the 1970 decision in Rowan u. 
United States Post Office Dep't - also unanimous - upholding a federal statute which 
allowed a householder to insulate himself from the receipt of certain mail which the 
householder deemed "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 397 U.S. 728, 730 
(1970). 
437. 463 U.S. at 71-72,77-78. Accord, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 
701 (1977) (but see Stevens' separate opinion, id. at 716-17). 
438. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
439. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
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police officers during an altercation, Blackmun invoked Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire"o (the quintessential "fighting words" 
case), and stated: "For me, Chaplinsky . .. was good law when it 
was decided and deserves to remain as good law now .... But I 
feel that by decisions such as this one and, indeed, Cohen v. Cal-
ifornia ... the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is 
merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky."441 
Later that same year, Blackmun dissented again, along with 
Rehnquist, when the Court summarily vacated and remanded a 
trio of decisions for reconsideration in light of Cohen and Good-
ing. In one of those cases, Rosenfeld v. New JerseY, .. 2 the appel-
lant had used profanity while addressing a public school board 
meeting attended by children as well as adults. Blackmun joined 
a dissenting opinion by Justice Powell, who would have upheld 
the conviction. That opinion contained these significant 
passages: 
But the exception to First Amendment protection 
recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to words 
whose mere utterance entails a high probability of 
an outbreak of physical violence. It also extends 
to the willful use of scurrilous language calculated 
to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling 
audience. 
[C]ertainly the State has an interest - per-
haps a compelling one - in protecting nonassent-
ing citizens from vulgar and offensive verbal 
assaults.443 
Rehnquist added a dissenting opinion, with respect to all 
three cases, which Blackmun also joined, in which he indicated 
displeasure with Cohen and basic agreement with the Powell 
view of Chaplinsky.'" 
440. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
441. 405 U.S. at 536-37 (citations omitted). 
442. 408 U.S. 901 (1972). The others were Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972), 
and Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972). 
443. 408 U.S. at 905, 907. 
444. [d. at 912. 
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The following year, in Papish u. Board of Curators,H" the 
Court upheld the right of a graduate student at a state univer-
sity to use profane and vulgar material in a newspaper distrib-
uted on campus. Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. They dis-
sented again, in 1974, when Lewis u. New Orleans·H6 returned to 
the Court, this time meeting with outright reversal on facial 
overbreadth grounds. The dissenters viewed the appellant's pro-
fane outburst (directed at a police officer) as a species of punish-
able "fighting words." 
In 1978, those two Justices were, along· with Stevens, part of 
the majority that upheld the famous FCC order in the "George 
Carlin case," FCC u. Pacifica Foundation.H7 As he had done' 
earlier in Young, Stevens (joined in this part of his opinion by 
Rehnquist) relied in part on a characterization of the speech at 
issue (here, Carlin's vulgar monologue) as speech of relatively 
low value.H8 Blackmun joined Powell's concurrence, largely dis-
tinguished by its refusal "to decide on the basis of its content 
which speech protected by the First Amendment is most 'valua-
ble' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is 
less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."449 They 
relied instead on the combination of the intrusion of radio into 
the home and the consequent potential effect upon children.4"o 
No subsequent Supreme Court case has involved restriction 
of speech on similar grounds, with the highly distinguishable ex-
ception, in 1986, of Bethel School Dist. u. Fraser,461 a case in-
volving a sexually suggestive campaign speech by a public high-
school student at an assembly. Only Marshall and Stevens dis-
sented, and the latter did so on due process grounds. The fact 
that even Brennan concurred in the judgment, howeverl suggests 
445. 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
446. 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
447. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
448. [d. at 744-48. 
449. [d. at 761. 
450. [d. at 755-62. Brennan and Marshall dissented on first amendment grounds. 
White dissented on statutory grounds. In 1987, the Court summarily affirmed a Court of 
Appeals decision reaching a different result with respect to "indecent" material shown on 
cable television. Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), aff'g Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 
F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986). Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented. 
451. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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how relatively weak a case it was for protection of the student's 
speech. 
At present, four members of the Court (and O'Connor as 
well if one puts Bethel aside) have had no meaningful occasion 
to either apply the "fighting words" concept4112 or to address the 
question of how profane or vulgar (but non-obscene) speech 
should be treated under the First Amendment. This is an area, 
in any event, in which even the "liberals" (Blackmun and Ste-
vens) have not been liberal. 
3. Beyond Pornography and Profanity 
Here is where the modern Court has protected speech to the 
greatest extent. Beyond the realm of the profane or the porno-
graphic, the Court has, in recent years, consistently rejected gov-
ernmental attempts to justify restrictions of expression on the 
grounds that some listeners or viewers may be offended by what 
they see or hear. 
The flag-burning cases of 1989 and 1990, Texas u. John-
son4&3 and United States u. Eichman,454 stand in part for that 
proposition. The majority in those cases, of course, refused to 
uphold the flag desecration laws on that basis. It will, of course, 
surprise no one to point out that, with Brennan and Marshall 
gone, the 5-4 majorities of those decisions might not be repli-
cated, should the precise issue resurface. But it is appropriate to 
quote from Stevens' dissent in Eichman, speaking for himself, 
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor: "Of course 'the Government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because soci-
ety finds that idea itself offensive or disagreeable.' ... None of 
us disagrees with that prohibition."455 Rehnquist said much the 
same thing in his dissent in Johnson.45e The dissenters urged 
that it was the flag-burner's "use of this particular symbol, and 
452. In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the majority easily and quickly re-
jected the suggestion that the burning of an American flag could fit the longstanding 
definition of "fighting words" as "a direct personal insult." [d. at 409. None of the dis-
senters suggested otherwise. 
453. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
454. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
455. [d. at 319. 
456. 491 U.S. at 432. 
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not the idea that he sought to convey by it" for which he was 
punished.u7 Their position, in these presumably unique cases, 
did not seem to rest on the likelihood of offensiveness to wit-
nesses, but that element was not entirely missing from the 
Rehnquist dissent in Johnson. Speaking for himself, White, and 
O'Connor, he said, analogizing to Chaplinsky: "Here it may 
equally be said that the public burning of the American flag by 
Johnson was no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and at 
the same time it had a tendency to incite a breach of the 
peace."4IIS Laudably resisting such a characterization, in addition 
to Brennan and Marshall, were Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,4I!J9 decided without dis-
sent in 1988, is another case which demonstrates the Court's re-
fusal to let the offensiveness of non-profane, non-obscene speech 
serve as adequate justification for its suppression. Granted, the 
holding of Hustler can be quite narrowly stated. Given an obvi-
ously fictitious printed parody of a public figure (suggesting in-
cest, no less), as to which a defamation claim had been rejected 
by a jury, the Court essentially ruled that a claim for damages 
under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
constitutionally impermissible. That the plaintiff was a public 
figure may well have been crucial to the result. It was, moreover, 
a situation in which a violent response was virtually inconceiv-
able. Nonetheless, the decision reflects a high degree of protec-
tiveness of expression on the part of the Court. For the majority, 
Rehnquist quoted Stevens, from the Pacifica case: " '[T]he fact 
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason 
for suppressing it' ".'60 If that pronouncement, and the Court's 
unanimity in making it, seems unremarkable, that simply shows 
how deeply embedded certain fundamental principles of free-
dom of expression have become. 
The 1992 decision in R.A. V. v. St. Paul461 reaffirmed this 
commitment to the protection of highly offensive speech. Con-
sider first the position of the four concurring Justices, speaking 
through Justice White, finding the St. Paul "hate-speech" ordi-
457. [d. 
458. [d. at 430. 
459. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
460. [d. at 55. 
461. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
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nance facially overbroad. Focusing on the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the law as limited to a subset of "fight-
ing words," White understood that court to say 
that St. Paul may constitutionally prohibit ex-
pression that "by its very utterance" causes "an-
ger, alarm or resentment." 
Our fighting words cases have made clear, 
however, that such generalized reactions are not 
sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional 
protection. The mere fact that expressive activity 
causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does 
not render the expression unprotected.462 
White was joined by Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor in ap-
plying that reasoning to the St. Paul Ordinance, despite its limi-
tation to speech inflicting emotional harm on the basis of race, 
religion, or gender. 
A question that will undoubtedly be explored by many is: 
What would this group of Justices allow? In the section of his 
opinion rejecting the theory of the majority, White made refer-
ence to "the social evil of hate speech,"463 and criticized the ma-
jority for "legitimat[ing] hate speech as a form of public discus-
sion."464 But White's logic and language point strongly to the 
conclusion that only "fighting words" (traditionally, a direct per-
sonal insult likely to produce an immediate violent response'6!!) 
which provoke "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der" can validly be punished as a means of deterring "hate 
speech. "466 
The majority in R.A. V., speaking through Scalia, probably 
surprised nearly everyone by stating that "fighting words," de-
462. [d. at 2559. 
463. [d. at 2553. 
464. [d. at 2553-54. 
465. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
466. 112 S. Ct. at 2553. The majority opinion, said White (speaking now only for 
three), "signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of intimidation and 
racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on someone's lawn, are of sufficient value to 
outweigh the social interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such 
fighting words outside the First Amendment." [d. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
It must be acknowledged, however, that a more focused statute, divorced from the 
"fig)tting words" concept, might possibly be accepted by these Justices. 
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spite their "unprotected" status, have some expressive value af-
ter all, and that content discrimination within that category was 
presumptively invalid.467 The city's attempt to justify the dis-
tinction met with no encouragement by this group of five Jus-
tices. Does that mean that they would look favorably upon no 
regulation of this kind other than a "fighting words" statute of 
general applicability? It may well mean that. 
The·Court has thus been vigilant in rejecting the contention 
that an offending idea may justify suppression of speech. The 
Justices have largely been far less vigilant when non-obscene 
material of a sexually suggestive nature has been involved, and 
it is far from clear that the Court would adhere to the protection 
afforded profane speech more than twenty years ago in Cohen v. 
California. 
E. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
1. Generally 
The Court has not decided a commercial speech case 
(outside the rather specialized area of attorney advertising) since 
1989, prior to the arrival of Justices Souter and Thomas. The 
Court did not, of course, extend First Amendment protection to 
commercial advertising until 1976, in the Virginia Bd. of Phar-
macy468 case. Justice Rehnquist seemed quite troubled by that 
extension from the beginning, as his dissenting opinion in . Vir-
ginia Pharmacy demonstrated,469 and he made his opposition 
plain in his dissent in the first attorney advertising decision, 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.'70 No one else has taken that po-
sition, however, and Rehnquist has not publicly adhered to it.471 
467. [d. at 2547-49. Note, too, that none of these Justices raised any question as to 
the continuing viability of the half-century-old "fighting words" concept, which is pre-
mised on the notions that, first, a speaker may be held responsible for the anticipated 
violence of a listener, and, second, that "an average addressee" can be expected to react 
to certain insults with violence. 
468. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
469. [d. at 781. Rehnquist had also dissented, with White, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 
421 U.S. 809 (1975), the decision that presaged the doctrinal breakthrough of Virginia 
Pharmacy. He dissented again in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), 
which struck down a ban on contraceptive advertising. 
470. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
471. Compare his dissent in Central Hudson to his majority opinion in Posadas de 
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But what the Court gave in Virginia Pharmacy it has, in 
significant part, taken away in its decisions of the 1980s. Pow-
ell's opinion for the Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Servo Comm'n·72 in 1980, was justifiably challenged by 
Blackmun (joined by Brennan) in his concurring opinion. Pow-
ell, of course, set forth a four-part test for evaluating restrictions 
on commercial advertising, and found the New York regulation 
wanting only with respect to the fourth part of the test; the 
state's interest in minimizing demand for electricity was an ac-
ceptably "substantial" reason for barring advertising promoting 
the use of electricity. Blackmun, the author of the groundbreak-
ing Virginia Pharmacy opinion, saw the implications: 
I do not agree ... that the Court's four-part test 
is the proper one to be applied when a State seeks 
to suppress information about a product in order 
to manipulate a private economic decision that 
the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed 
directly . 
. . . [T]he Court ... leaves open the possibil-
ity that the State may suppress advertising of 
electricity in order to lessen demand for electric-
ity. I, of course, agree with the Court that ... en-
ergy' conservation is a goal of paramount ... im-
portance. I disagree with the Court, however, 
when it says that suppression of speech may be a 
permissible means to achieve that goal. 473 
He continued: 
I seriously doubt whether suppression of in-
formation concerning the availability and price of 
a legally offered product is ever a permissible way 
for the State to "dampen" demand for or use of 
the product. Even though "commercial" speech is 
involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the 
heart of the First Amendment. This is because it 
is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the 
choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct 
Puerto Rico, infra at note 476. But he has nearly always voted to uphold regulations of 
commercial speech, the unusual exception being Bolger V. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 75 (1983). 
472. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
473. Id. at 573-74. 
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regulation, but by depriving the public of the in-
formation needed to make a free choice.474 
515 
Concurring separately, Stevens indicated a similar reaction:m 
The theoretical division of Central Hudson became genuine' 
disagreement as to result in the 1986 decision, Posadas de Pu-
erto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.·76 Rehnquist 
wrote for the .majority in upholding a Puerto Rico restriction on 
advertising of casino gambling. Observing that Puerto Rico 
could have prohibited casino gambling by residents of Puerto 
Rico altogether, he asserted: "In our view, the greater p'ower to 
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising of casino gambling."·77 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Writ-
ing for himself, Marshall, and Blackmun, Brennan restated the 
philosophical basis of the Blackmun concurrence in Central 
Hudson, and asserted that "where the government seeks to sup-
press the dissemination of nonmisleading commercial speech re-
lating to legal activities, for fear that recipients will act on the 
information provided, such regulation should be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny. ".76 In keeping with that high degree of sug-
gested protection for commercial speech, he went on to criticize 
the majority for not requiring Puerto Rico to prove the substan-
tiality of its purported interests and the absence of less restric-
tive means for the accomplishment thereof. The. differences in 
approach between the Justices were thus quite sharp. Of the dis-
senters, only Blackmun and Stevens remain. From the majority, 
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor remain. 
In the Court's most recent commercial speech case, Board of 
474. [d. at 574-75. 
475. [d. at 579-83. "But if the perceived harm ... is not sufficiently serious to justify 
direct regulation, surely it does not constitute the kind of clear and present danger that 
can justify the suppression of speech." [d. at 581. 
476. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
477. [d. at 345-46. 
478. [d. at 351. See also the unusual case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Iftc. v. 
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), in which only Brennan and Marshall· would 
have stricken a statute which the majority upheld as a permissible regulation of commer-
cial speech. [d. at 560-73. Only they perceived an effect upon non-commercial speech -
a position more likely,' in prior cases, to have been raised by Stevens. See Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. 557,579 (1980); Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983). 
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Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox,·&79 Scalia wrote for a ma-
jority which included Kennedy and Stevens, as well as Rehn-
quist, White, and O'Connor. The majority held that it was not 
part of the test for the validity of regulation of commercial 
speech to require that the government utilize the "least restric-
tive means" of achieving its goal. That decision reveals little or 
nothing about how Scalia or Kennedy would have voted in, for 
instance, the Posadas case, but it is certainly inconsistent with 
Brennan's invocation of strict scrutiny (at least some of the 
time) in commercial speech cases. Although they did not empha-
size their apparent disagreement with the majority on the 
"least-restrictive-means" issue, Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar-
shall dissented, once again, in Fox. 
2. Attorney Advertising 
With respect to the constitutionality of state bar rules regu-
lating advertising by attorneys, the battle lines have been clearly 
drawn - and the future of most such advertising depends upon 
the views of Justices Souter and Thomas. Rehnquist, O'Connor, 
and Scalia stand ready to change the rules in this area. Kennedy 
and White, along with Blackmun and Stevens, do not. 
Rehnquist, of course, dissented at his first opportunity, in 
the seminal Bates case of 1977. He, as well as O'Connor, joined 
in the unanimous decision in 1982's In re R.M.J.,4BO but by 1985 
those two Justices had registered the first of three significant 
dissents to rulings invalidating restrictions of attorney advertis-
ing. That 1985 decision was Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel,'f81 in which Justice White, for the majority, struck 
down an Ohio rule forbidding attorney ads containing advice re-
garding a specific legal problem. Everyone had agreed, in the 
Ohralik"B2 case of 1978, that case-specific in-person solicitation 
could be banned, but the Court in Zauderer felt that a newspa-
per advertisement was quite distinguishable. O'Connor's dissent 
suggested far-reaching disagreement with the majority's ap-
proach, and that suggestion blossomed into a major pronounce-
479. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
480. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
481. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
482. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
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ment three years later. 
In 1988, the Court held, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar 
Ass'n,483 that the use of direct mail by an attorney, even when 
addressed to a potential client known to be facing a particular 
legal problem, was protected commercial speech. The majority, 
speaking through Brennan and including Kennedy, saw neither 
the letter nor the comparable newspaper advertisement as inher-
ently misleading or overreaching. O'Connor, joined now by 
Scalia as well as Rehnquist, disagreed: 
Applying [the Central Hudson] test to attorney 
advertising, it is clear to me that ,the States 
should have considerable latitude to ban advertis-
ing that is "potentially or demonstrably mislead-
ing," ... as well as truthful advertising that un-
dermines the substantial governmental interest in 
promoting the high ethical standards that are 
necessary in the legal profession.484 
Advertising the price of an initial consultation might be accept-
able, she continued, but: 
As soon as one steps into the realm of prices 
for "routine" legal services ... however, it is quite 
clear to me that the States may ban such adver-
tising completely. The contrary decision in Bates 
was in my view inconsistent with the standard 
test that is now applied in commercial speech 
cases.481i 
Bates was wrong, she explained, because of the impossibility of 
knowing in advance of consultation whether a legal problem is or 
is not truly "routine"; hence, such price advertising is inherently 
misleading.48B Solicitation practices are even worse, because they 
are misleading and have "a tendency to corrupt the solicitor's 
professional judgment."487 The Court's decision in Shapero, she 
concluded, "confirmed the need to reconsider Bates . ... "488 
483. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
484. [d, at 485 (citations omitted), 
485. [d. 
486. [d, 
487. [d, at 486 .. 
488. [d. at 487. 
105
Rohr: Freedom of Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
518 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:413 
In 1990, those three Justices dissented once more, this time 
accompanied by White, in Peel v. Attorney Regist. and Disc. 
Comm'n,489 from a ruling upholding an attorney's right to hold 
himself out as "certified" by a national organization. Stevens, 
writing for a plurality that included Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Kennedy, rejected the argument that Peel's letterhead was mis-
leading by virtue of the certification announcement, but the 
O'Connor group of dissenters disagreed. Marshall and White 
each thought the letterhead announcement to be "potentially 
misleading" and thus subject to regulation, but were led in dif-
ferent directions as to the disposition of Peel's particular case; 
Marshall concurred in the judgment, while White dissented.490 
Thus, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia not only want to 
overrule Bates, but have also been most apt to perceive advertis-
ing and promotional devices employed by attorneys as inher-
ently misleading. Stevens, Blackmun, and Kennedy, on the other 
hand, have been least inclined to think so. 
F. THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
1. Freedom of Speech 
The setback in this area has already occurred, in the form of 
the highly deferential 1983 decision in Connick v. Myers. 491 Jus-
tice White wrote that opinion, which changed the law in this 
area by imposing a threshold requirement that, in order for the 
employee's job-related speech to be protected, it must bear upon 
"a matter of public concern."492 The majority (which included 
Rehnquist and O'Connor) then displayed great deference to the 
government in deciding both that most of Ms. Myers' operative 
speech was not on a matter of public concern (even though it 
involved the operation of a district attorney's office) and that 
the subsequent balancing of interests favored the government 
employer. Said White, most candidly and significantly: 
When close working relationships are essential to 
fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of 
deference to the employer's judgment is appropri-
489. 496 U.S. 91 (1990). 
490. [d. at 111-17 (Marshall, J., concurring), 118-19 (White, J., dissenting). 
491. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
492. Id. at 146. 
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ate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for 
an employer to allow events to unfold to the ex-
tent that the disruption of the office and the de-
struction .. of working relationships is manifest 
before taking action.493 
519 
The actual effect of Ms. Myers' speech upon the agency was 
minimal, as Brennan observed in dissent. He was joined by Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Steven~. 
The. Court considered only one other case of this kind after 
Connick, that being .the unusual matter of Rankin v. McPher-
son"94 in 1987. By virtue of Justice Powell's vote in favor of the 
public employee, the Connick. dissenters were able to form a 
bare majority in Rankin, applying Connick in a way that was 
highly protective of speech. Although her speech was fairly out-
rageous, the plaintiff was a low-level employee who had minimal 
contact with either the public or the official who presided over 
the office, and the speech at issue occurred in a private conversa-
tion with a co-worker. To Powell, who concurred with the Mar-
shall majority opinion, this last fact was apparently the key. 
Nonetheless, Scalia dissented, joined by Rehnquist, White, and 
O'Connor. Those Justices felt that the right of the public em-
ployee (a deputy sheriff of sorts) to privately express the hope 
that the President be assassinated was outweighed by "Consta-
ble Rankin's interest in maintaining both an esprit de corps and 
a public image consistent with his office's law enforcement du-
ties."4911 They also rejected the conclusion that her statement ad-
dressed a matter of public concern. 
While the Scalia position in Rankin, had it prevailed, would 
not in itself have threatened a great deal of speech by public 
employees, it is a position less protective of speech than that of 
the Rankin majority. How Justices Kennedy, Souter, or Thomas 
would rule in such a case is unknown. 
2. Freedom of Association 
It is questionable whether the Court's jurisprudence in the 
493. [d. at 151-52 (footnote omitted). 
494. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
495. [d. at 401. 
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realm of public employees' rights of political affiliation will sur-
vive the departures of Brennan and Marshall. In a trilogy of 
cases extending from 1976 to 1990 - Elrod v. Burns,"96 Branti 
v. Finkel;1.97 and Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill."98 - those 
two Justices, joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, voted 
consistently to apply First Amendment principles to the vener-
able patronage practices of hiring and firing public employees 
according to political party membership. In Branti in 1980, Ste-
vens put forth the governing principle: "The question is whether 
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an 
appropriate requirement· for the effective performance of the 
public office involved.""99 In the case of an assistant public de-
fender, the majority's answer was negative. Justice Rehnquist 
joined the dissent of Justice Powell, whose disagreement with 
the majority was fundamental; the Court erred, in their view, by 
ignoring "the substantial governmental interests served by 
patronage. "1100 
In Rutan in 1990, Brennan extended the reasoning of Elrod 
and Branti, which dealt with dismissals, to patronage hiring and 
promotions, toughening the rhetoric of these decisions, in fact, 
by stating that only "vital government interests" could justify 
these practices.llol 
This time Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he 
made it clear, on behalf of himself, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and 
Kennedy, that he would overrule Elrod and Branti as well. The 
use of strict scrutiny, he asserted, was unprecedented and un-
called for in this area. Assuming for purposes of discussion the 
propriety of some sort of balancing test, these four Justices 
would strike the balance in favor of governmental power to util-
ize a patronage system, not even seeing the restrictive effect on 
public employees (or potential public employees) as "a signifi-
cant impairment of free speech or free association."1I02 Elrod and 
Branti should, at a minimum, be distinguished and not ex-
496. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
497. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
498. 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
499. 445 U.S. at 518. 
500. [d. at 523. 
501. 497 U.S. at 74. 
502. [d. at 110. 
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tended, Scalia argued, but in, fact they should be overruled: 
Even in the field of constitutional adjudication, 
where the pull of stare decisis is at its weakest, 
... one is reluctant to depart from precedent. But 
when that precedent is not only wrong, not only 
recent, not only contradicted by a long prior tra-
dition, but also has proved unworkable in prac-
tice, then all reluctance ought to disappear. In my 
view that is the situation here.lIoa 
521 
Scalia then proceeded to demonstrate the conflicting results (in 
the lower courts) and consequent uncertainty that have flowed 
from Branti. 
Scalia's referenc,e to tradition provided the basis for a 
wholly independent rationale for opposing the Court's handi-
work in this area, but in this he was joined only by Rehnquist 
and Kennedy. The provisions of the Bill of Rights, he wrote: 
did not create by implication novel individual 
rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, 
when a practice not expressly prohibited by the 
text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement 
of a long tradition of open, widespread, and un-
challenged use that dates back to the beginning of 
the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking 
it down . 
. . . Given that unbroken tradition ... , there 
was in my view no basis for holding that pa-
tronage-based dismissals violated the First 
Amendment .... 1104 
If either Justice Souter or Justice Thomas were to agree 
with these dissenting Justices, the reign of Rutan could be short, 
and the Court could seize the opportunity to overrule this entire 
line of cases. 
503. [d. at 110-11 (citations omitted). 
504. [d. at 95, 97 (footnote omitted). 
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G. THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS 
Again, a major blow has already been struck, this time in 
the 1988 case of Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier.r.or. A ma-
jority consisting of Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
O'Connor, and Scalia upheld the power of a public high school 
principal to effectively censor the content of a student newspa-
per linked to a journalism class. For the first time in a public 
school case, the Court invoked the "public. forum" doctrine, and 
found that the newspaper was not a public forum. Of the three 
dissenters, only Blackmun remains. (Kennedy was not yet 
aboard.) 
Kuhlmeier arguably did nothing to undermine the power of 
the classic Tinker decision of 1969,r.06 which upheld the right of 
students to engage in non-school-sponsored speech on school 
grounds, as long' as that speech does not substantially interfere 
with the operation of the school or the rights of others. Only 
White, the author of the Kuhlmeier majority opinion, remains 
from the Tinker Court, where he also joined the majority. But 
Tinker predated the development of the "public forum" doc-
trine, which, if applied to public schools in accordance with its 
most recent use generally,r.07 could wholly eviscerate the force of 
Tinker. 
Even without applying "public forum" analysis, the Court 
in 1986, in Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser,"08 rejected a student's 
right to be free from discipline for making a sexually suggestive 
campaign speech at a high school assembly. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing for the majority, adverted to the Tinker standard, 
but really relied on a new (and unstructured) rationale, namely 
that government had the power, through the schools, to incul-
cate values of civility in students. Only Marshall dissented on 
First Amendment grounds, while Stevens' dissent rested, essen-
tially, on due process grounds. Blackmun silently concurred in 
the result. Brennan, somewhat surprisingly, concurred sepa-
rately, coming close to sharing in Burger's reasoning while mak-
505. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
506. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
507. See the discussion at notes 307-13, supra. 
508. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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ing more pointed references to the student's "disruptive" lan-
guage,1I09 and cautioning that "[t]he authority school officials 
have to regulate such speech by high school students is not lim-
itless. "1110 The Fraser decision surely modified Tinker to a signif-
icant extent. 
In Kuhlmeier, White expressly distinguished the Tinker 
situation: 
The question whether the First Amendment 
requires a school to tolerate particular student 
speech - the question that we addressed in 
Tinker - is different from the question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirma-
tively to promote particular student speech. The 
former question addresses educators' ability to si-
lence a student's personal expression that hap-
pens to occur on the school premises. The latter 
question concerns educators' authority' over 
school-sponsored publications; theatrical produc-
tions, and other expressive activities that stu-
dents, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school .... li11 
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard 
articulated in Tinker for determining when a 
school may punish student expression need not 
also be the standard for determining when a 
school may refuse to lend its name and resources 
to the dissemination of student expression. In-
stead, we hold that educators ~o not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control 
over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.1I12 
509. [d. at 687-90. 
510. [d. at 689. 
511. 484 U.S. at 270-71. 
512. [d. at 272-73 (footnotes omitted). 
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This appears to be a highly deferential standard, within its ap-
pointed realm. Blackmun, with Marshall, joined the far less def-
erential dissenting opinion by Brennan. 
In 1982, the Court flirted, inconclusively, with the related 
issue of removal of controversial books from school libraries, in 
Board of Educ. v. Pico.m A plurality, including Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, joined Brennan in finding "that the First 
Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply im-
plicated by" such acts on the part of a school board.li14 The 
Brennan opinion went on to suggest some difficult and question-
able distinctions that, in his view, guided analysis in this troub-
lesome area. White provided the necessary fifth vote for af-
firming the Court of Appeals' reversal of summary judgment for 
the school board, while not committing himself to any approach 
to the merits of the dispute. Among the four dissenters, Rehn-
quist and O'Connor saw no First Amendment rights at issue, 
and spoke, along with Chief Justice Burger (in a fashion that 
presaged the Fraser decision) of the "inculcative" role of the 
public schools. iiI Ii 
In light of both the Fraser and Kuhlmeier decisions (recal-
ling, once more, that the latter decision brought "public forum" 
analysis to bear upon the public school setting), it seems quite 
hard to believe that the Brennan position in Pico - finding 
even a potential violation of First Amendment rights when 
schools make book selections - would prevail today. White and 
Scalia, in particular, seem most unlikely to embrace any such 
approach. 
The Court has occasionally addressed the First Amendment 
rights of university students, each time favorably. Most notably, 
the Court's per curiam decision in Pap ish v. Board of Cura-
tors,1i18 in 1973, upheld the rights of a student at a state univer-
sity who distributed an independent newspaper thought to be 
"indecent" by virtue of its vulgarity. Rehnquist and (the early) 
Blackmun dissented. Presumably, but by no means certainly, 
this decision survives Fraser and Kuhlmeier, given the factual 
513. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
514. [d. at 866. 
515. [d. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 913-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
516. 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
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distinctions, especially the ages of the students. But if Blackmun 
maintained his original position in Papish, this suggestion would 
be considerably more questionable.m 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas have yet to rule in a 
case involving freedom of speech in the public school setting. 
V. BURDENS ON SPEECH 
Finally, the Justices have differed with respect to their 
readiness to perceive certain governmental actions as signifi-
cantly burdening the exercise of freedom of speech. It is, of 
course, the rare case in which this threshold issue has arisen, 
most often in connection with the attachment of strings to the 
receipt of government funding. The entire Court agreed "that a 
legislative decision not to subsidize the exercise of [First 
Amendment rights] does not infringe the right" in Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Wash., in 1983,IH8 a decision 
upholding the denial of tax-exempt status to an organization en-
gaged in substantial lobbying activities. The next year, in FCC v. 
League of Women Voters,1H9 however, the majority found that 
freedom of speech was denied by the federal prohibition on "edi-
torializing" by noncommercial educational broadcasters receiv-
ing federal funds. Brennan, for the majority, rejected the gov-
ernment's argument analogizing the case to Regan,&20 but 
Rehnquist and White, dissenting, embraced it; in their eyes, the 
government was "simply exercising its power to allocate its own 
public funds,"&21 and was entitled to do so. Stevens dissented on 
other grounds. From the majority, only Blackmun and O'Connor 
remain. 
In 1991, Rehnquist and White' had their way, joined by 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, in the celebrated case of Rust, v. 
517. In the far easier case of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Court 
struck down a content-based discrimination by a state university against religious speak-
ers, the school's Establishment Clause-based defense being found misguided. See also 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), upholding a freedom of association claim by a cam-
pus political group. The concurring opinion by Rehnquist, at 201-03, however, was less 
encouraging. 
518. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
519. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
520. [d. at 399-401. 
521. [d. at 407. 
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Sullivan,m which rejected a First Amendment challenge to the 
federal ban on abortion counseling by family planning projects 
receiving federal funding. Rehnquist, for the majority, distin-
guished the League of Women Voters case, rejected the sugges-
tion of viewpoint discrimination, and found, once more, that 
"the government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is in-
stead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the pur-
poses for which they were authorized. "1128 Blackmun, joined by 
Marshall and Stevens in dissent, saw the restriction as an "un-
constitutional condition" and as viewpoint-discriminatory. 1124 
O'Connor dissented on purely statutory grounds. 
With Brennan and Marshall gone, Blackmun appears to be 
the Justice least likely to dismiss an argument that government 
has impermissibly burdened speech, with Stevens and O'Connor 
somewhat less dependable in this regard.1I211 While the harmful 
precedent - the Rust decision - is limited and potentially dis-
tinguishable, it appears to mark a turning point, and to bode ill 
for future challenges to speech-limiting conditions upon the re-
ceipt of government funds. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THE JUSTICES, INDIVIDUALLY 
With respect to the First Amendment issues addressed in 
this Article, the following summations regarding the propensities 
of each of the Justices now on the Court (listed in order of se-
niority) can be fairly made: 
1. Byron White 
Justice White is 75 years old and has been on the Court 
since 1962. He is protective of attorney advertising, and of pub-
lic employees' rights of association. From the standpoint· of 
speech-protectiveness, however, his weak points are as follows: 
522. 111 s. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
523. [d. at 1774. 
524. [d. at 1780-82. 
525. See also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), in which the Stevens majority 
opinion concluded that the Foreign Agents Registration Act's "political propaganda" 
provision placed no burden on speech; Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall disagreed. 
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He has always upheld time, place, and manner regulations, and 
virtually always refuses to find the existence of a public forum; 
he would radically revise the First Amendment law of defama-
tion, altering the principle of New York Times u. Sulliuan r.26 and 
. overruling Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.;f>27 he has not been recep-
tive to extending the procedural requirements of Freedman u. 
Marylandl:>28 in the area of prior restraint; he often favors plac-
ing limits upon the availability of facial overbreadth challenges; 
he has not been consistently protective of the right of the press 
to publish truthful information; and he has often been weak in 
responding to content discrimination, as in the flag-burning 
cases (but see his impressive dissenting opinion in Barnes u. 
Glen Theatres, Inc. 1:>29). Low points include his opinions for the 
Court in Connick u. Myers,530 reducing protection for public em-
ployees, and in Hazelwood School Dist. u. Kuhlmeier,531 reduc-
ing protection for public high school students. 
2. Harry Blackmun 
Justice Blackmun is 84 years old, and has been on the Court 
since 1970. He has been extremely critical of the Court's public 
forum doctrine, and highly protective of commercial speech, the 
rights of public employees, and the right of the press to publish 
truthful information. He has been vigilant with respect to elimi-
nating prior restraints (but see his early dissent in the Pentagon 
Papers532 case), intolerant of "unconstitutional conditions," and 
fairly resistant (in recent years) to placing limits on the availa-
bility of facial overbreadth challenges. He has voted to strike 
down some time, place, and manner regulations, and has been 
fairly protective of speech in the defamation area. Highlights in-
clude his opinions for the Court in the Virginia PharmacylJ33 
and Forsyth County534 cases, along with his dissenting opinions 
in Cornelius lS31S and Rust u. Sulliuan.1:>36 
526. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
527. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
528. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
529. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
530. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
531. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
532. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
533. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
534. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
535. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
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Any assessment of Justice Blackmun's First Amendment ju-
risprudence must take into account the dramatic difference be-
tween his early years on the Court (extending roughly into the 
mid-1970s) and the more extensive period of time since then. 
Blackmun's first five years on the Court were marked, persist-
ently, by an apparent hostility to the facial overbreadth doctrine 
and a clear tolerance of government suppression of profane 
speech. Since 1975, there has been virtually no evidence that 
Blackmun has adhered to those views. In recent years, he can be 
faulted only for intermittent "softness" with respect to content 
discrimination; despite his positions in the flag-burning cases 
and Barnes v. Glen Theatres, he approved of content discrimi-
nation in Burson v. Freeman,m probably his least persuasive 
majority opinion in the realm of freedom of expression. 
3. William Rehnquist 
Justice Rehnquist is 68 years old, and has been on the Court 
since late in the year 1971. His opinion for the Court in Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell"'38 stands alone as a highly speech-protec-
tive majority opinion authored by him. In all other respects, 
Rehnquist's positions on the matters addressed by this Article 
stamp him clearly as the Justice most likely to uphold a govern-
mental regulation of speech. He has always rejected challengers' 
attempts to portray public property as public forums, and he 
has virtually always upheld time, place, and manner regulations 
and regulations of commercial speech. More than any other Jus-
tice, he has resisted the use of the facial overbreadth device, and 
favored imposing limitations on its use. He has often resisted 
the application of the Freedman requirements in the prior re-
straint area, and has been soft on content discrimination. He has 
consistently opposed placing limits on defamation claims, and 
has been quite tolerant of regulation of profanity. He would 
overrule the cases protecting attorney advertising and public 
employees' rights of association, and has not been very protec-
tive of the right of the press to publish truthful information. 
Low points include his majority opinions in Renton,"'39 Rust, and 
536. III S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
537. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
538. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
539. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
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Posadas de Puerto Rico,1I40 along with his dissenting opinion in 
Texas v. Johnson. lI41 
4. John Paul Stevens 
Justice Stevens is 72 years old, and has been on the Court 
since late in the year 1975. He has been extremely critical of the 
Court's approach to obscenity, and has generally rejected its 
public forum doctrine as well. He has been highly protective of 
commercial speech, and of the rights of public employees. Of the 
present Justices, he seems most likely to find substantial facial 
overbreadth, unless the case involves what he views as "low 
value" speech. He has opposed "unconstitutional conditions," at 
least where he perceives viewpoint discrimination, and has 
shown some sensitivity concerning prior restraints (but with less 
than total consistency). He has voted against some time, place, 
and manner regulations, and shown some strength (although not 
dependably) in the area of content discrimination. Highlights in-
clude his dissent in Burson and his partially dissenting opinion 
in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana.1I42 His willingness to brand 
some speech "low value," on the other hand, is a weakness, and, 
as noted, it has led hini both to an acceptance of content dis-
crimination and a rejection of facial overbreadth challenges in 
such cases. He has, quite characteristically, displayed a clear in-
difference at times to the "theory" of content discrimination. Fi-
nally, he has demonstrated a solicitude for the interests of defa-
mation plaintiffs that has led him to reject some First 
Amendment limitations on such claims. Low points for Stevens 
include hi~ opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatresll43 and 
FCC v. Pacifica Found.,M4 as well as his dissent in Philadelphia 
Newspapers v. Hepps.1I411 
5. Sandra Day O'Connor 
Justice O'Connor is 62 years old, and has been on the Court 
540. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
541. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
542. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
543. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
544. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
545. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
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since 1981. She has displayed some sensitivity with respect to 
the facial overbreadth doctrine (but see Massachusetts v. 
Oakesr.46), the requirements of Freedman v. Maryland in the 
realm of prior restraint, the need for limits on defamation 
claims, and, at times, content discrimination (but see the flag-
burning cases and Renton). She has also shown herself willing, 
despite the absence of a public forum, to pronounce a regulation 
"unreasonable." High points include her opinions for the Court 
in Jews for Jesus M7 , Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, and 
the Simon & Schusterr.48 case. On the other hand, she has al-
ways rejected challengers' public forum arguments, and virtually 
always upheld time, place, and manner regulations. She would 
overrule the cases protecting attorney advertising and public 
employees' rights of association. She has often favored limita-
tions on the availability of facial overbreadth challenges. Her 
lowest points were her majority or plurality opinions on the pub-
lic forum issue, Cornelius and Kokinda.M9 
6. Antonin Scalia 
Justice Scalia is 56 years old, and has been on the Court 
since 1986. He has demonstrated some sensitivity to the appro-
priateness of facial overbreadth challenges, and some vigilance 
in striking down content-based regulations. He joined the Bren-
nan majority in the flag-burning cases. He also joined Brennan's 
solid rejection of "unbridled discretion" in City of Lakewood v. 
Plain Dealer,m rejecting the doctrinal tinkering of Justice 
White's dissenting opinion. Scalia's high points have included 
his majority opinion in' R.A. V. r.r.l and his concurring opinion in 
Massachusetts v. Oakes. On the other hand, he has always re-
jected challengers' public forum arguments (even reaching out 
alone to do so in Burson), and would overrule the cases protect-
ing attorney advertising and public employees' rights of associa-
tion. He has favored the placing of limits on facial overbreadth 
challenges. He joined the majority in Hazelwood School Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier. His absolute low point was his partially dissenting 
546. 491 U.S. 576 (1989). 
547. 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
548. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). 
549. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
550. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
551. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
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opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,552 in which he put 
forth a theory of "pandering" of pornography which would be 
truly dangerous if it attracted any support. 
7. Anthony Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy is 56 years old, and has been on the Court 
since early 1988. He has rejected the Court's public forum doc-
trine, and has taken a unique position that is highly intolerant 
of content discrimination (but see his concurrence in Burson v. 
Freeman); he joined the Brennan majority in the flag-burning 
cases and the Scalia majority opinion in R.A. V. (but seemed to 
accept the questionable theory of the Renton case, in his opinion 
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism553). H~ also joined the majority 
opinions in the Forsyth County case and Florida Star v. 
B.J.F.,554 and has been protective of attorney advertising. He 
has also shown himself (in International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. ("ISKCON") v. Lee555) to be willing to shike 
down a time, place, imd manner regulation. High points for him 
surely include his two opinions on the public forum issue, con-
curring in Kokinda and partly dissenting in ISKCON. On the 
other hand, he would overrule the cases protecting public em-
ployees' rights of association, and he authored the majority 
opinion in Ward, which unhelpfully modified the analysis of 
time, place, and manner regulations.556 
8. David Souter 
Justice Souter is 53 years old, and has been on the Court 
since 1990. He has rejected the Court's public forum analysis, 
and shown strength in rejecting content-based regulations in 
R.A. V. and Burson v. Freeman (but see his concurrence in 
552. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
553. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
554. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
555. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992). 
556. Kennedy also authored a highly speech-protective plurality opinion in Gentile 
v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), a case that involved first amendment 
issues not addressed in this article, namely the right of an attorney to make extra-judi-
cial comments concerning pending cases. Along with O'Connor and Souter, he has also 
demonstrated, outside the first amendment context, a reluctance to overrule prior deci-
sions. See their joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, in which he accepted the Renton ap-
proach to this issue). He also joined the majority in the Forsyth 
County case. His dissenting opinions in ISKCON v. Lee (in 
which he not only repudiated prevailing public forum doctrine 
but also showed his readiness to strike down a time, place, and 
manner regulation) and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.lm (in which 
he would have upheld the right of the press to publish truthful 
information) are promising high points. Only his concurrence in 
the Barnes case, which upheld a content-based regulation of ex-
pression, is cause for serious concern thus far.1I118 
9. Clarence Thomas 
Justice Thomas is 44 years old, and has been on the Court 
since 1991. He has participated in only three of the decisions 
discussed in this Article. Of those three decisions, the only one 
in which Thomas took a speech-protective position was R.A. V. v. 
St. Paul, in which he joined the Scalia majority opinion. In do-
ing so, he presumably demonstrated a heartening intolerance of 
content discrimination (in a factual setting, it is worth adding, 
in which he might well have been expected to rule 'otherwise) as 
well as a willingness (along with every other member of the 
Court, in this case) to embrace the facial overbreadth concept 
without apparent reservation. On the other hand, Thomas also 
joined the majority in ISKCON v. Lee, thereby presumably sign-
ing on to the Court's rigid and restrictive approach to the defini-
tion of a public forum (and joining in upholding the challenged 
regulations as "reasonable"). Finally, he joined Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion in the Forsyth County case, a position from 
which no negative inferences can clearly be drawn. (Joining the 
Blackmun majority in that case, on the other hand, would have 
been a positive sign.) 
B. THE COURT OVERALL 
Freedom of expression remains vibrant and strong in 
America, and there is little reason to fear that the present Court 
is likely to retreat from what has been, during the past three 
557. 111 s. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
558. But see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, supra note 556, in which Souter joined 
an opinion by Rehnquist that was less than maximally protective of attorneys' speech. 
120
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3
1993] FREEDOM OF SPEECH 533 
decades, a largely speech-protective position. Admittedly, the 
Court has not had occasion, since formulating the "test" of 
Brandenburg v. Ohior>r>9 in 1969, to revisit the core First Amend-
ment question of the extent to which one is constitutionally en-
titled to advocate crime or revolution; assumptions that the 
Court remains (or, indeed, has ever been) fully committed to 
that "test" may therefore not be warranted.r>6O Obscenity re-
mains an unprotected category of speech, but that is nothing 
new. These areas aside, the differences among the Justices, while 
i~portant, should not lead anyone to overlook their apparently 
shared commitment to a system of fundamental and presump-
tive freedom of expression. Nonetheless, some changes may 
await us in the post-Brennan era. 
Some very positive aspects of the law of freedom of speech 
appear to be quite stable. Sharing the top of this list are the key 
principles that content discrimination is presumptively invalid 
and that government cannot prohibit speech on the ground that 
its message is potentially offensive to listeners. Safe and settled, 
too, is the axiom that administrative officials cannot be given 
unfettered discretion to decide who shall speak and who shall 
not. There is little evidence to suggest that the First Amend-
ment rules of defamation law are about to be altered. Despite all 
of the complaining and ostensible tinkering that have accompa-
nied its use, the facial overbreadth doctrine also appears to be in 
good health. 
Some other, less positive aspects of the law appear to be 
stable as well. As has been noted, the law of obscenity does not 
appear to be about to change. Time, place, and manner regula-
tions are almost always upheld, and the line between content-
neutrality and content-discrimination has been blurred by the 
theory of the Renton case, a theory that no sitting Justice has 
opposed. Protection of commercial speech has already been 
weakened, as has protection of public employees' freedom of 
speech. While a single decision may be too slender a reed on 
which to base a generalization, Rust v. Sullivan appears to have 
substantially undermined the longstanding judicial resistance to 
559. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
560. See generally Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shap-
ing of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,97-104 (1991). 
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"unconstitutional conditions" upon the receipt of government 
funds. 
In some other areas of First Amendment law, the prospect 
of diminished judicial protection, while uncertain, is real. Four 
Justices have gone on record as ready to overturn the Court's 
precedents protecting public employees' rights of political asso-
ciation, and three Justices have announced their desire to re-
verse the Court's protection of attorney advertising. The logic of 
the Kuhlmeier decision would seem to point toward even further 
erosion of the First Amendment rights of public high school stu-
dents. The Court's commitment to uphold the freedom to pub-
lish truthful information, in the face of competing interests in 
privacy or confidentiality, may well be about to weaken dramati-
cally. So, too, may its adherence to the procedural requirements 
of Freedman v. Maryland, stubbornly applied to so many "prior 
restraints" by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Finally, it is by 
no means clear that the present Court, if given the opportunity, 
will maintain the view of suppression of profanity embodied in 
the classic case of Cohen v. California/'S} In only one of the ar-
eas discussed in this Article is the Court visibly poised to possi-
bly broaden its protection of freedom of expression, that being 
the issue of what government property constitutes a "public fo-
rum" in which speech is presumptively free. Thanks to Justices 
Kennedy and Souter, this is the one aspect of the law of freedom 
of speech in which liberalization looms as a distinct possibility in 
the future. 
In the meantime, those of us who care deeply about freedom 
of expression will never cease to be grateful to Justices Brennan 
and Marshall. Like their forebears Black, Douglas, Brandeis, 
and Holmes, their commitment was truly extraordinary. They 
need not be the last ones about whom that can be said. 
561. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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